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Preface
Annalisa Fischer (LMU Munich)
Hardly any other picture has been reproduced as often as Leonardo da Vinci s̓ Mona 
Lisa. Many great artists have created their own versions of the painting, among 
them the likes of Andy Warhol and Robert Rauschenberg. Marcel Duchamp even 
created several variations in his famous L.H.O.O.Q. The image has been print ed on 
mugs, posters, shopping bags, and numerous other objects of varying artistic value. 
For the cover of this volume, we chose a recent work by Lithuanian artist Šarūnas 
Joneikis, entitled Looking for Mona. In this work the artist examines the relation ship 
between the well-known visual image, its title and the expectancy this title creates in 
the observer. In fact, in 1911, when the painting was stolen from the Louvre, people 
were literally “looking for Mona”. When it resurfaced in 1913, the picture was not 
identified as the original due to its appearance or an analysis of the canvas, but rather 
because of its inventory number. The theft sparked an unforeseen interest in copies 
of the absent original, and made the Mona Lisa the famous painting it is today. The 
history of Leonardo s̓ Mona Lisa is thus deeply connected with forg eries, copies, 
and disputable originals. In a series of etchings in which the same motif is shown 
with slight variations, Joneikis attempts to determine the point at which one of his 
prints actually could become the Mona Lisa. By deforming the image in his prints, 
the artist emphasises the arbitrariness of the connection be tween title and image. 
Hence, every version he creates effectively becomes a kind of Mona Lisa.
Forgeries are a universally current topic. In the last few years the art market 
was shaken by forgery scandals surrounding the works of Max Ernst and 
Alberto Giacometti, creating a great amount of public interest. Documentaries 
and movies such as Stefan Ruzowitzky s̓ Oscar-winning film The Counterfeiters 
are being produced to critical acclaim, and in contemporary art research, forgers 
and their work are a topic of continuing interest. See, for example, Christopher 
S. Wood s̓ Forgery, Replica, Fiction: Temporalities of German Renaissance 
Art (2008) or Thierry Lenain s̓ 2011 study Art Forgery: The History of a Mod­
ern Obsession. Forgeries are an omnipresent part of contemporary culture, and 
closely related to historically and culturally informed ideas of authenticity, legality, 
authorship, creativity, tradition and innovation. Current interest revolves around not 
only the concept of faking, but an interrogation of the categories ‘authentic’ and 
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‘fake’. The international conference Faking, Forging, Counterfeiting: Dis credited 
Practices at the Margins of Mimesis, held in Autumn 2015 at the Ludwig Maxi-
milian University of Munich by the International Doctoral Program MIMESIS, 
aimed at expanding the horizon of research in this area. In this conference publi-
cation, different approaches to the concept of forgery are brought together to high-
light the notion that forgeries have to be understood as productive mimetic process-
es and seen in the context of their time. To reach a broader understanding of what 
such a perception entails the editors chose essays from different scholarly fields 
such as art history, literary studies, media studies, and theatre studies. The contribu-
tions describe the practice of forgery not as the inability on the part of the artist to 
create an original, but rather as a creative act in itself. They focus on various imple-
mentations of forgery such as faked traditions, pseudo-translations, imposters, iden-
tity theft, and hoaxes in different cultural and historic contexts. By opening up the 
scope of the aesthetic implication of forgeries, this anthology aims to consolidate 
forgeries in the aesthetic discussion as an autonomous mimetic method of creation.
In lieu of an introduction, in his essay Henry Keazor (Heidelberg Univer sity) 
dis cusses the theory of ‘six degrees of separation’ that can be discerned be tween 
what is commonly referred to as the ‘original’ and as the ‘forgery’. Hereby, it be-
comes evident that most of the practices that can lead to a forgery are in themselves 
legitimate and even well established in every day art practice. It is only the way in 
which their results are presented that can make them become forgeries. In the second 
part of his text, Keazor goes on to discuss cases in which the boundaries between a 
“hoax” and a “fake” are blurred, thus demanding the implementation of new, fitting 
notions which can cover both phenomena. He coins the term ‘foax’, a compound 
neologism melding forgery and hoax, and emphasises how such forgeries develop a 
life of their own. Keazor proposes to understand these not merely as deceptions but 
as entities that challenge our understanding of originality and authorship.
Friedrich Teja Bach (University of Vienna) takes a more critical approach with 
regard to forgeries as an independent art form. Whilst discussing several recent 
cases of forgeries and relaying his own experiences as an expert on Constantin 
Brâncuși, Bach examines strategies of unveiling forgeries, and in doing so scruti-
nizes the interdependence of the forger and the art market. By discussing the stories 
behind forgeries, he emphasises the narrative as a possible key to uncover a forgery. 
In this way, he characterises forgers as storytellers rather than as artists.
In a case study Jacqueline Hylkema (Leiden University) explores the 17th- 
century discourse in which painters and playwrights identified themselves with 
the figure of the mountebank — a character which by the late 1500s had become 
a byword for all types of forgery and fakery. Hylkema discusses three artworks 
by Hendrick Goltzius, Ben Jonson, and Gerrit Dou, which use the mountebank 
as a vehicle to explore the illusionary nature and dynamics of their own métier. 
She then argues that the Earl of Rochester s̓ Alexander Bendo handbill (1676) is 
a continua tion of this particular discourse but takes the identification between the 
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mountebank and artist one significant step further and thus challenges the bound-
aries between art and forgery.
Through a reading of 19th-century Voltaire pastiches, Manuel Mühlbacher 
(LMU Munich) explores the transition from the early modern to the modern para-
digm of authorship in France. While the emerging discipline of bibliography and 
the editors of Voltaire s̓ collected works strive to enforce new publishing conven-
tions, Mühlbacher argues, such figures as the notorious pastiche writer Nicolas 
Châtelain continue to subvert the ideal of identifiable authorship. Playing with mul-
tiple identities and questioning the concept of personal style, 19th-century pastiche 
writers seem strangely faithful to Voltaire, who was himself a master of literary 
mystification and deceit.
Margaret S. Graves (Indiana University Bloomington) focuses in her essay on 
pre-modern Islamic art objects and their inauthentic modern ‘completions’. In the 
19th and early 20th centuries, an enormous number of objects without secure archae-
ological provenance were sold. In her study of the Andarz-nāma manuscript and 
certain minā’ī ceramics, Graves examines and problematizes the techniques by 
which dealers fabricated complete objects to meet the demands of the market.
Tina Öcal (Heidelberg University) proposes a reading of the forgeries of 
Giovanni Bastianini against the background of Italian risorgimento. She stipulates 
that Bastianini s̓ forgeries embody the transculturation process of the European- 
American gaze of the 19th century into early Renaissance art. Öcal argues that these 
forgeries can be perceived not only as a falsification but also a way of preserving 
the culture by merely selling duplications instead of the original. Both essays also 
examine the cultural and spatial transfers these objects have been subjected to.
With Klaus Benesch s̓ essay we both leave the forgery of art and art objects 
behind and take a leap into the 20th century. Benesch (LMU Munich) argues that 
William Gaddis̓ 1955 novel The Recognitions, in response to the abundance of 
fake art in contemporary society, sets out to redefine the act of repetition itself. 
The essay reads Gaddis̓ novel together with Kierkegaard s̓ philosophical narrative 
Repetition (1853) and thus identifies Gaddis̓ handling of various repetitions and 
recognitions in his text as the re-capturing or unfolding of an existential truth in 
Kierkegaard s̓ sense.
Florencia Sannders (LMU Munich) focuses on a different aspect of repeti tion. 
In her essay, she explores the grey area between literary experimentation and plagia-
rism. Sannders takes a look at Pablo Katchadjian s̓ 2009 novella El Aleph engordado 
(The Fattened Aleph). Since this book adds 5,600 words and thus ‘fattens’ Jorge 
Luis Borges̓ short story ‘El Aleph’ from 1949, Borges̓ widow, who is also the heir 
and copyright holder of his literary estate, considered the work an act of plagiarism.
Laura Kohlrausch (LMU Munich) then proceeds to contextualize and scruti-
nize i.a. Borges̓ own acts of forgery in her essay. Taking a theoretical approach, 
she aims to show how literary texts since antiquity have invented their own sources 
by referring to or even quoting from fictitious texts. Kohlrausch points out that 
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in these instances of feigned intertextuality texts are not forged in the traditional 
sense but rather non-existing sources are referenced and thus effectively brought 
into existence. 
Yola Schmitz (LMU Munich) explores yet another kind of forgery with James 
Macpherson s̓ Poems of Ossian (1765): the feigning of a translation. Schmitz 
examines what many consider to be one of the most sensational literary forgeries of 
all time, discussing how Macpherson achieved these poems̓ apparent authenticity, 
and how he managed to convince so many readers, including linguists, of their 
veracity — in spite of the absence of ‘original’ texts.
Laura Fenelli s̓ contribution (Kent State University / Richmond College in 
Florence) addresses the faking of miraculous images and relics. The icon of St. Do-
minic of Soriano in the 17th century created a cult which rapidly spread from 
southern Italy to Spain and the Americas. Yet, this image was in fact shown to be 
a late 15th-century painting, only later promoted as a miraculous icon for political 
and economic reasons.
Contemporary practices that could be considered forgeries are explored by 
Daniel Becker (LMU Munich) in his paper on imitation in new media art. He dis-
cusses how strategies similar to those of forgers were used by artificial intelligence 
and avatars to disguise their bodiless existence. Becker addresses the dimensions of 
deception and counterfeiting on an interactive level, from Alan Turing s̓ theory of 
the ‘Imitation Game’ to contemporary art works that deal with questions of the au-
tonomy and agency of computer software and data. His paper retraces such strate-
gies and points out their consequences for a modern concept of forgery.
Simone Niehoff (LMU Munich) also focuses on 21st-century strategies of 
forgery, specifically examining hoaxes. She defines the hoax as a mimetic practice, 
which employs forgery as a means of parody, subversion, and, more recently, po-
litical activism. Niehoff reads the infamous Dreadnought Hoax from 1910 as a 
pre cursor to more contemporary artistic interventions expressing critical political 
views. She contrasts this approach to recent fake political campaigns by The Yes 
Men and the German Center for Political Beauty.
This conference collection could not have been realised without the support and 
kind encouragement of the directors Christopher Balme and Tobias Döring and our 
friends and colleagues at the International Doctoral Program for Literature and the 
Arts MIMESIS at LMU Munich. The editors especially would like to thank Silvia 
Tiedtke who as coordinator of the IDP quickly responded to our every question. 
Our gratitude also goes to the Elite Network of Bavaria which not only funds the 
IDP itself but also generously financed the conference as well as this publication. 
We would also like to thank the Center for Advanced Studies (CAS) of the LMU 
Munich for kindly hosting and supporting our conference. Furthermore, we thank 
all those who contributed to our conference and thus enhanced its cooperative 
and pleasant atmosphere. The cover image of Looking for Mona was kindly made 
available to us by Šarūnas Joneikis.
Six Degrees of Separation 
The Foax as More
Henry Keazor (Heidelberg University)
Part I: SIx DegreeS of SeParatIon
It is not coincidental that the title of this article references the stage play by John 
Guare from 1990, specifically its film adaptation, directed three years later by Fred 
Schepisi and starring Will Smith, Donald Sutherland and Stockard Channing.1
Interestingly, the premise of Six Degrees of Separation is implicitly connected 
with the idea of forgery. The main character, Paul, presents to his hosts, the couple 
Ouisa and Flan Kittredge — who happen to be professional art dealers — an in-
vented, forged existence. It turns out that he is actually not who he pretends to be: 
among other things, he claims to be a friend of their children at Harvard University 
and the son of a man who is directing a film version of the Broadway musical Cats. 
Ultimately, both the viewer and the Kittredges can only speculate about Paul s̓ mo-
tivations for forging a false existence, but in doing so, he presents a mirror to the 
art dealers̓ privileged and only apparently liberal existence, since he has modelled 
his invented character as a reaction to their expectations and way of behaviour.2 
This is an important aspect of forgery: it is often created in response to something 
which already exists, and therefore can be considered reactive rather than purely 
active. Moreover it is very closely modelled on the expectations, hopes, fears and 
the behaviours of those whom the forgery aims to convince of its originality. In the 
end the fake ‘Paul’ also serves as a link in the ‘six degrees of separation’: before 
approaching the Kittredges, he had already deceived other couples who were also 
members of the New York upper-crust, and because Paul has a profound, baffling 
effect on each couple he encounters, he links them in their shared experience.
1 | Six Degrees of Separation, USA 1993, D.: Fred Schepisi. See also: 
Plunka 2002, Chapter 8: 186-202.
2 | See Plunka 2002: 191: “Flan and Ouisa are essentially con artists — up-
per class hustlers. Through elegance and erudition, Flan und Ouisa have 
mastered the art of the deal but have no idea of their hypocrisy […].”
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However, the title Six Degrees of Separation actually refers to an unproven theory, 
developed in 1929 by the Hungarian author and translator Frigyes Karinthy in his 
short story Láncszemek [‘Chains’ or ‘Chainlinks’].3 According to this theory, any-
one or anything on the planet can be connected to any other person or thing through 
a chain of acquaintances that has no more than five intermediaries. Thus, everyone 
is six or even fewer steps away, by way of introduction, from any other person in 
the world. Any two people on the planet are therefore connected by a chain of a 
friend of a friend statement from each other in a maximum of five steps (Newman / 
Barabási / Watts 2006; Barabási 2003). I have borrowed the title for the first part of 
my article since I want to show that what we today call ‘the original’ is only five 
degrees of separation from what we conceive of as a ‘forgery’.
Thus we have:
I. The ‘original’
II. The replica or replication
III. The copy
IV. The pasticcio/pastiche
V. The stylistic imitation (or stylistic appropriation since here somebody 
 takes on the style of somebody else) 
VI. The ‘fake’ or ‘forgery’.4
3 | See for this among others: Newman / Barabási / Watts 2006, Chapter 
2: 9-11 as well as 21-26 with a reprint of the English translation of Karin-
thyʼs short story.
4 | There has been a tendency to distinguish between the two notions, 
so for example by the curator Colette Loll who in 2011 organized the 
exhibition Intent to Deceive or by the author Noah Charney. But the claim 
that these terms (according to Loll) are properly used when applying 
‘fake’ to an exact copy of an already existing work, which is then passed 
off as the original, and ‘forgery’ to a work that is not an exact copy, but 
rather done ‘in the style of’ (stylistic imitation), which is then passed off 
as an original, or (according to Charney) to apply ‘fake’ to the “alteration 
of, or addition to, an authentic work of art to suggest a different au-
thorship”, and ‘forgery’ to “the wholesale creation of a fraudulent work”, 
is unjustified because these uses are (as the contradicting definitions 
of Loll and Charney already show) utterly arbitrary, since not covered 
by any etymology. No wonder, thus, that in the art world (for example 
in art technology which is occupied with fake-busting) the distinction 
has not been established so far. For the distinct use of the terms by Loll 
and Charney see the CBS-News-report by Mason 2014 on one of Loll’s 
touring exhibition stops, where from 1:18 to 1:30 min., the supposed dif-
ference is explained, and Charney 2015: 17.
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I want to demonstrate these steps in the following.
I place the terms ‘original’, ‘fake’ and ‘forgery’ in quotation marks for two reasons: 
firstly, in order to distinguish them from the other four manifestations, which in a 
certain way are more objective terms inasmuch as one does not have to argue if 
something is a replica, a copy, a pasticcio or a stylistic imitation, because there is 
a series of criteria for settling this. However, the question if and when something 
is an ‘original’ and / or a ‘fake’ is more open to discussion, and this is related to the 
second reason why I put these notions into quotation marks.
The ‘original’ is something that is throughout the ages each time culturally negotiat-
ed and defined anew: we can see this by the fact that in Western antiquity ‘original’ 
or ‘authentic’ meant something different for a Greek than for a Roman — and for 
both again something slightly different than to us. Since the object in question was, 
when declared ‘original’ or ‘authentic’, in ancient Greece less associated with the 
particular name of an artist or even a workshop than in Rome; it was related to the 
material and to the way something was technically made.5
Later, in early modernity, a client or an expert again had very different expec-
tations from a single artist and / or his workshop or studio than today, depending in 
particular on how the contract was stipulated: did the artist pledge that he would 
personally work with his own hands at the work of art, and to what extent? Or did 
he just pledge that the artwork would be executed in his studio and under his super-
vision? (Keazor 2015: 32-33) How differently one and the same object can be judged 
becomes clear when we look at the case of a long-lasting legal battle, only recent-
ly concluded, about the second version of the painting Ready-Made de l̓Histoire 
dans Café de Flore by the German painter Jörg Immendorff, which today is in a 
gallery in New Zealand. A private client had bought a second version in 1999 from 
a workshop assistant of Immendorff in his studio for 30.000 Marks (15.000 Euro) 
and received a certificate of authenticity. After Immendorff s̓ death in 2007, his 
widow Oda Jaune claimed that the second version was actually a forgery: according 
to her, it is just a copy executed without any authorisation by her late husband and 
then fraudulently sold as an original. She also stressed the fact that the signature 
on the certificate had been produced mechanically. In 2012 the district court, the 
Landgericht Düsseldorf, agreed to her point of view and ordered the destruction of 
the painting. However, in August 2014 the Higher Regional Court, the Oberlandes-
gericht Düsseldorf, decided that the client had bought the second version legally 
in the studio of the painter and therefore could expect him to know of this deal, 
especially given that the production and the direct selling of such copies via stu-
dio assistants had occurred before in Immendorff s̓ workshop. Thus, it would have 
seemed as if the painter had agreed to this practice and hence to the release and the 
5 | See i.a. Keazor 2015: 32.
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valorisation of such pictures as part of his œuvre. Consequently, the plaintiff could 
claim neither the destruction of the painting nor its identification as a forgery. The 
court, however, emphasised that it would not be able to make a statement concern-
ing the actual status of the work as an ‘original’ or a ‘copy’. Thus, the court refused 
to comment on its artistic value.6
In a way, here we witness the clash of two conceptions of the artist: the first 
stems from the early modern era, in which the artist had at his disposal a workshop 
and assistants working in his style and under his name, who were therefore allowed 
to sell replicas or copies with the Master s̓ agreements as originals. The second is 
the modern, contemporary conception according to which only works which have 
been directly created by the artist himself can be sold as originals.
To turn to an artistic trend which came to the fore in the 1960s, the so-called Fake 
or Appropriation Art consists of artworks which repeat motifs and elements from 
other works and nevertheless claim to be ‘original’ and ‘authentic’, whilst simulta-
neously baptising themselves ‘fake’.7 Of course, given that the works are present ed 
and understood under this heading, the works presented are of course not true fakes, 
since a fake intends to deceive whereas these artists here aim at asking critical and 
provocative questions concerning what actually lies at the heart of art, what makes a 
work of art ‘original’ and ‘authentic’. Is it the idea in the first place or the manual exe-
cution by the artist himself? Art which employs appropriated imagery or labels itself 
‘fake’ thus illustrates that art always references art which already exists. 
Or, to shift our perspective to non-Western cultures, such as for example Japan 
or China, we encounter a different idea of ‘forgery’. Here, imitations and replica-
tions of an already-existing object are highly esteemed because, firstly, ‘originality’ 
is not conceived, understood and defined in such a material way as in our culture, 
but rather in a conceptual way; and secondly, there is a greater cultural appreciation 
of the craftsmanship which is needed to repeatedly manufacture an object. Thus, 
the ‘original’ has a very different status than in our culture.8
Since ‘original’ and ‘fake / forgery’ are terms which refer to each other, because 
without the original there is no forgery, the concept of faking is relative if the concept 
of the ‘original’ is already relative. Indeed, it is also culturally negotiat ed, depend ing 
on the culture and the precise context, what a forgery is (see the above mentioned Im-
mendorff-example). Now we will see that each of the degrees between the ‘original’ 
and the ‘forgery’ are steps which all can be considered as legitimate — or if, misused, 
tampered with or misread by society, as activities which can result in something that 
can be used as a forgery. Therefore I will demonstrate the ‘six degrees’ or steps, sepa-
rating the original from the forgery, by reference to certain art works. 
6 | See the news report by Müller 2014 and Keazor 2015: 91-92.
7 | See, for example, Römer 2001.
8 | See, for example, Fraser 2013, Shan 2002, Barboza / Bowley / Cox /
McGinty 2013 and Effinger / Keazor 2016.
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Thus, we have the ‘original’ or the prototype (I) which can be replicated (II) 
by the artist himself. If the artist redoing the work is not identical with the original 
author, we have the case of the copy (III). The French Master Nicolas Poussin paint-
ed the picture Camillus and the Schoolmaster of Falerii (Pasadena, Norton Simon 
Museum) in 1635, based on a story passed on by ancient authors such as Plutarch 
and Titus Livius (Thuillier 1994: 254, No. 109). Two years later the Parisian Lou-
is Phélypeaux de La Vrillière commissioned a replica of the painting, which was 
executed by Poussin himself and sent to Paris (Paris, Musée du Louvre) (Thuillier 
1994: 255, No. 122). However, we also know of instances where Poussin s̓ paintings 
were copied by other artists such as in the case of his Plague of Ashod, painted 
around 1631 for the Sicilian nobleman Fabrizio Valguarnera (Thuillier 1994: 251, 
No. 81). Possibly while the original painting was still unfinished, he ordered a copy 
by the Italian painter Angelo Caroselli (London, National Gallery), who, probably 
also in order to emphasize the function of the picture as a copy, altered various 
aspects of it. These alterations included the size of the painting, measuring rather 
squarely 148 × 198 cm in Poussin s̓ version, and an oblong 129 × 205 cm in Carosel-
li s̓ version, but also details such as the architecture and colours (Keazor 2012: 56). 
The next step away from the original is the pastiche or pasticcio (IV) where individ-
ual elements from several works of an artist are assembled by another artist into a 
new composition. The Italian term — meaning literally ‘pie’ — is borrowed from 
the art of cooking, since it was common in the early modern period to bake pies, the 
filling of which consisted of a mixture of various ingredients, which only formed 
a whole when baked together in such a pie. Such a pasticcio, based on Poussin s̓ 
paintings, can be observed for example in a composition designed for the packag-
ing of an instant cappuccino in the 1990s, sold by the Italian company Lavazza 
(fig. 1) (Keazor 2007: 95). Here, the female lute player in the left foreground is taken 
from Poussin s̓ Bacchanale with Lute­Player (Paris, Louvre, 1627 / 28) (Thuillier 
1994: 248, No. 55), the woman with the basket directly behind her comes instead 
from his Adoration of the Shepherds (London, National Gallery, 1633) (Thuillier 
1994: 252, No. 92), the musicians on her left come from Poussin s̓ Triumph of David 
(Dulwich Picture Gallery, 1632 / 33) (Thuillier 1994: 252, No. 91) while the group 
of dancers on her right, apparently moving to the sound of the wind players, in turn 
stems from Poussin s̓ Adoration of the Golden Calf (London, National Gallery, 
1635) (Thuillier 1994: 253, No. 100). Finally, the man in the right foreground, clad 
in a green garment, is taken from his Death of Germanicus (Minneapolis Muse-
um of Arts, 1629) (Thuillier 1994: 249, No. 58). One can thus see that the anon-
ymous painter of the pasticcio has chosen paintings which Poussin did between 
1627 / 28 and 1635, thus covering a more or less coherent artistic and stylistic period 
which also adds to the impression of a certain consistency the pasticcio gives — and 
which could be treacherous if the painting was presented as an alleged original. 
The penultimate step is the stylistic imitation (V): here, an artist does not refer with 
such precise and identifiable quotes from another artist s̓ work as in the case of 
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the pasticcio, but the resulting art work instead stylistically points to a distinctive 
artistic manner of an individual artist or an era. For example, the German Romantic 
painter Johann David Passavant in his Self­portrait in Front of an Italian Land­
scape (Frankfurt am Main, Städelsches Kunstinstitut, 1818, fig. 2) heavily refers 
via the costume worn by him in the painting, the composition and of the prospect 
onto a landscape, to typical Italian Renaissance portraits of the 16th century such as 
Raphael s̓ Portrait of a Man (Florence, Uffizi, 1503 / 04, fig. 3). Passavant s̓ picture 
could easily be confused with this painting at a first superficial glance. The painters 
of the Romantic era with their reverence for Italy in general and for Raphael in 
particular were longingly looking back to the Renaissance. However, Passavant did 
not paint such works with the intent to deceive (Keazor 2015: 35).
Thus, all these forms of imitation are not only perfectly legitimate, but also 
traditional and well-established tropes in the history of art: until photographic re-
production, a copy of the work was the only way to produce the (coloured) image 
of a painting a second time. Learning to reproduce an original was also an impor-
tant means of gaining the technical skills of painting or drawing. By copying, a 
young artist learned the manual techniques of artistic execution, and even the 
pasticcio or the working in the style of somebody else was an accepted practice in 
artist s̓ studios: the assistants of a Master very often had to execute entire paint-
Figure 1: Pasticcio (after Nicolas Poussin) for the packaging of an Italian brand 
of instant cappuccino, around 1999.
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ings in his manner and therefore needed to be able to paint in the Master s̓ style. 
They sometimes even executed compositions which were only roughly sketched 
by their Master and hence they had to be able to finish the detailed composition 
by combin ing known elements from other works in the way of a pasticcio. How-
ever, all these legitimate, well-established, and traditional forms can also become 
‘forgeries’ if they are passed off as supposed ‘originals’. Although it would seem 
as if even the category of the ‘replica’ could hardly threaten the ‘original’, since 
in both cases they are done more or less by the same author, i.e. respectively his 
studio and the Master himself, it suffices to refer to the Immendorff-case. Here, 
the question as to whether the disputed work was an ‘original’, a replica or a copy 
shows that such things can quickly get difficult. It thus becomes clear that the one 
and the same object can assume very different states, depending from the context 
in which it is seen each time and the viewpoint of the beholder.
The act of ‘forgery’ can thereby be perpetrated by presenting a copy (III) as an 
alleged original. Giorgio Vasari s̓ life of Andrea del Sarto tells the story of a copy 
done by the painter after a portrait by Raphael, with the purpose of substituting 
the original which the Medici were supposed to give away, but which they kept by 
swapping the original with the copy (Vasari 2004: 143). A pasticcio can also be 
misused when it is fraudulently displayed as an original: the painting Christ and 
Figure 2: Johann David Passavant, 
“Self­portrait in Front of an Italian 
Landscape”, Frankfurt am Main, 
Städelsches Kunstinstitut, 1818.
Figure 3: Raphael, “Portrait of 
a Man” (Francesco Maria della 
Rovere?), Florence, Uffizi, 1503 / 04.
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the Disciples at Emmaus (Rotterdam, Museum Boymans-van Beuningen, fig. 4), 
done by Han van Meegeren in 1937, not only adopts the style of the Dutch painter 
Jan Vermeer, but combines it with references to Caravaggio, thus presenting a thor-
oughly mixed pasticcio (Kilbracken 1967: 47-51). However, van Meegeren present-
ed this imaginative composition as an original by Vermeer which not only delighted 
art historians with a newly-discovered work by Vermeer, but which moreover gave 
them one of the rare religious paintings by the artist. Eventually, the work, via the 
Caravaggio references, even seemed to confirm the previously purely speculative 
connections between Vermeer and Italy. The fakes of the German forger Wolf-
gang Beltracchi launched into the art market from the middle of the 1980s onwards 
(Koldehoff / Timm 2012), appear to be primarily stylistic imitations. This seems 
to be in accordance with the fact that Beltracchi was always very proud to point 
out that he never copied.9 But on closer inspection it becomes clear that they also 
rely on the techniques of the copy and of the pasticcio. His painting Liegender Akt 
mit Katze (Reclining Act with Cat), executed in 2003 and passed off as a painting 
done by the German painter Max Pechstein in 1909 (fig. 5), is actually a painted 
and amplified copy of an original drawing by Pechstein (Berlin, Brücke-Museum, 
1909, fig. 6) (Keazor / Öcal 2014: 35). That Beltracchi practised this kind of forgery 
already earlier in his career can be shown by the origins of the picture Energie 
entspannt (Energy Relaxed; fig. 7). This painting was done in 1985 and aimed at 
appearing to be an original by the German painter Johannes Molzahn from 1919. 
However, Beltracchi only copied a woodcut by Molzahn from 1919, titled Energien 
entspannt (Energies Relaxed, fig. 8), and colourised it (Keazor 2016: 14). But Bel-
tracchi also worked with the technique of the pasticcio: his infamous forgery Rotes 
Bild mit Pferden (Red Painting with Horses) from 2005, apparently created by the 
German painter Heinrich Campendonk in 1914 (fig. 9) and which ultimately led 
9 | See for example his statement in an interview with the German 
news-magazine Der Spiegel where he claims that (using the metaphor 
of music) he wanted to “create new music” (in the original: “Jedes Phil-
harmonie-Orchester interpretiert nur den Komponisten. Mir ging es da-
rum, neue Musik dieses Komponisten zu schaffen. Ich wollte das kreative 
Zentrum des Malers so erreichen und kennenlernen, dass ich die Entste-
hung seiner Bilder mit seinen Augen und eben auch das neue, von mir 
gemalte Bild mit seinen Augen sah — und zwar bevor ich es malte“). A 
few lines later he heavily objects to the assumption that he would have 
used technical devices in order to copy (in the original: “Auch wenn im 
Verfahren Gutachter anderes behaupteten: Ich habe bei keinem einzigen 
Bild technische Hilfsmittel benutzt. Keine Projektoren, keine Raster. Ist 
ja lächerlich. Warum soll ich eine Skizze umständlich projizieren, wenn 
ich sie aus der Hand malen kann?“). For the interview see Gorris / Röbel 
2012: 131.
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to Beltracchi s̓ exposure in 2010, selects and re-combines several motifs from the 
original Campendonk painting Paar auf dem Balkon from 1912 / 13 (Couple on 
the Balcony, Penzberg, Stadtmuseum, 1912 / 13, fig. 10). The horses on the left in 
the original are shifted to the right in the forgery, the boat below the horses in 
the forgery can also be found on the right in the original, and the house is posi-
tioned behind the horses in both works (Keazor / Öcal 2014: 32). Here again, a look 
at other forgeries done by Beltracchi shows that this practice is not exceptional in 
his body of work, since for his forgery in the style of Fernand Léger Kubistisches 
Stillleben (Cubistic Still­Life, apparently a work of the French cubist from 1913, 
fig. 11), he took up elements from two original works by Léger and combined them. 
Whereas the Léger painting Nature Morte aux Cylindres Colorés (Still­Life with 
Coloured Cylinders; Riehen, Fondation Beyeler, 1913, fig. 12) provided him with 
the idea for the machine-like arrangement of the mechanical looking elements (in 
Beltracchi s̓ case they form a steam-engine), the picture Contraste de Formes (Con­
trast of Forms; Riehen, Fondation Beyeler, 1913, fig. 13) served him as a model for 
the colours of the composition (Keazor / Öcal 2014: 30).
Figure 4: Han van Meegeren, “The Supper at Emmaus”, forgery in the style of 
Jan Vermeer, Rotterdam, Museum Boymans­van Beuningen, 1937.
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Figure 5: Wolfgang Beltracchi, “Liegender Akt mit Katze” (1909), forgery, based 
on a drawing by Max Pechstein, 2003.
Figure 6: Max Pechstein, “Liegender weiblicher Akt mit Katze”, Berlin, Brücke­
Museum, 1909.
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Figure 7: Wolfgang Beltracchi, “Energie entspannt” (1919), forgery in the style of 
Johannes Molzahn, 1985.
Figure 8: Johannes Molzahn, “Energien entspannt”, woodcut, 1919.
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Figure 9: Wolfgang Beltracchi, “Rotes Bild mit Pferden” (1914), forgery in the 
style of Heinrich Campendonk, 2005.
Figure 10: Heinrich Campendonk, “Paar auf dem Balkon”, Penzberg, 
Stadtmuseum, 1912 / 13.
Six Degrees of Separation 23
Figure 11: Wolfgang 
Beltracchi, “Kubistisches 
Stilleben” (1913), forgery, 
combining elements from 
paintings by Fernand Léger, 
before 2006.
Figure 12: Fernand 
Léger, “Nature Morte 
aux Cylindres Colorés”, 
Riehen, Fondation 
Beyeler, 1913.
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The boundaries between these categories are not always so distinct; they can be 
also fluid. A forgery such as the so-called Tiara of Saitaphernes (Paris, Louvre), a 
seemingly ancient crown made around 1895 / 96 by the Odessa-born, Jewish gold-
smith Israel Dov-Ber Rouchomosky, had allegedly been conceived by its author as a 
pure stylistic imitation with no intent to deceive. According to Rouchomovksy, it was 
only the merchants who had commissioned the Tiara who then passed it off — with-
out his knowledge — as an original.10 However, the Tiara is not only a stylis tic imi-
tation, but also a pasticcio of different motifs taken from antique artefacts.11 And 
the Tiara brings us to other techniques which can be legitimate, but which can 
also be involved in cases of forgery. Thus, we observe at the Tiara what we could 
call an ‘objective falsification’: the Tiara in itself, as a production of Rouchomov-
sky, was manipulated and falsified insofar as the goldsmith subsequently inserted 
old antique pegs into it. When the Tiara was examined, these pegs, together with 
the stylistically old appearance of the tiara and its many visual as well as textual 
references to antiquity, conveyed a misleading impression as they seemed to 
suggest the likelihood of it being an antique object (Keazor 2015: 55). Rouchomov-
sky claimed that he had been told by his clients to put these pegs into the Tiara, 
but one could then ask why Rouchomovsky did not get suspicious concerning the 
10 | See Rolle / Herz 1990 and Keazor 2015: 51-53.
11 | For the various sources, combined here, see Keazor 2015: 52.
Figure 13: Fernand 
Léger, “Contraste 
de Formes”, Riehen, 
Fondation Beyeler, 
1913.
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purpose of the Tiara since a pure stylistic imitation could and should have done 
without such ‘original’ and misleading elements.
Such manipulations, however, can be also executed without any intent to de-
ceive; see for example the changes made to paintings such as Albrecht Dürer s̓ 
Paum gartner Altar (Munich, Alte Pinakothek, 1498 / 1503). It was heavily over-
painted with additions and changes in costumes and personnel in 1613 in order to 
adapt it to contemporary taste, and was only restored to its original appearance 
in 1903 (Bayerische Staatsgemäldesammlungen 1986: 170-71, No. 706). Another 
example is Joshua Reynolds s̓ portrait Mrs. James Paine and Her Daughters Char­
lotte and Mary (National Museums Liverpool, 1765), where the mother was over-
painted at the end of the 19th century, possibly because an art dealer thought that 
it might sell better if the painting only showed two young girls — an intervention 
which was only removed in 1935.12
In each case, these manipulations were carried out to suit contemporary tastes, 
and since there was no urgent need to change these elements, one can not call these 
interventions ‘restorations’ in the proper sense of the term. However, such changes 
can also either be carried out with the intention of restoring the appearance of an 
art work, or to pass it off as something different. 
I therefore briefly want to discuss the painter and restorer Joseph van der Veken 
who tampered with damaged copies and mediocre early modern paintings in a 
way that made them afterwards appear as alleged originals of art-historical inter-
est. For example, he manipulated an anonymous and artistically rather poor copy 
(fig. 16) of the late 15th or early 16th century after Rogier Van der Weyden s̓ Ma­
ria Magdalena from the so-called Braque Triptyque (1452) (fig. 14) in such a way 
that it was considered a copy done by the German painter Hans Memling, who 
had spent some time in Van der Weyden s̓ workshop (fig. 15). Since van der Veken 
thus ‘upgraded’ art works without, however, making his interventions perceiv-
able, his method is today known as ‘hyperrestauration’, because this practice goes 
way beyond a mere ‘restauration’ (Lenain 2011: 247-48; Keazor 2015: 38-40). The 
same holds true in an even more extreme way concerning an alleged Portrait of the 
Princess Maria Josepha the Younger of Saxony, attributed to the circle of the 
French painter Louis de Silvestre, appearing on the art market in 1992 and subse-
quently acquired by the Deutsches Historisches Museum in Berlin (fig. 17). It turned 
out to be a heavily manipulated portrait of Maria Josepha the Elder of Saxony, 
Queen of Poland (fig. 18), which had been overpainted in the late 19th century by a 
French interior designer with a more appealing portrait to adorn Ochre Court, the 
summer residence of Ogden Goelet, then one of the richest men in the United States 
(Deutsches Historisches Museum 2000; Keazor 2015: 168-71). Luckily for the Ber-
lin museum, the painting turned out to be not just a work from the circle of Louis de 
Silvestre, but to be a previously undiscovered work by Silvestre himself, before only 
12 | See for example the entry under Liverpool Museums.
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Figure 14: Rogier Van 
der Weyden, “Maria 
Magdalena”, from 
the Braque Triptyque, 
Paris, Louvre, 1452.
Figure 15: Copy, 
formerly attributed 
to Hans Memling, 
actually manipulated 
by Joseph Van der 
Veken, Belgian State.
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Figure 16: Photography 
of a copy after Rogier 
Van der Weyden s̓ 
“Maria Magdalena”, 
showing its original 
state in 1914, prior 
to Van der Veken s̓ 
manipulations, Archive 
Max Friedländer.
Figure 17: Circle of 
Louis de Silvestre, 
“Portrait of the 
Princess Maria Josepha 
the Younger of Saxony”, 
Berlin, Historisches 
Museum, 1747 / 50, 
overpainted condition 
between 1892 and 1992.
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Figure 18: Louis de 
Silvestre, “Portrait 
of Maria Josepha the 
Elder of Saxony, Queen 
of Poland”, Berlin, 
Historisches Museum, 
1743, present condition 
after cleaning.
Figure 19: The painting, 
illustrated in Fig. 17 
and 18 in the process 
of cleaning and 
restoration.
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known because of an engraving, and it could be returned to its original state by 
removing the overpaint bit by bit (fig. 19). But if there is an ‘objective’ falsification, 
there must also be its counterpart, the ‘subjective’ falsification. The case of John 
Drewe and John Myatt can be recalled as such an example of this practice: between 
1985 and 1995 the supposed physicist John Drewe (actually an impostor born as 
John Cockett), smuggled forged documents into museum and gallery archives in 
order to give forgeries executed at his request by the painter John Myatt a credible 
history and provenance (Salisbury / Sujo 2010; Effinger / Keazor 2016: 72-174).
Thus, as we have seen:
• manipulated originals (such as mediocre early modern paintings van der Veken 
tampered with)
• copies 
• imitations
can all be used as fakes.
But the issue becomes even more complicated since we also have to discern 
the purpose for which these forgeries have been created. As we will see, some forg-
eries are made and used with the clear intention to have them unmasked sooner 
rather than later as a means to test the awareness of a group of experts or society. 
Others are made with the clear objective to deceive experts and society as long as 
possible — ideally forever.
Part II: the foax aS More
Two notions can be assigned to the two phenomena just described: objects which 
are produced with the clear intention to deceive experts and society as long as pos-
sible can be called fakes or forgeries, whereas things which are made up in order 
to have them unmasked sooner rather than later, as a means in order to check upon 
the awareness of a group of experts or of the society, should be more properly label-
led as ‘hoaxes’. This term describes something that is often intended as a practical 
joke or to cause embarrassment, or to provoke social or political change by raising 
people s̓ awareness of something — all reactions for which it is necessary that the 
hoax is at a certain time unmasked, be it by its producers or by the target audience. 
But since ‘hoaxes’ work with fakes, i.e.: deliberately fabricated falsehood, it is easy 
to mix the two of them up and to take the one for the other. This is exactly what 
happens for example in Jonathon Keats̓ recently published book Forged: Why 
Fakes are the Great Art of Our Age (Keats 2013). As provocative as Keats̓ title 
might sound, the author actually falls short of the thus raised expectations, since 
where he talks about fakes, he merely rehashes the already well-known biogra-
phies of six forgers — Lothar Malskat, Alceo Dossena, Han van Meegeren, Elmyr 
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de Hory, Eric Hebborn and Tom Keating. It is moreover extremely arguable if 
any of their forgeries can be considered ‘great art’ since it suffices to refer as an 
example to the forgeries by Lothar Malskat or Van Meegeren which today are 
seen as works which have not stood the test of time and now look rather corny. 
And where Keats talks about ‘great’ respectively ‘new art’, he actually talks about 
Appropriation Art or about hoaxes. Hereby, one could discuss Keats̓ definition 
of ‘great art’ in the first place since it seems to boil down for him to works which 
are ‘provocative’ and ‘scandalous’ — see for example his quote: “No authentic 
modern masterpiece is as provocative as a great forgery” (Keats 2013: 4). As a def-
inition of ‘great’ or ‘new art’, this seems rather one-sided and even old-fashioned 
since it smacks more of the effects of the avant-garde in the early 20th century 
than of contemporary art practice. Among the Appropriation artists mentioned 
are Marcel Duchamp, Elaine Sturtevant and Sherrie Levine, none of whom did 
produce fakes with deceptive intentions, but on the contrary intend for the be-
holder to realise that they are subvert ing and undermining the classical under-
standing of creativity. Among the hoaxes cited by Keats is an Internet project by 
the Italo-American artist-couple Franco und Eva Mattes, who in 1998 created a 
fake website of the Vatican which copied and mimicked the appearance of the 
real site.13 The Mattes̓ enriched their Vatican website with provocative content 
such as quotes from pop songs, the exaltation of free love, soft drugs, “brother-
ly intolerance” between religions and the oblivion of the senses. The success of 
student movements was invoked and the member of the Vatican claimed their 
own “duty to civil and electronic disobedience”. In the “Intermediatic Decree 
on Communications Tools”, the “Great Cathodic Church” explained its “Total 
Domination Plan” in terms of “Technomoral Law” and “Telesalvation” and dur-
ing those months the Pope absolved sinners via email in the name of the “Free 
Spirit Jubilee”.14 It was clear that the endeavour wanted to be recognised and un-
derstood for what it really was: a hoax intended to offer a satirical critique of the 
extremely conservative position of the Vatican. If the hoax had failed, the Vati-
can suddenly would have been perceived by the society as progressive and open- 
minded, thereby having a positive effect on its public image. 
Fakes and hoaxes are not only linked by the fact that the hoax relies on the 
fake, but both can blend and mutate from one into the other. When the hoax is not 
understood as such and unmasked, it unintentionally — or even in certain cases, 
deliberately — becomes a fake. On the other hand when a fake is unmasked, it is 
sometimes perceived as a hoax.
13 | See http://0100101110101101.org/files/vaticano.org/ (last accessed 
on 12 June 2017).
14 | See the description by the Mattes themselves under http://01 
00101110101101.org/vaticano-org/ (last accessed on 12 June 2017). 
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Alfred Lessing s̓ seminal article What is Wrong with a Forgery from 1965 de-
veloped and defended a view of fakes according to which it does not matter for the 
beholder if he or she knows that he or she is standing in front of a fake or an original 
(Lessing 1965). However, the blurring of the lines between fake and hoax reveals 
his position to be highly disputable. Context always matters — we never perceive 
things objectively. Thus it affects our appreciation of something if we realise that 
we have been standing in front of a hoax or in front of a fake, especially if we re-
alise that what we thought was a fake is actually a hoax and vice-versa.15 In order 
to clarify my arguments I would like to give two known examples for each case.
The first example is from 1973, when the young art critic Cheryl Bernstein pub-
lished an exhibition review under the title The Fake as More in an anthology with 
the title Idea Art, edited by the American art critic Gregory Battcock who collected 
several theoretical texts on conceptual art in this volume (Bernstein 1973). After 
having introduced Bernstein with a short biography, the text mostly deals with the 
importance of a painter called Hank Herron, who for his exhibition in a New York 
gallery had assembled copies of all the paintings his colleague Frank Stella had 
executed between 1961 and 1971. Bernstein discusses the conceptual meaning be-
hind Herron s̓ exhibition, which did not show new works in the individual style of 
an artist, but were mere copies of another artist s̓ work. The young art critic accord-
ingly judges Herron s̓ endeavour, reminiscent of the still-young Appropriation or 
Fake Art, as a ‘fake’ on several levels: in her view Herron had committed an act of 
piracy since he had, without getting Stella s̓ permission, copied his paintings and 
put them into a show carrying his own (Herron s̓) name. But by exposing Stella as 
the real author behind these repetitions, Herron also effectively ‘forged’ an exhi-
bition, since he denied the visitors’ satisfaction of their usual expectations upon 
entering an exhibition: to see something new.
Nevertheless Bernstein defends Herron s̓ approach, since by copying only the 
outer appearance of Stella s̓ paintings without any regard to their original context, 
grouping all of them then together in one single gallery space, and moreover by, so 
to speak, condensing the timeframe of their creation (Stella had painted his works 
in a time-span of ten years whereas Herron copied them within a year), Herron 
gave these copies new meaning within his exhibition concept. Bernstein therefore 
sees a “radical new and philosophical element” (Bernstein 1973: 44) in Herron s̓ 
emancipation from the original context and time of Stella s̓ paintings, as well as 
from the imperatives of the art business which continuously demands formal as 
well as stylistic innovations and creative developments from an artist. Instead of 
obeying this precept, Herron created a paradox: by simply repeating and then re-
grouping something already existing, he did something new and innovative which 
broke with art world tradition. Through his disinterest in the visual appearance and 
original context of Stella s̓ works, Herron made the intellectual process, the concept 
15 | See for this also Keazor 2014.
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or ‘idea’ (a notion that has an essential part in the title of Battcock s̓ volume) behind 
this procedure all the more evident. Therefore Bernstein concedes that the ‘fake’ 
committed by Herron creates a certain added value to the work, which is why she 
titles her review The Fake as More.
Bernstein s̓ text has proven to be seriously consequential because as far as I can 
see, it was the first defence of the fake — since 1884, when Paul Eudel cursed fakes 
and forgeries as something only harmful and destructive.16 Bernstein s̓ text instead 
presents the notion of the fake as something positive.
Bernstein s̓ essay had an even more interesting afterlife. Some aspects of the 
text may have struck the attentive reader as somewhat odd: for example the fact that 
this apparently intellectually precocious young art critic obviously did not know 
about the American artist Richard Pettibone, who had not only begun to copy and 
repeat the works of famous artists such as Robert Rauschenberg or Andy Warhol 
in the sixties, but who in 1965 had also started to copy a series of works that Stella 
had painted between 1960 and 1971.17 Thus, Herron s̓ concept was not as ‘new’ and 
daring as it appears in Bernstein s̓ review. Moreover, Pettibone had resolved a prob-
lem that Herron apparently had not: since Stella s̓ works are mostly of a remarkable 
size, Pettibone had copied them in scale-down versions; Bernstein, however, leaves 
the reader uncertain as to how Herron managed to cram all the same-scale copies 
after Stella s̓ huge originals stemming from a fertile 11-year-period into one single 
gallery space.
Maybe such inconsistencies were intended as warning signs for the attentive 
reader in order to make him or her aware of what he or she was actually reading, 
because, as it turns out, neither was there an art critic called ‘Cheryl Bernstein’, nor 
was there a painter named ‘Hank Herron’. Both were inventions of the American art 
historian Carol Duncan and her husband Andrew Duncan, who created this hoax 
with the complicity of the editor Gregory Battcock. The text was intended as a cri-
tique of the contemporary art-critical discourse which, in the view of the Duncans 
and of Battcock, was too weak and indulgent before art that seemed to circle only 
around itself without really involving the audience or, more generally, society. Their 
special target was obviously the Appropriation Art and the positive critical reaction 
it got, causing art critics to focus on abstract theories such as those voiced by their 
‘Cheryl Bernstein’ in her review, instead of, as the Duncans would have preferred, 
raising questions about the political meaning of such art for society.18
16 | Eudel 1884. See for this context also Lenain 2011: 252-54.
17 | See Berry / Duncan 2005: 84-87 and 174, Nos. 97-103. Interestingly, 
an exhibition of the Appropriation artist Mike Bidlo, who often respects 
the size of the originals he copies, was reviewed by Levin 1988 under 
the title The Original as Less, thus appropriating and varying the title of 
Bernsteinʼs review.
18 | See for this and the following Crow 1986.
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The Duncans had originally thought that their hoax would be quickly unmasked 
and the inherent critique understood. They had even put in some humorous hints 
and distorted quotes from then-fashionable French philosophers, but still no-one 
objected to this intellectually lofty and solipsistic text. In a way, the Duncans̓ cri-
tique was thereby implicitly confirmed, even though it had not yet been exposed 
since no one took Bernstein s̓ text for what it actually was, a parodic hoax.
The Fake as More thus became a fake, until it was finally exposed thirteen years 
later by the art historian Thomas Crow in his 1986 essay The Return of Hank Her­
ron.19 However, even he only knew of the hoax because Carol Duncan had made him 
privy to the secret behind ‘Cheryl Bernstein’, ‘Hank Herron’ and his exhibition. Now 
it became clear that the title The Fake as More revealed yet another level of meaning 
since it not only appeared as programmatic for the text s̓ own nature (a fake, used as 
a hoax). But it also presented ‘more’ by actually providing less: from an invented art 
critic, who reviews a non-existent exhibition of an equally fictitious painter, the text 
raises fundamental issues about the reality of the art world and its business.
This was the theoretical side of a hoax being a blind shell. In order to also 
present a practical example, I would like to refer to Tom Keating and his so-called 
‘time bombs’. Keating was a painter and restorer who supposedly forged more than 
2.000 paintings by about 100 different artists.20 He was unmasked in 1976 by the 
journalist Geraldine Norman in an article she wrote for the Times. He was arres-
ted the following year and accused of fraud, but the accusation was subsequently 
dropped. This was partly due to his poor state of health, but partly also because 
Keating always had intended his forgeries as hoaxes, meaning that he had always 
left clear traces of their inauthenticity. For example, he wrote messages in lead white 
for his restorer colleagues on the canvas before applying the first layer of paint for 
the forged composition. He expected the writing to become visible once the work 
was examined with X-rays. Furthermore he incorporated deliberate mistakes into 
his forgeries, such as too many fingers or crude anachronisms, or he executed them 
with modern materials, even if they pretended to have been created in the early 
mod ern era. With these ‘time bombs’ Keating speculated that sooner or later the 
traces would be detected, his forgeries would be unmasked and thus the weaknesses 
of the art market would be put into evidence, which would be irritated and destabi-
lised. He was motivated by his contempt for what he considered to be the corrupt 
and gallery-dominated art market, where American art critics and dealers dictated 
the taste and were only keen to make a profit at the expense of naive collectors as 
well as impoverished artists. Keating could publicise such views in 1977 when Ge-
raldine Norman, the journalist who had unmasked him, published together with her 
husband Frank Norman a biography of Keating with the title The Fake s̓ Progress: 
19 | Ibid.
20 | See for this and the following Norman / Norman 1977 and, for the 
context Effinger / Keazor 2016: 171-72.
Henry Keazor34
Tom Keating s̓ Story. The book s̓ title alludes to one of William Hogarth s̓ ‘moral 
subjects’ from 1733-1735, The Rake s̓ Progress; but whereas Hogarth s̓ Tom Rake-
well falls from fortune and social favour and ends up in a mental asylum, Keating 
experienced a social and financial ascent. After his exposure and Norman s̓ book, 
which featured a catalogue of Keating s̓ works (Norman 1977), Keating became 
a celebrity and even hosted a British television series between 1982 and 1983, in 
which he explained the techniques of the Old Masters. To a certain extent, it could 
be argued that the forger became the expert who he had previously been fighting 
against, and he ultimately became a servant of the system he had first protested.
What is important, however, is that just as in the case of the Duncans̓ ‘Cheryl 
Bernstein’ hoax, Keating s̓ hoaxes became forgeries since, instead of being rapidly 
unmasked, they were taken for the real thing for a long time, and thus deceived 
more people and for a longer period than planned by Keating.
A variation of this ‘hoax turned fake’ is the case of the above-mentioned Han 
van Meegeren, who initially intended to expose the incompetence of the art crit-
ics and experts who had derided the work van Meegeren had presented under his 
own name (Kilbracken 1967). But when he realised that he had successfully fooled 
them, he saw the comfortable side of his success in the money he earned. Therefore, 
instead of exposing his forgery and thus embarrassing the experts with his hoax, he 
decided to keep the illusion of an allegedly newly discovered Vermeer masterpiece 
and of further Vermeer rediscoveries intact in order to gain more and more money.
As stated above, there is also the second situation where a forgery is later de-
clared to have been partly or even exclusively intended as a hoax. I would like to 
present one example of this.
The Hungarian forger Elmyr de Hory (apparently born in 1905 as Elemir Horthy 
in Budapest)21 — made famous by Orson Welles̓ stunning documentary F for Fake 
from 1973 — began to forge after the Second World War. He emulated drawings 
and paintings by masters of classical Modernism, such as Pablo Picasso, Amadeo 
Modigliani, Chaim Soutine or Henri Matisse. When de Hory was exposed in 1967, 
21 | So the Norwegian director Knut W. Jorfald in his documentary “Al-
most True. The Noble Art of Forgery” (aka “Masterpiece or Forgery? The 
Story of Elmyr de Hory”) from 1997. Recently, Forgy 2012: 316 referred 
to inquiries in the archives of the “Association of Jewish Communities” in 
Budapest and reported that in a book, dated to 1906, one could find the 
entry concerning a “Elemér Albert Hoffmann” which he, without giving 
any reasons why, identifies with Elmyr de Hory. Because of this lacking 
explanation and since Forgy also does not further specify what kind of 
records the book (described by Forgy only as “records” in “a coffee- 
table-size book dated 1906”) represents, I am here following the up to now 
more plausible and transparent identification furnished by Jorfald 1997.
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he claimed that one of his motivations was to unmask the incompetence of the ex-
perts, critics and art dealers who had judged de Hory s̓ own creations in a negative 
way. At the same time, he asserted that it had been among his aims to show how 
mediocre some acclaimed artists were, such as Henri Matisse, who in de Hory s̓ 
view was actually a bad and highly overrated draughtsman. According to de Hory, 
forging Matisse s̓ work presented quite a challenge for the (allegedly) highly talent-
ed de Hory, forcing him to disguise his talent in order to be able to draw as badly as 
he claimed Matisse did (Irving 1969: 233).
All this shows that there are cases in which hoax and fake blend with each 
other into indistinguishability. Again we can recall ‘Paul’ from Six Degrees of Sep­
aration, since in his case it remains unclear whether he is ultimately an exposed 
con man (a forger) or somebody who, by being ‘unmasked’, actually reveals the 
self-righteous lifestyle of those who apparently debunk him.22 I have suggested 
call ing the objects involved when hoax and fake blend in such a manner ‘foaxes’, a 
mix of ‘fake’ and ‘hoax’ which sounds like the French word for fake, faux (Keazor 
2015: 15).
Adapting the title of ‘Cheryl Bernstein s̓’ review, I believe there are cases in 
which one could see the ‘Foax as More’. Firstly, in a very banal way adding the foax 
creates a third element, a ‘more’ which complements the two notions of the ‘fake’ 
and the ‘hoax’.
Secondly and still rather simply, the criteria which are applied to the fake and 
the hoax also apply to the ‘foax’. It holds up a mirror to society and raises questions 
such as ‘How do we see what we think is an original?’, ‘As what, in which way 
do we see it?’ and: ‘What does this say about us?’ Analysing a fake, a hoax or a 
foax can be highly informative and telling about us, how we encounter art, how to 
contextualise it and what to expect of it. One could thus say that fakes, hoaxes or 
foaxes are in some ways like caricatures: they single out and then emphasise, con-
dense, concentrate in the object and charge it with what we perceive as typical of 
something. This could be an artist’s style such as Beltracchi s̓ Campendonks or Van 
Meegeren s̓ Vermeers; or how we assume an old artwork should look; for instance, 
slightly damaged, but not too much (e.g. Spiel 2000: 54). We can also understand 
the fake / hoax / foax as a form of wish-fulfillment since they represent what we wish 
should have survived and how we wish an art work should have survived. This con-
cept is reflected by Wolfgang Beltracchi s̓ ascription of the origin of his forgeries to 
his wife s̓ grandfather Werner Jägers̓ art collection. According to this web of lies, 
this collection hosted and preserved precious pieces from the collection of Alfred 
Flechtheim which normally would have been associated with ‘looted art’, but by 
claiming that Jägers bought the art works from Flechtheim in time before the Nazis 
could take them, Beltracchi purified the paintings from such a negative association 
(Koldehoff / Timm 2012; Keazor / Öcal 2014). 
22 | See here note 2 above.
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This subterfuge was carried out in order to convince us, but after its exposure 
it can cause us to question ourselves critically about the reasons for the fraud s̓ 
success. The herefrom arising issues might include questions after the weak nesses 
in ourselves and in our systems, in art history, at the university, at the art market, 
in our society: which shortcomings have thus become visible and understandable?
Thirdly, it is exactly the ‘foax’ that prompts us to reflect upon the different and 
difficult-to-distinguish aggregate state.
And last but not least, it reveals the creative and performative potential that lies 
in hoaxes, fakes and foaxes — see again the case of Bernstein s̓ The Fake as More 
with its invented art critic who writes an invented review of an invented exhibition 
of an invented artist. We are close here to what Jean Baudrillard called “the simu-
lacrum” (Baudrillard 1995), a phenomenon that appears to be real, but actually has 
severed almost all of its ties to reality. There is, indeed, something real from which 
the whole invention stems — a real art business with painters who paint the way 
‘Hank Herron’ does and with critics who write the way ‘Bernstein’ does, but what 
has been newly invented on this basis has then been emancipated from these real 
phenomena and has developed a life of its own.
One could ultimately say that more or less the same happened in the case of Bel-
tracchi. Based on real masterworks which were once in a real collection of mod-
ern masterpieces, he conceived paintings which were then substantiated with 
faked historical evidence asserting that they were once part of a collection of 
masterpieces — which, however, had never existed. In this case, too, the whole 
scam started from things which really existed, such as the person of Werner Jä-
gers, the grandfather of Wolfgang Beltracchi s̓ wife Helene, the collector Alfred 
Flechtheim, or the paintings that had once been in his collection but had van- 
ish ed until then, and of course the painters who had created them.
Again, the whole invention developed a life of its own, up to the point that 
Beltracchi even created alternative versions of the artists he forged. Because he did 
not entirely follow their known style, but here and there digressed from them and 
instead added some new stylistic elements, he even created new stylistic patterns 
and phases of the painters he forged (Keazor / Öcal 2014: 31-34). This was precisely 
the same strategy used by Han van Meegeren decades earlier, when he had present-
ed a Vermeer in his forgeries who began apparently to detach himself stylistically 
more and more from the known Vermeer paintings through which Van Meegeren 
had first oriented himself — and instead began to paint increasingly the way Van 
Meegeren had done under his own name.23 In both cases, this led to the paradox 
that new works appearing on the art market were increasingly compared not to the 
actual known works of the artists apparently behind these creations, but instead 
23 | Kilbracken 1967: 125: “He painted less and less in the manner of 
Vermeer […] — and more and more in the manner of van Meegeren.“
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with those allegedly genuine works that had recently been discovered. This meant 
that the proof for authenticity in the case of Van Meegeren or Beltracchi became the 
previous forgeries by Van Meegeren and Beltracchi. 
In summary, as we have seen, the fake, the hoax and the resulting foax can 
actually add in some way something ‘more’ to our reality by opening up “a parallel 
universe” via an “art of the second degree”, or “second power” as Koen Brams calls 
this in his book The Encyclopedia of Fictional Artists, edited in 2000.24 Of course, 
one has to keep in mind that not all fakes, hoaxes or foaxes are automatically, as 
Jonathon Keats maintains, “great art”, and one also has to observe under which 
conditions they are launched. This is because we perceive works through different 
preconceptions, which also shape the relationship of the agents in the art world: that 
is between the artist, the client and the viewer, all of whom agree to an unspoken 
understanding that each knows the difference between an original and a fake.
However, as we have seen, having our traditional ideas about originality shaken 
up is, especially in a globalised world, not something that should automatically 
be shunned. Because sooner or later we will be confronted with the phenomenon 
again, we should learn to be not reactive, but active in our response to the fake, the 
hoax and the foax.
The fake, the hoax and the foax are ‘more’, insofar as they can be conceived 
and taken by us as a chance to question our way of dealing with art, of reflecting 
upon it and therefore perhaps better explaining and understanding it. Or, to phrase 
it in the words of the French neuroscientist Jean-Pierre Changeux who carried out 
significant research on how we perceive art: “Understanding does not equal loving; 
but a better explanation will make for a better understanding, and more understand-
ing will, perhaps, make for a better loving” (Changeux 1994: 13, my translation).25
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Forgery: The Art of Deception
Friedrich Teja Bach (University of Vienna)    
Translated by Joel Scott
For many years now, the Berlin art historian Horst Bredekamp has been interested 
in the relationship between art and science, and has become an advocate for the 
significance of a thought that thinks in images, of the hand that draws as an organ 
of thought. Beginning in 2005, this interest led him to his work on an edition of Ga-
lileo Galilei s̓ Sidereus Nuncius that had come onto the market in New York. Bre-
dekamp was convinced that this copy of the Starry Messenger, which contains ink 
wash illustrations of the moon in place of the etchings of the definitive edition, was 
Galileo s̓ proof copy of the book, and analysed its drawings as a crowning example 
of the connection between scientific thinking and image production. Doubts about 
its authenticity had been expressed here and there in different places, but neither 
Bredekamp, nor the interdisciplinary research team that he put together, nor the in-
stitutions supporting him — such as the Max Planck Society, the Rathgen Research 
Laboratory, the Stuttgart State Academy of Art and Design, the Federal Institute 
for Materials Research and Testing and the Technical University of Berlin — had 
been able to confirm them.
In 2007 Bredekamp published his results in the wide-ranging monograph 
Galilei der Künstler. Der Mond, die Sonne, die Hand (Galileo the Artist: The 
Moon, the Sun, the Hand). An extensive report on the research project appeared 
in 2011, published in two volumes under Bredekamp s̓ editorship as Galileo s̓ O 
(Bredekamp / Brückle / Hahn 2011; Bredekamp / Needham 2011). In spring 2012 it 
was then discovered that the New York copy of Sidereus Nuncius was a forgery, 
organised and carried out — like the forgery of other writings by Galileo — by 
the Italian Galileo scholar Massimo De Caro. As director of the famous Bib-
lioteca dei Girolamini in Naples he had been responsible for the embezzlement 
and counterfeit ing of incunabula and valuable books on a grand scale (Schmidle 
2013). It is a case that can teach us a great deal about materials and technical pro-
cesses, about the psychological dispositions of its participants, the self-stylisation 
of researchers and forgers, the success of the “cloaking strategies” of forgers, and 
the interaction of the humanities and science in an era when forgers and their 
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international networks are able to make use of laser and digital technologies and 
techniques. But just one point will be of special interest to us here. In the third 
volume of Galileo s̓ O, published in 2014 under the title Forgery: Unmasking the 
New York Sidereus Nuncius, Paul Needham, the librarian for rare books and spe-
cial collections at Princeton University, who was heavily involved in Bredekamp s̓ 
Galileo project, writes the following remarkable sentence: “Consider: from the 
time that a serious problem with the authenticity of SNML [the New Yorker Side­
reus Nuncius, F.T.B.] arose […] to the time absolute proof was found that SNML is 
forged, only three weeks passed, 10 to 31 May 2012” (Needham 2014: 95). In other 
words, from 2005 to 2012 an entire staff of experts pored over this book — and 
then, once a serious suspicion was raised, it took just three weeks to establish that 
it was a forgery.
How can that be? To elaborate briefly focusing on one technical detail: the pa-
per of the New York copy being of decidedly lower quality than all other copies 
of this work that have hitherto come down to us, was suspect from the very begin-
ning — too raw and in fact unsuited to illustration. But the supposition that the New 
York manuscript represented Galileo s̓ proof copy, and that the watercolour illus-
trations were the work of his own hand, seemed to explain — indeed, to necessi-
tate — this divergence in the quality of the paper. Moreover, the X-ray fluorescence 
analysis of the paper showed nothing unusual, while in the absence of any initial 
suspicion, an invasive examination of the material — which would mean damaging 
the book by removing paper fibres for examination — was out of the question. After 
all, in all scientific tests of authenticity, something like a principle of proportionali-
ty must be observed. Only once suspicions had been raised did an invasive analysis 
take place and reveal a cotton content which was much too high for the early 17th 
century.
Thus, what Paul Needham s̓ remark about the “three weeks” illustrates above 
all else is the decisive effect of an initial suspicion — of a change of perspective that 
it introduces. It demonstrates the truth of the phrase from Max Friedländer s̓ On 
Art and Connoisseurship that serves as an epigraph to the third volume of Galileo s̓ 
O: “The eye sleeps, until the spirit awakes [sic] it with a question” (after Brede-
kamp 2014: 5). In their introduction to this volume the leading members of the team 
carrying out the research into the New York Starry Messenger identify the reason 
for their failure: “the evidence of authenticity seemed so unequivocal that none of 
the authors thought them questionable. All participants had used the method of 
negating the possibility of forgery, instead of attempting to confirm the opposite” 
(9). Logically speaking, these seem to be equivalent — the attempt to exclude the 
possibility of forgery and the attempt to demonstrate it. But in reality, and as work-
ing processes, they are fundamentally different.
The second case of forgery to which we shall briefly turn is the Beltracchi / Spies 
affair. In Autumn 2011, Wolfgang Beltracchi and three co-defendants appeared 
before a court and were sentenced in relation to a number of forged paintings that 
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they were proved to have created.1 The case achieved particular prominence not 
only on account of the scope of Beltracchi s̓ activities as a forger — according to 
his own avowals having forged the works of around 50 modernist artists — but also 
because the seven Max Ernst paintings he produced between 1994 and 2004 had 
been examined and authenticated by Werner Spies, Director of the Musée National 
in Paris 1999-2000, and one of the world s̓ most renowned experts on the work of 
Ernst.
Let us compare two versions of the 1927 painting The Horde by Max Ernst, 
one of them an original, the other forged by Beltracchi (fig. 1 and 2). Naturally it 
is impossible to properly address the question of whether something is an original 
or a forgery merely by looking at reproductions, but one dimension of the question 
can nevertheless be adumbrated here. Would it have been possible or necessary to 
arrive at an initial suspicion in this case? By what criteria could one s̓ attention have 
been guided in order to arrive at such a suspicion, beginning merely at the level of 
stylistic analysis? Above all, criteria which result from tensions between the sub-
ject of the picture and its painterly execution. The subject of The Horde implies a 
menac ing ferocity — and something amorphous, a basic undefinedness.
Thus, in comparing the two images, our attention would be directed above all 
towards the different levels of determinacy and articulation: the legibility or illegi-
bility of the “figures”, the degree to which they are articulated as human, as male or 
female, and the corporeality of their depiction, which is to say: towards the spati al-
ity and plasticity of the orifices of the body, the application of colour and shadow 
to delineate the respective figures, and the qualities of the outlines, the shading and 
the internal line-work and of the ground of the painting. And of course, in encoun-
tering differences one would have to consider which aspects might be due to the 
difference in the format of each painting, and a potentially related difference in the 
status of the two works.
Studying these differences, one could notice the sexualising quality of the cor-
poreality of the second figure from the left in figure 2. This sexualisation in the way 
the figure is portrayed has an explicitness, a definiteness in the form, which is not 
present in figure 1. Does this quality appear in comparable works painted by Max 
Ernst around 1927? In particular, is it to be found in paintings that bear explicit 
references to sexual themes in their titles? And in others, such as The Horde, for 
which this is not the case? If you pursue these questions, then you will find that 
this fleshly tactility does indeed stand out. This need not imply that the picture 
shown by figure 2 wasn̓t painted by Max Ernst. But the obviousness of such a detail 
could generate something like an initial suspicion which would have to be pursued 
further. A good magnifying glass would in that case identify acute problems like 
the ‘craquelure’, the quality of the small cracks on the surface of the paint. And the 
1 | On Beltracchi more generally, see, for example, Koldehoff / Timm 
2012; and the autobiography Beltracchi / Beltracchi 2014.
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Figure 1: Max Ernst, “The Horde”, 1927, oil on canvas, 115 × 146 cm,  
Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam.
Figure 2: Max Ernst, “La horde” (forgery by Wolfgang Beltracchi), 1927,  
oil on canvas, 65.4 × 81.2 cm, European Collection.
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Figure 3: Page of the Auction­Catalogue “Impressionist and Modern Art”  
(with a detail of Peter Paul Rubens, Rape of the Daughters of Leucippus on  
the left side), Evening Sale, Christie’s London, 20 June 2006, pp. 174 / 75.
Figure 4: Wolfgang Beltracchi, untitled (framing: F. T. Bach), drawing, undated.
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analysis of the material to which this would have to lead would reveal pigments that 
were simply not available in 1927. Although one should add that there are also other 
reasons why, in the case of Max Ernst around the year 2000, analysis of the material 
would have been an urgent necessity, even in the absence of initial suspicions.
I don̓t wish to speculate on why these analyses weren̓t carried out. An equally 
interesting question is why the forged Max Ernsts were so readily accepted. Consid-
er a brief addendum on this point: in the Christie s̓ auction catalogue Beltracchi s̓ 
Max Ernst was accompanied by a reproduction of Rubens̓ Rape of the Daughters 
of Leucippus on the opposite page (fig. 3). In its marketing strategy, by including a 
reproduction of Rubens̓ Rape as a point of reference, the auction house has com-
pletely succumbed to the detail which we examined earlier. That means that the 
sexualising shift that Beltracchi applied to Max Ernst s̓ The Horde corresponded 
to one of the trends of contemporary taste, which — as one can discover from one 
of his early drawings (fig. 4) — was always also decidedly his own. In other words, 
it is not just the “historicity of the gaze” that determines the forgery, just as it does 
art, and, with time, reveals it, but also the psycho-physical disposition of the artist 
or forger, and their relation to the taste of their time.
An initial suspicion is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition if forgeries are 
to be rooted out. The work of expert identification is characterised by a combination 
of the forensic methods of the sciences of materials with the expertise of the con-
noisseur of style. Beyond these, competence in a specific, narrowly defined area 
needs to be complemented by an attention to the strategies of forgers as they come to 
light — because they set precedents and serve as models for successors. The New 
Yorker Ely Sakhai became famous by his trick of selling a work twice, while for some 
time now whole catalogues have been forged in order to prove that today s̓ forgeries 
appeared in historical exhibitions of Russian avant-garde works that never in fact 
took place. Such references show that Beltracchi was not the first to work with 
forged museum and gallery labels. The British forgery duo John Drewe and John 
Myatt became famous for their sophisticated ways of forging a work s̓ provenance. 
Before a work was placed on the market, John Drewe would manipulate archival 
materials in leading London institutions like the Tate, the Victoria & Albert Museum 
and the Institute of Contemporary Art, so that the experts researching a work would 
actually find it in historical catalogues and documents (Salisbury / Sujo 2009). Be-
fore this method of forging provenance became known, institutions had been care-
ful to ensure that scholars, or people claiming to be scholars, were unable to carry 
anything out of their archives — they had not paid attention to what was brought in.
We shall not pursue these more narrowly technical problems here, but turn instead 
to consider whether and to what degree forgeries can lead to fundamental questions 
and insights concerning art. In discussing the significance of an ‘initial suspicion’ 
we have already alluded to such an insight: namely into our perception and how it 
is formed. It is an everyday experience that something that was able to fascinate 
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us just last year now leaves us peculiarly cold, while something else to which we 
have hitherto been indifferent is suddenly of the greatest interest. Through this 
experience of the changes of our perception, we can gain a sense of the forces that 
form them.
But in cases where we vacillate in our judgment between recognising some-
thing as an original and deeming it a forgery, this shift in perception acquires a 
particular intensity and Evidenz.2 Reflecting on these changes, we can look on, as 
it were, while our gaze shifts, we can see how an emotional investment in it that 
would otherwise remain unconscious reveals itself in an abrupt alteration. In such 
cases, we catch a glimpse of something which is in fact continually taking place but 
usually goes unnoticed, namely the formation of what we see by the horizon of our 
expectations. The experience of a relatively sudden replacement of one horizon of 
expectation by another allows us to catch a glimpse of a quality of our seeing that is 
of decisive importance for the work of the art historian more generally: the power 
of the quality of projection that has always already determined our seeing.
There is hardly anything of more significance for the understanding of our pow-
er of sight and the insight into the necessity of its being double-checked than the ex-
perience of such a relatively sudden switch between the expectational horizons that 
ground vision — the experience of the achieved closure of a new horizon of expec-
tation, which through a rapid switch establishes itself as just as ‘evident’ as the one 
preceding it. We need to remember, however, that in dealing with a questionable 
work, the task we are faced with is a double one. It is fundamentally necessary 
to work in two directions simultaneously. In the words of Max Friedländer: “It is 
indeed an error to collect a forgery, but it is a sin to stamp a genuine piece with the 
seal of falsehood” (after Hoving 1996: 209).
A second fundamental question has already been alluded to through our dis-
cussion of ‘initial suspicion’: the relationship between the whole and its details. 
In the case of Beltracchi s̓ Horde, it was a detail that ought to have aroused an 
initial suspicion. This ought to have been pursued until it either showed itself to 
be unfounded or was confirmed. The sexualising, almost voluptuous and tactile 
articulation of the figure s̓ buttocks ought to have drawn attention to itself given 
the thematic context, essentially defined, as it is, by formal indeterminacy. But is 
it not also the case that details that disturb the unity of the structure of a whole 
and thus draw attention to themselves, that indicate a contradiction or at the least a 
2 | Evidenz has no simple translation in English. It is a common topic of 
enquiry in German-language art theory and visual cultures, and refers 
to the ways in which images take on an evidentiary character, in part 
through material and visual qualities of the images themselves, but also 
through their embedding in cultural discourses and practices which 
imbue them with specific meaning and function, and which are in turn 
shaped by the function of these images. [Trans.]
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tension between the thematic conception and the execution — that such details also 
appear in authentic works of art, in ‘strong’ works? We can recall, for example, the 
peculiar ities of 15th-century Italian annunciation scenes to which Daniel Arasse has 
drawn attention, such as in Franceso del Cossa s̓ The Annunciation in the Gemälde-
galerie Dresden (fig. 5; Arasse 2003). In the imposing construction of this painting, 
the two main figures of which are placed on either side of a monumental central pil-
lar, arranged diagonally and drawing the eye into the depth of the perspectival field, 
there is one detail that is altogether out of place: the snail in the foreground. Its pres-
ence can, at a pinch, be justified iconographically as a symbol of the Virgin Mary, 
how ever its position and exaggerated size “remain disconcerting, indeed, almost 
shocking” (87).3 Positioned on the bottom edge of the picture, the snail is not paint-
ed into the fictional space, but rather onto the image, or its frame, “onto the border-
line between our space and the space erected by the perspective of the painting” 
(88). It is a detail — though I will skip the particulars of Arasse s̓ argument — that 
by means of its “divergence” indicates “the disproportion of the divine”, that shows 
that “the perspectival structure, as ‘symbolic form’, is a symbol, not for the infinity 
of the world, but rather for its commensurability — and that the infinity of God is 
incommensurable with the world” (89).
What distinguishes the way a detail in a painting that turns out to be a forgery 
becomes suspicious from the ‘conspicuousness’ of a detail in an authentic work? 
Certainly not the degree to which it lends itself to interpretation. The two examples 
which we began with make clear how sophisticated forgeries often offer ‘interpre-
tability’ as a bait, so to speak, with which to tempt the expert. But if interpretability 
is not the distinguishing mark, then what is? We cannot define a universal criterion; 
criteria of authenticity can only be made precise in each particular case. Which 
does not mean that attention to forgeries will not allow us to open up important 
insights into the relationship between the whole and the detail — for as long, that is, 
as this relationship remains foundational for thinking about art.
In different ways, forgeries raise the problem of boundaries. It is not just that the 
concept of a forgery already implies the distinction between original and forgery. 
Work in the field of the question of original and forgery always ultimately pre-
supposes a judgment about the scope of the quality of an artist s̓ work in a given 
period — and a given medium. Because it is much more probable that a hastily 
scribbled drawing, in spite of its questionable quality, would be the product of 
a quality draughtsperson s̓ “weak moment” than that a sculpture requiring six 
months work would diverge markedly from the standards of the work created by 
a sculptor around the same time, and yet nonetheless belong to his œuvre. But 
forgeries also raise the question of the boundary in a yet more fundamental sense. 
3 | With regard to the reading flow all German quotations have been 
translated.
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Figure 5: Francesco del Cossa, “The Annunciation”, 1470 / 72,  
tempera on poplar, 139 × 113.5 cm, Gemäldegalerie, Dresden.
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Art, espe cially in its modern and contemporary forms, increasingly understands 
itself as the attempt to push beyond boundaries. These are simultaneously the 
locus and the object of experimental artistic practices which investigate the mini-
mal conditions of art, which ask which of its traditional characteristics are ques-
tionable or dispens able. In the context of neo-structuralism and postmodernism, a 
broad discursive field has formed in which the relationship between original and 
forgery appears in a new light. This field encompasses the interrogation of the 
qualities of authenticity and repetition, of artistic piracy, and of allegorical pro-
cedures and procedures of appropriation and the critical revision of the concept 
of originality. Beyond that, it encompasses questions around and approaches to 
the affirmation of the phenomena of forgery, the questioning of the dichotomy of 
the original and the fake, which in the course of this volume will be discussed 
extensively by others.
Understood as a radical form of art s̓ own self-reflection, a forgery certainly 
stands in a certain proximity to avant-garde forms of art that throw basic assump-
tions of our traditional understanding of art into question. Indeed, in some strands 
of contemporary discourse, the phenomenon of forgery seems to have filled the 
space vacated through the obsolescence of avant-garde art and the ebb of the neo-
avant-gardes. Let me illustrate this by the example of one of Jean Dubuffet s̓ Cows 
from the mid-1950s (fig. 6). Hubert Damisch reflected on works of this kind in an 
Figure 6: Jean Dubuffet, “Vache la belle queutée (ou Vache au pré rose)”, Nov. 
1954, oil on canvas, 97 × 130 cm, The National Museum of Western Art, Tokyo.
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early text from 1967 (Damisch 1998: 28-40). What if — this, according to Damisch, 
is the line of questioning intended by Dubuffet — what if our culture is constituted 
in such a way as to hinder our perception of art? How could art possibly remain 
fixed in the place to which culture, with all its signs and pointers, assigns it, reduc-
ing it to a museum object? Art is a cognitive process, an undertaking of the mind; it 
no longer recognises itself in the mirror that culture holds up to it, in the degenerate 
and caricatured form of the knowledge of the cognoscenti, the connoisseur. Culture 
itself must rather be interrogated, its personnel and its institutions chal lenged in the 
name of art. According to Damisch, Dubuffet s̓ art seeks to break out of the circle 
of culture by activating the order of the bestial.
But if the aim is to throw culture itself into question, to break out of its circle, 
then why should this breakout accept the framing of the traditional category of 
the original? Wouldn̓t the escape be more radical if it liberated itself from this 
cultural prison too? There are about half a dozen Dubuffets forged by Drew and 
Myatt (Salisbury / Sujo 2009: 106, 205). Are these not much more radical artistic 
statements than Dubuffet s̓ own painting? There are a number of variants of con-
temporary discourse which suggest this. Forgery is claimed as a sort of replace-
ment for the avant-garde, even if this claim is not explicitly made the object of 
reflection.
As can be seen from the collages of Karl Waldmann, such thinking can pro-
vide a basis for acts of curatorial self-aggrandisement that play into the hands of 
the forgery industry (Steinfeld 2015: 9). In the summer of 2015 eleven collages by 
Waldmann were shown as part of the exhibition Künstliche Tatsachen/Boundary 
Objects at the Galerie Kunsthaus in Dresden. The collages reveal interesting com-
binations of Dadaist techniques with those of the Soviet avant-garde (fig. 7). They 
are works by an artist who was discovered in 1990 and has since been in demand 
on the international art market, with 149 works sold since 2001. His virtual mu-
seum is represented, among others, by the well-known New York art dealer Wal-
ter Maibaum. If you r̓e not acquainted with this artist, you r̓e in good company. 
Nobody knows him. As it turns out, the existence of Karl Waldmann is no less 
uncertain than the provenance of his collages. As the chorus of doubt concerning 
the authenticity of both artist and work swelled in volume, the head of the Dresden 
Kunsthaus tried to deftly get out from under her predicament. She transformed the 
life and work of Karl Waldmann into conceptual art, and stated that it was also 
possible “that we are dealing with a contemporary artistic project that works with 
fictional strategies” (after id.: 9). At the same time, the curator responsible for the 
exhibition described her own activity as “working curatorially at the boundaries of 
(hegemonic) canonisations — and, contrary to the scholarly paradigm, continually 
expanding those boundaries” (after id.: 9).
It is possible to speak here — along with Thomas Steinfeld from whose article 
in the Süddeutsche Zeitung I have drawn these references — of “a determined rejec-
tion of the museum as institution”. Steinfeld continues:
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Figure 7: Karl Waldmann, “20 Mark”, undated, collage on cardboard, 
32 × 24.5 cm, Galerie Pascal Polar, Belgium.
Forgery: The Art of Deception 53
[Until now] one of the most important functions of this institution has con-
sisted in checking, evaluating and declaring the provenance of what it 
exhibits. Those who refuse to do this […] transform every possible object 
into a potential work of art and elevate […] even economically motivated 
kitsch to the status of an object belonging in a gallery for ‘contemporary 
art’. Their methodical doubt asserts itself in the form of a moral ressenti-
ment that is effectively more hegemonic than any assurance of authentic-
ity. It stands as the basis of a curatorial practice that by doing nothing 
and knowing nothing assures itself of always being in the right. (9)
A few decades ago, the invention of a “Karl Waldmann” might actually have been 
an artistic project that worked with “fictional strategies”. Today, this dissimulation 
has become a sales strategy. That which once served the avant-garde critique of the 
fetishisation of the original work and the artistic ideologies of the cultural sector 
has long since become an element of this sector. The line along which exhibitions 
like that of the Dresden Kunsthaus are curated is one of the market.
Where, then, do we stand in our reflections on forgery, what is their real context? 
In his 1996 book False Impressions Thomas Hoving estimates that in the decade 
during which he was director of the New York Metropolitan Museum, 1967-1977, 
questionable works and fakes made up a good 40% of the works that he investigat-
ed. He also assumes that at the time of the publication of his book, this portion had 
risen to 50% (Hoving 1996: 17). This estimate was, as I have said, formulated in 
relation to high-level museums and does not address the even more acute form of 
the problem in the “emerging markets” of Russia, China and eBay. In a single raid 
in 2009, the State Office of Criminal Investigations in Stuttgart seized around 1000 
forgeries of works by Alberto Giacometti, an artist who only produced some 500 
sculptural works (Rost 2015: R3). The picture we get of the art of the Russian Revo-
lution is also horrific (Lorch 2013: 13; 2015: 17). The market for this art has largely 
collapsed since the beginning of the 1990s on account of a flood of fakes, the pro-
duction of which has for some years now taken on an industrial character, with its 
own galleries, experts, marketing systems and research institutes. The most recent 
high-point in this development was a case brought before a court in Wiesbaden in 
February 2017, after investigators of the Federal Office of Criminal Investigations 
seized more than 1500 dubious works in the style of the Russian avant-garde. In 
situations like these, Steinfeld s̓ analysis rings especially true, that “at some point, 
art history and the study of art just stop working” (2015: 9).
It is by no means the case that these sorts of practices only end up harming the 
art market and speculators, for whom our sympathy may, with some justification, 
be limited. Art history and the study of art, not to mention the general public, are 
affected too, and seriously. Exhibitions are prevented from taking place, certain 
books are unable to be published, others, including catalogues, are only financed, 
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written and published in order that two or three doubtful works can be included 
and in this way “authenticated”. Thus there exists no catalogue of the drawings of 
Constantin Brâncuși, one of the ‘founding fathers’ of modern sculpture. Nor will 
there be one in the foreseeable future, despite the fact that such a catalogue would 
be indispensable for the investigation of this side of his creative activity. This lack 
amounts to a long-term impairment of study and curatorial work in the area, and 
obstructs our understanding of it. However the large number of forgeries in this 
area, which makes the prospect of producing a catalogue a long and difficult busi-
ness, is not the only hindrance. It is even more the conjunction of the difficulty 
of the work with the juridical context in which it would have to take place that 
is decisive. Particularly in the USA, a stage has been reached where in the case 
of several leading modern artists, nobody can any longer be found who would be 
willing to provide an expert opinion concerning the authenticity of a newly dis-
covered work, for fear less of the juridical ramifications of an error than of being 
sued for compensation for decreases in value resulting from a negative evaluation 
of a work. The interaction between the scale of forging practices and the legal con-
text in which this practice takes place is something that requires attention — much 
more than is possible here.
The reason for emphasising the scale at which forgery is now carried out is that 
only in this way is it possible to appreciate the real damage done by this form of 
“mimesis”. In the catalogue to the legendary exhibition Fake? The Art of Decep­
tion, held at the British Museum in 1990, editor Mark Jones summarised this 
damage as follows:
When a group of fakes is accepted into the canon of genuine work 
all subsequent judgements about the artist or period in question are 
based on perceptions built in part upon the fakes themselves. […] This, 
finally, is our complaint against fakes. It is not that they cheat their 
purchasers of money, reprehensible though that is, but that they loosen 
our hold on reality, deform and falsify our understanding of the past. 
(1990: 16)
In this respect I retain a measure of scepticism vis-à-vis the title of this conference 
collection Faking, Forging, Counterfeiting. Discredited Practices at the Margins 
of Mimesis, which suggests, at the very least, that forgeries are ultimately unjustly 
discredited. Accordingly, the title I have chosen for my own essay, Forgery: The 
Art of Deception, is also meant ironically. Of the hundreds of forgeries with which 
I have had to do in the last 25 years, or more precisely, of the hundreds of works 
with which I have had to do in the last 25 years of which one was required to ask 
whether or not they were authentic works by Brâncuși or perhaps merely falsely 
attributed to him, or indeed forged, perhaps only 1 in 100 was even in the slightest 
‘artistically productive’.
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A recent article on contemporary art claims that the replicative practices of con-
temporary art go to show that the basic assumptions of the concept of forgery are 
problematic. When, in summary, the author claims that “in light of the adaptations 
carried out by conceptual artists, the authenticity of the original itself — and with it 
also of its counterfeit — are revealed as ‘deceptive phantasms’” (Frohne 2006: 368), 
then that is accurate — for the works of contemporary art being described. What is 
problematic about this stance is the way the author s̓ ultimate formulation implicitly 
extends the idea of the deceptive character of the conceptual dyad of original and 
forgery, making it into a universal determination. It is necessary to make distinc-
tions here. Not because these things bear no relationship. Of course, the way we 
think about past practices of forgery is affected by what forgery has become today, 
in an era of the global counterfeiting both of commodities and of reality itself. 
But if it is true that in modern and contemporary art — since Duchamp, roughly 
speaking — the basic meaning of the idea of originality and thus also the cate-
gorical difference between original and forgery has sometimes been subverted in 
artistically and theoretically interesting ways, that does not mean that this is simi-
larly true for a painting by, say, Monet, or for the relationship between a drawing 
by Monet and a Monet drawing as forged by Eric Hebborn. The conceptual dyad of 
original and forgery is an historical one and must be grasped in its specific quality 
in every particular case.
As you will have presumably noticed I decided to write this essay in a narrative 
mode. I would like this mode to be understood as a reminder that the world of 
forgeries is itself powerfully determined by stories, by narrative framings. Not-
withstanding the predictable topoi and framing clichés that accompany any new 
work that turns up, such narrative fabrics usually have a particular weave that can 
give us important insights into a forger s̓ strategy and the quality of the work pre-
sented. In the case of doubtful sculptures from Romania attributed to Brâncuși, for 
example, such stories usually say that the piece was buried in order to keep it out of 
reach of the state apparatus and was therefore — unfortunately — recently cleaned. 
This “explains” why in recent decades the piece in question has never appeared in 
official contexts and why its surface now looks like it does. In short, it is a story that 
uses an apparently unquestionable historical context to deprive experts of the op-
portunity to base their judgments on questions of provenance and on the quality of 
the surface and patina. The way these basic elements are presented and connected 
with others can be extraordinarily informative.
Experience shows that it is better to take a serious interest in this narrative fab-
ric, in its stories, legends and thematic stylisations, in order to be able to tear it open 
from inside, as it were, rather than attempting to avoid it altogether. Because the 
danger is that in trying to sidestep this fabric, one will become all the more hope-
lessly entangled in one of its threads. It is here, in the invention of contextualising 
stories and placement strategies, and not in the theoretical provocation and material 
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execution of the forgeries themselves, that the often truly productive aspect of the 
forgery industry ultimately lies; or, to return once more to the ironic formulation of 
the title of this text, its ‘art’. 
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The Artist and the Mountebank 
Rochesterʼs Alexander Bendo and the Dynamics  
of Forgery and Illusion in 17th-Century Art
Jacqueline Hylkema (Leiden University)     
In July 1676, a new mountebank arrived in London, set up shop in Tower Street and 
promptly published a handbill to advertise his services. In itself this was noth ing 
new or particularly noteworthy, but Alexander Bendo s̓ advertisement was extra-
ordinary, in the sense that it addressed the very notion mountebanks tended to 
avoid mentioning: deception. In Early Modern Europe, mountebanks — doctors 
who trav elled from town to town and would usually present their medicines and 
skills on a small stage — were generally thought to be guilty of a multitude of 
different decept ions, most notably the selling of useless cures with the aid of 
invented exotic persona, forged diplomas from imaginary universities, and let-
ters of recommend ations from invented persons of note. In fact, mountebanks 
were so commonly associated with fakery that they soon became a byword for 
deception.1
Alexander Bendo, however, claimed to be the genuine article: “if I appear to any 
one like a counterfeit”, he wrote, it could only be because as an honest man, he is 
“the counterfeit s̓ example, his original […]. Is it therefore my fault if the cheat by 
his wits and endeavours makes himself so like me, that consequently I cannot avoid 
resembling of him?” (Rochester 1676: 2-3) Despite these protestations, Alexander 
Bendo was a counterfeit, but not in the sense that he was a deceiving mountebank: 
he was in fact the creation of the Baroque poet and playwright John Wilmot, the 
Earl of Rochester. The handbill was part of an elaborate imposture that according 
to Gilbert Burnet, Rochester s̓ first biographer, had seen Rochester: “set up in the 
1 | I am very grateful to the Stichting Fonds Catharine van Tussenbroek, 
whose grant for my Occasional Studentship at the Warburg Institute in 
2011 enabled me to start the research for this study there. I also thank 
Professor Caroline van Eck and Dr. Joy Burrough-Boenisch for reading 
the text and providing me with their valuable comments.
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Tower­Street for an Italian Mountebank, where he had a Stage, and practised Phys-
ick for some Weeks not without success” (1680: 27). 
The Alexander Bendo episode has proven to be irresistible to Rochester s̓ later 
biographers (it has appeared in every biography since Burnet s̓ as a testimony to 
Rochester s̓ eccentricity and outrageousness) and literary historians alike. In recent 
decades, the handbill has found its way into academic studies, where it has been 
discussed in the context of satire and Restoration politics. This paper will not argue 
with this particular approach — the handbill very obviously includes an exercise in 
political satire — but wants to propose that the text is also part of a very specific dis-
course in which the mountebank served as a vehicle for Baroque artists to explore 
the dynamics of deception in their work. The concept of deception was fundamen-
tal to Baroque aesthetics and there was no greater acclaim for the Ba roque artist if 
his virtuosity managed to deceive the eye of his audience — a notion reflected in the 
very name of one of the most popular genres in Baroque painting, the trompe l o̓eil. 
All over Europe, Baroque artists — painters and playwrights in particu-
lar — would explore and discuss this trait in their work, particularly by drawing 
sustained comparisons between themselves and the mountebank. Although some 
of these comparisons have been discussed in isolation, very little attention, if any, 
has been paid to how they relate to one another. This article will attempt to provide 
a first sketch of the illusionist artist / mountebank discourse, which I will introduce 
with a drawing by the Dutch artist Hendrick Goltzius, the mountebank scene from 
Ben Jonson s̓ comedy Volpone (1606) and Gerrit Dou s̓ painting The Quack (1652). 
Rochester s̓ handbill, I will argue, is a continuation of this artist / mountebank dis-
course, in the sense that it draws comparisons that are similar to those found in the 
works of Jonson and Dou but also takes them further, in an intricate game with 
representational boundaries and his readers̓ expectations.
the artISt anD the Mountebank
The mountebank was a particularly popular subject in Early Modern Europe, espe-
cially in the Dutch Republic, the Southern Netherlands, Britain, Germany, France 
and Italy.2 He appeared in many different genres, ranging from the stages of 
2 | A small study conducted by six students (Oliver Antczak, Thomas 
Gia coletto, Rian van den Dool, Damiët Schneeweisz, Mariam Orjonikidze 
and Jack Lindsay) in my Research Clinic “Faking It: Political Deception 
in Early Modern Art and Culture” at Leiden University College yielded 
dozens of visual and textual representations of the mountebank for all of 
these countries in the period between 1600 and 1800. The visual repre-
sentation of the mountebank appears to have been particularly popular in 
the Dutch Republic, Britain, Germany, France, and Italy but much less so 
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Molière and Thomas Asselijn to a multitude of cheap prints, as well as paintings 
by artists as diverse as Jan Steen, Jean Tassel and Giovanni Domenico Tiepolo.3 
Although there appear to have been some cultural differences in the approach to 
the subject, the emphasis in these representations was usually placed on the notion 
of the mountebank s̓ deceitful nature and the audience s̓ gullibility. The relation-
ship between these two is, for example, expressed succinctly in the satirical English 
print The Infallible Mountebank or Quack Doctor (ca. 1688-1705, fig. 1). In the text 
that accompanies the image, the mountebank presents his audience with a long list 
of obviously false claims, which he concludes: “Read, Judge and Try. And if you 
Die, never believe me more.”
However, this wealth of visual and textual representations of the mountebank 
hides a much smaller and rather more sophisticated discourse in which artists 
would compare their own craft with that of the mountebank and use him as a vehi-
cle to explore the dynamics with their own audiences.4 Hendrick Goltzius̓ draw ing 
“The Children of Mercury”, from his 1596 The Children of the Planets series, pro-
vides a particularly good introduction to this discourse.5 The drawing, which was 
turned into a print by Goltzius̓ former student Jan Saenredam (fig. 2), depicts Mer-
cury along with the professions associated with him. However, rather than show-
ing Mercury as the protector of merchants, as had been common in the Children 
of the Planets tradition, Goltzius presents him in the context of rhetoric, the art of 
in Eastern Europe and Russia. The discourse in which artists compared 
themselves to the mountebank seems to have been limited mainly to the 
Dutch Republic, Britain, France and Italy.
3 | Steen, Tassel and Tiepolo are just three of the many artists who paint-
ed quacks and their audiences in the 17th and 18th century but they have 
in common that they made several versions of the subject. Jan Steen 
painted his between 1650 and 1660 and all versions are simply known as 
De Kwakzalver — the best-known of these is part of the collection of the 
Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam. Jean Tassel painted at least two, extremely 
similar, versions of his Le Charlatan, one of which is to be found at the 
Musée Massey in Tarbes. Neither version is dated but they were probably 
produced in the 1650s or early 1660s. Giovanni Domenico Tiepolo paint-
ed several versions in the 1750s, including Il Ciarlatano (1751-52), which 
can be found in the collection of the Louvre in Paris.
4 | It must be noted that this discourse is in fact part of a wider one in 
which artists identified with other types of tricksters. For a particularly 
good example, please see Gianlorenzo Berniniʼs only surviving play Lʼ Im-
presario (ca. 1643) and Donald Beecherʼs excellent article on it: “Gian-
lorenzo Berniniʼs The Impresario: The Artist as the Supreme Trickster” 
(1984).
5 | Also see my brief discussion of this image in Hylkema 2014: 6-7.
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Figure 1: Anonymous, “The Infallible Mountebank” or Quack Doctor, ca. 1688­
1705, engraving, British Museum, London, © Trustees of the British Museum.
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Figure 2: Jan Saenredam, “The Children of Mercury”, ca. 1596, engraving after 
a drawing by Hendrick Goltzius, British Museum, London, © Trustees of the 
British Museum.
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persuasion, which he emphasizes by placing two rhetoricians in the foreground. To 
Mercury s̓ left, we see the painter holding a palette and maulstick, and the sculptor, 
busily carving a human figure. In the background, an orator is addressing a crowd 
and to the right, a theatrical performance is in progress. In between the stage and 
the painter, another of Mercury s̓ children is found: the mountebank, presenting a 
bottle of medicine.
These professions have in common that they all deceive their audiences, a 
no tion that Goltzius emphasizes by placing a weaving shuttle between the quack 
and the painter. This shuttle is a reference to the early modern Dutch word 
‘webbe’, which meant a woven tissue but was also used for literary texts and in the 
phrase ‘een webbe van leughens’, which literally translates as ‘a tissue of lies’ or 
‘ein Lügen gewebe’. But what lies do Mercury s̓ children tell their audiences? The 
mounte bank tells a multitude of lies but in the end, they all serve the same purpose: 
to persuade his audience that the bottle he is holding up contains a potent medicine, 
rather than mere water — or worse. This indeed is similar to the kind of lie Mer-
cury s̓ artists tell their respective audiences: theirs is the lie that occurs when a work 
of art transcends its representational frame and the viewer experi ences and treats it, 
however briefly, as that which it represents. We reach out to touch a hand or shoul-
der, only to touch cold marble and realize that we have fallen for the sculptor s̓ lie.
Drawing on the anthropological work of Alfred Gell, Caroline van Eck has 
theorized the process in which the viewer forgets the “demarcations between art 
and life” and experiences a sculpture as alive as the “living presence response” (van 
Eck 2015: 11). In Baroque sculpture, the eyes played a particularly important part 
in achieving this effect: Claude-Henri Watelet wrote about Bernini s̓ gift to convey 
“the illusion of life”: “the ‘living’ eyes of the statue fix the viewers and bring to the 
soul of the viewer an idea of life, and the sensation of gratified desire” (van Eck 
2015: 65-66, translation by van Eck). The trick to this effect lies in what Hannelore 
Hägele has described as the process of carving in the gaze. This entails adding a 
focused pupil to the sculpture s̓ eye and this is exactly what Goltzius̓ sculptor is 
doing in “The Children of Mercury”: sitting on the floor, he is cutting a pupil into 
one of the eyes of female head in front of him. Hägele writes:
As the beholderʼs eye follows the path of the glance to its object, he an-
ticipates a fuller measure of eye-tugging and darting, just as in real life. 
A quickening sensation is thus effected in him partly by what he sees, 
but more by what he senses may happen were the frozen image to be 
quickened into motion. (2014: 136-37)
That response is the moment when the artist succeeds in making the spectator 
believe that this is flesh and blood rather than cold marble, and it is the ultimate 
victory of Baroque mimesis, in which the work of art is experienced, however fleet-
ingly, as alive and as that which it represents, rather than a mere representation.
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It is important to note that Goltzius̓ drawing does not dismiss or condemn 
Mercury s̓ deceptive brood. In this respect, it would set the tone for the many com-
parisons that would be drawn between artists and mountebanks in the century to 
come. Contrary to neo-Platonic and Calvinist debates about the deceptive nature of 
the imitative arts, these comparisons celebrated the artist s̓ ability to create illusions 
and discussed this in terms of craftsmanship and virtuosity as well as the pleasure 
that it gave audiences. In this sense, this discourse was strongly related to the 17th 
century s̓ renewed interest in the story of the contest between the Greek painters, 
Zeuxis and Parrhasius, in which the latter deceived his rival by painting curtains 
that were so lifelike, that Zeuxis tried to open them and lost the contest as a result. 
In his Inleyding tot de Hooge Schoole der Schilderkonst (1678) the Dutch painter 
and art theorist Samuel van Hoogstraten concludes his praise of the achievement of 
Parrhasius with the remark that the perfect painting is “like a mirror of nature, that 
makes things that are not there appear as if they are, and as such is deceptive in a 
permissible, entertaining and praiseworthy manner” (25, my translation).
the PlayWrIght anD the PaInter:  
ben JonSon anD gerrIt Dou
In the theatre, the mountebank was regularly used as a vehicle for the exploration 
of the dynamics between the performance and its audience, a notion beautifully 
illustrated by the mountebank scene (Act II, scene 2) in Ben Jonson s̓ comedy 
Volpone. In this scene, the villainous Volpone impersonates an Italian mountebank 
by the name of Scoto of Mantua and in this guise addresses a crowd on stage. The 
performance is witnessed by two characters — Sir Politic and Peregrine — who 
provide a running commentary on their reception of the mountebank. Scoto s̓ 
speech confirms Sir Politic s̓ belief that mountebanks are “great general scholars” 
and “excellent physicians” (Jonson 1995: 35) whereas Peregrine will not be con-
vinced and mocks Sir Politic and the rest of the crowd for falling under Scoto s̓ 
spell. 
It must be noted that the mountebank scene in Volpone is hardly the only case 
of deception in Jonson s̓ work: from Every Man in His Humour (1598) to The 
Mag netic Lady (first staged in 1632), almost every single one of Jonson s̓ comic 
plots is driven by imposture, forgery, hoaxing, and other kinds of trickery. However, 
the mountebank s̓ formal performance within the actual performance does offer 
Jonson the opportunity to explore the mimetic relationship between deception and 
truth through a series of implicit comparisons. What Jonson presents his audience 
with is in fact the performance of an actual deception, Volpone s̓ impersonation of 
Scoto Mantua. And what a glorious deception it is too: apart from Peregrine, Scoto s̓ 
audience is completely taken in by the mountebank s̓ rhetorical virtuosity and are 
persuaded of the effectiveness of Scoto s̓ potion. More importantly, everyone falls 
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for the actual deception: Volpone s̓ impersonation of Scoto. Even Peregrine, who 
prides himself on his scepticism, does not for a moment wonder whether Scoto of 
Mantua is who he claims to be.
Mimesis plays an important part in this success. At the beginning of the 
scene, as Scoto s̓ stage is erected, Sir Politic and Peregrine both describe their own 
general views of the mountebank: whereas Politic admires them, “They are the 
only knowing men of Europe!”, Peregrine has heard “that they are most lewd im-
posters; made of all terms and shreds” (Jonson 1995: 35). Scoto s̓ speech confirms 
both these views, in the sense that Volpone understands exactly what constitutes 
a mountebank in his audience s̓ eyes, creates its likeness and then brings it to life 
before them. This notion echoes a remark by Francis Bacon that Jonson would 
later quote in Discoveries (1640): “deceit is the likeness of truth” (Jonson 1892: 66). 
Without ever pointing out the comparison explicitly, the mise en abyme structure of 
the mountebank scene gives Jonson the opportunity to show his audience what he 
does as a playwright: he understands what constitutes their truth and then imitates 
that on stage to make them believe his illusion.
Half a century later, the Dutch painter Gerrit Dou would present a very similar 
point in his painting The Quack (fig. 3), albeit in a rather more explicit manner.6 At that 
stage Dou was celebrated throughout Europe for his gift to produce extraordinarily 
lifelike paintings. The Dutch poet Dirk Traudenius assured his readers that if Zeuxis 
were to see Dou s̓ work, “[he] would be deceived all over again. Here it is not paint 
that lies on the panel / but life and spirit” (1662: 17, my translation). In fact, Dou would 
often include deceptively real curtains in his paintings, as in the Rijksmuseum s̓ Man 
Smoking a Pipe (ca. 1650), to allude to his status as the modern Parrhasius. He was ob-
viously proud of his extraordinary mimetic powers, a notion that is abundantly present 
in The Quack, in which he, as Eric Jan Sluijter writes, “presented with remarkable wit 
his unconcealed pride in the ‘deceit’ he was able to produce” (1998: 195).
In Dou s̓ Quack, the mountebank takes centre-stage, literally, and is shown 
presenting his captivated audience with a bottle of medicine. He is accompanied 
by all the exotic props traditionally associated with mountebanks: a monkey, a 
para sol, and a medical diploma so outrageously grand that it cannot be real. How-
ever, where as other artist / mountebank comparisons are abstract, like Goltzius ,̓ or 
implicit, like Jonson s̓, Dou makes his specific and personal by including a self- 
portrait in the image. In fact, Ivan Gaskell points out that “the scene is set at the 
Galgewater in Leiden, where Dou had his studio” (1982: 18). The painter is shown 
hanging out of the window of his studio directly behind the quack, holding a palette. 
The symmetry in how the figures of the mountebank and Dou present the attributes 
of their respective professions immediately establishes an explicit comparison be-
6 | A shorter discussion of this work was included in my article “The 
pleas ure of being deceived: spectatorship in the arts and other decep-
tions in eighteenth-century England” (Hylkema 2014).
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Figure 3: Gerrit Dou, “The Quack”, 1652, oil on canvas, Museum Boijmans  
Van Beuningen, Rotterdam, © Stichting Museum Boijmans Van Beuningen.
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tween the two. Dou, however, is not watching the mountebank but directly confronts 
the viewer s̓ gaze. This creates a relationship between spectator and painter that 
explicitly resembles that between the mountebank and his audience. I, Dou appears 
to tell his viewer, am doing exactly to you what he is to them: I am deceiving you.
the Poet: roCheSter anD alexanDer benDo 
Although Gerrit Dou s̓ painting has, to my best knowledge, never been connect-
ed to any of the many other works in which the artist compares himself to the 
mountebank, it is quite possibly the most discussed example of this discourse on 
artistic deception. Rochester s̓ Alexander Bendo, however, has so far escaped such 
attention, even though elements of the handbill clearly deal with the concept of 
mimesis and deceit. What makes the Alexander Bendo case particularly intriguing 
is that Rochester takes the comparison one step further: whereas Dou went beyond 
Jonson s̓ implicit comparison by literally inserting himself in the work, the line 
between Rochester and Bendo is very thin indeed. 
Although accounts of the Bendo episode vary, most agree that he started the 
imposture in the summer of 1676 in order to escape being arrested and charged 
with the murder of his friend Captain Downs.7 On 17 June that year, Rochester 
and several friends had become involved in a drunken brawl in Epsom that ended 
in Downs̓ death. It has never become clear what happened exactly, but Roches-
ter, who had fled the scene, was widely held responsible. With a possible murder 
trial hanging over his head, Rochester decided to lie low in London, disguised as 
Alexander Bendo (Greene 1974: 106; Johnson 2004: 250). Several years after 
Rochester s̓ death, his former servant Thomas Alcock published The Famous 
Pathologist or The Noble Mountebank (1687), which greatly elaborated on the 
account of the imposture in Gilbert Burnet s̓ biography. Claiming that he had 
assisted Rochester in the imposture, Alcock describes how carpenters had set 
up a stage for Rochester at his lodgings in Tower Street, where he lived and 
practised as 
the noble Doctor Alexandr Bendo, in an old overgrown Green Gown 
[…] —lined through with exotick furrs of diverse colours, an antique Cap, 
a great Revernd Beard, and a Magnificent false Medal sett round with 
glittering Pearl, rubies, and Diamonds of the same cognation, hung abt 
his Neck. (1961: 29)
7 | One notable exception is Vivian de Sola Pinto, who does not connect 
the imposture to the events at Epsom but dates the Bendo imposture one 
year earlier, to 1675, in his introduction to Alcock’s pamphlet (de Sola 
Pinto 1961: 13-14).
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The story of the Bendo imposture has become a firm fixture in Rochester s̓ biog-
raphy: it has proven irresistible to all of Rochester s̓ subsequent biographers and 
featured prominently in Laurence Dunmore s̓ film about Rochester s̓ life, The Lib­
ertine (2004). The imposture has also found its way into academia, for instance in 
Kirk Combe s̓ article “Making Monkeys of Important Men: Performance Satire and 
Rochester s̓ Alexander Bendo s̓ Brochure” (2012), which approaches the weeks that 
Rochester lived and practised as Bendo as “a prolonged period of performance art” 
(56). Combe s̓ analysis, which he mainly bases on the handbill, Alcock s̓ account 
and — as he readily admits — “educated guesswork” (ibid.), is intriguing and very 
relevant in the context of the artist/mountebank discourse. The problem, how ever, 
is that there is not a shred of evidence that the imposture actually happened. As 
Germaine Greer points out in her book on Rochester s̓ life and works, there is no 
mention of Alexander Bendo in the transactions of the Society of Apothecaries, 
which she argues must mean that “Alcock s̓ tale can hardly be true” (2000: 66).
Kate Loveman also casts doubt on the authenticity of the imposture by pointing 
out that it is strange that Alcock was the only individual “to claim to have witnessed 
the cheat by so notorious a courtier. If the stage performance and the laboratory 
visits had indeed occurred, we might expect to find more people claiming to have 
been present, or at least telling stories about others who had fallen for the trick” 
(Loveman 2008: 15). Loveman concludes: “On the basis of the current evidence 
then, and rather regretfully, it seems necessary to concur with Greer s̓ judgement 
that no prolonged impersonation occurred” (ibid.). The story of the imposture does 
indeed seem to be too good to be true and not particularly likely in the light of 
Roch ester s̓ predicament in the summer of 1676: when trying to avoid being arrest-
ed for murder, one would hardly try to attract attention in the manner described in 
Alcock s̓ pamphlet. Indeed, the motto Alcock included in his title page “Si popu-
lus vult decipi decipiantur” (if people want to be deceived, let them be deceived) 
may well have been a warning to his readers rather than a reference to the alleged 
victims of Rochester s̓ deception. 
The imposture may be such stuff as Ben Jonson s̓ comedies are made on but 
Rochester most certainly did produce the handbill. The British Library keeps its 
surviving copy (fig. 4) in a folder with genuine 17th-century mountebank advertise-
ments, and it is so similar to the others that it is easily overlooked. The title page, in 
which Bendo identifies himself and greets his audience, “To all Gentlemen, Ladies, 
and others, whether of City, Town, or Country, ALEXANDER BENDO wishes 
all Health and Prosperity” is certainly typical of the genre. On closer inspection, 
there are some differences: at eight pages, it is longer than most genuine handbills 
and is perhaps more elegantly printed. However, on the whole, Alexander Bendo s̓ 
handbill looks authentic, to the extent that it could be defined as a forgery in terms 
of its appearance. A forger, however, would have tried to make his creation indistin-
guishable from authentic mountebank handbills and that is definitely not the case in 
Rochester s̓ handbill — on the contrary. 
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Figure 4: Rochester, John Wilmot, 1676, Earl of, front page of To all gentlemen, 
ladies, and others, whether of city, town, or country: Alexander Bendo wisheth 
all health and prosperity, British Library, London, © British Library Board, 
General Reference Collection C.112.f.9.(41.).
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The handbill opens with a discussion about fraud, continues with a shorter sec-
tion on the deceitful nature of politics and then embarks on a lengthy advertise-
ment of Alexander Bendo s̓ medicines and treatments. The opening alone may have 
raised suspicion in Rochester s̓ readers: although mountebanks did compare their 
skills and medicines to those of their competitors, they were generally careful to 
avoid mentioning the concept of deception. Bendo, however, introduces it immedi-
ately, in a sustained attack on his fellow mountebanks. As Greer notes: “A mounte-
bank who persists in reminding people that they are being practised on by a ‘Bas-
tard race of Quacks and Cheats’ will hardly do well” (2000: 65).
The unusual opening of the handbill may have given Rochester s̓ readers reason 
to doubt the handbill s̓ authenticity but the second part of the text decidedly lacks 
any resemblance to real advertisements. Bendo embarks on a comparison between 
the mountebank and the politician, in which he concludes that:
The politician (by his example no doubt) finding how the people are taken 
with specious, miraculous, impossibilities, plays the same game; pro-
tests, declares, promises I know not what things, which he s̓ sure can 
nee̓r be brought about. […] So you see the politician is, and must be a 
mountebank in state affairs; and the mounte bank no doubt, if he thrives, 
is an errant politician in physic. (Rochester 1676: 3)
Academic discussions of the handbill appear to have focused exclusively on the 
satirical section of the text and ignored its opening and, particularly, the third and 
by far longest part of the text, in which Bendo advertises his medicines and skills. I 
would, however, argue that these two parts firmly place the text in the art ist / moun-
tebank discourse. Like Jonson s̓ mountebank scene and Dou s̓ painting, Roches-
ter s̓ handbill reflects on the illusionist nature of its art, and like Jonson and Dou, 
Rochester uses the mountebank as a vehicle to demonstrate his own virtuosity in 
fooling his audience. There are however several crucial differences between the 
three works, the first of which is found in how their respective audiences encounter 
and experience the works. 
Jonson s̓ mountebank scene and Dou s̓ painting are explicitly offered as works 
of art and Jonson and Dou are explicitly identified as their creators. Scoto s̓ speech 
is so clever in imitating real mountebanks that the play s̓ audience may have for-
gotten briefly that they are in the theatre, but the experience is only temporary. Be-
fore and after they have been seduced by the illusion of the performance, the audi-
ence knows that they are in the theatre, and will place and appreciate the experience 
in this context. The same applies to Dou s̓ painting: even though the tapestry on the 
quack s̓ stage looks deceptively real, the viewer is aware that it is offered with in a 
painting. The moment the viewer is fooled and reaches out to touch the fabric does 
not last: like Zeuxis, he or she will feel oil on canvas, and then remember that it was 
a painting all along.
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The reader s̓ experience of Rochester s̓ handbill is entirely different. Contrary 
to Dou s̓ viewer and Jonson s̓ audience, Rochester s̓ reader sets out thinking that the 
text is authentic but the author then deliberately spoils this effect with the ambiguity 
of the opening. Rochester s̓ reader realizes that he or she may have been fooled, and 
that the text in front of him or her may be satirical fiction rather than an authentic 
handbill. In other words, whereas the illusionist effect in Jonson s̓ and Dou s̓ re-
spective works is achieved when their mimetic virtuosity makes their audiences 
and readers forget, however briefly, that what they see is representation, Rochester 
manages to frame his work in such a way that it deceives his reader from the very 
start — and then he stops the deception himself by revealing that it is fiction. 
Another difference is found in how these works relate to their respective 
creators. Whereas Jonson s̓ comparison between the playwright and Scoto the 
mounte bank is abstract and implicit, Dou inserts himself in the image, making 
the comparison explicit and personal. Rochester, however, takes this further, par-
ticularly in places where the text seems so authentic that the boundary between 
the authorial voice and Bendo appears to dissolve. This holds particularly true for 
the part that critics usually ignore, in which the text moves from obvious political 
satire to an advertisement of Bendo s̓ skills and medicines. This section takes up 
more than half of the handbill and, like the opening, it is marked by ambiguity. 
In most ways, the text is remarkably similar to authentic handbills and treatises 
on mountebank remedies of the period: all the illnesses that Bendo mentions, for 
instance, can be found in authentic handbills. These include barrenness, venereal 
diseases, inflammations and obstructions, bad breath, obesity and scurvy, of which 
he writes:
First, I will (by the leave of God) perfectly cure that Labes Britannica, or 
grand English disease, the scurvy; and that with such ease to my pa-
tient, that he shall not be sensible of the least inconvenience whilst I steal 
his distemper from him; I know there are many, who treat this disease 
with mercury, antimony, spirits, and salts, being dangerous remedies, 
in which I shall meddle very little, and with great caution, but by more 
secure, gentle, and less fallible medicines, together with the observation 
of some few rules in diet, perfectly cure the patient. (Rochester 1676: 4)
Scurvy was rife in England at the time and Bendo s̓ observations on the illness 
sound sensible as well as knowledgeable — mercury and antimony were indeed 
used as remedies against scurvy in 17th-century England (Baron 2009: 319) and 
Bendo is absolutely correct to point out that they were dangerous. 
The fragment also closely mimics authentic handbills in other ways, for in-
stance the structure of an authentic mountebank s̓ text: it introduces an illness 
and then focuses on the effect of the treatment on the patient, often comparing 
it to the remedies used by competitors. In several places, Bendo s̓ advertisement 
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emphasizes the safety of his remedies: he promises that if he, Bendo, is unfa-
miliar with an illness, a patient need not be afraid of “having experiments tried 
upon him; a privilege he can never hope to enjoy, either in the hands of the grand 
doctors of the court and town, or in those of the lesser quacks and mountebanks” 
(Rochester 1676: 5). 
This emphasis on safety was a common feature in authentic handbills, as was 
the assertion of the mountebank s̓ exotic qualifications. “Many quacks,” writes 
Tobias B. Hug, “advertising through handbills in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries claimed to have travelled through various places in Europe 
and ‘beyond seas’, to have cured kings or to possess medicines from abroad” (Hug 
2009: 54). Bendo includes these claims too, after a long list of his particular medical 
accomplishments: “The knowledge of these secrets I gathered in my travels abroad 
(where I have spent my time ever since I was fifteen years old to this my nine and 
twentieth year) in France and Italy” (Rochester 1676: 7).
Finally, Bendo concludes his handbill:
They that will do me the favour to come to me, shall be sure from three of 
the clock in the afternoon till eight at night at my lodgings in Tower-street, 
next door to the sign of the Black Swan, at a goldsmith s̓ house to find 
Their humble servant, ALEXANDER BENDO. (Rochester 1676: 8)
This too strongly resembles the final part of authentic bills. One genuine handbill 
published anonymously in London sometime between 1660 and 1685 closes with 
the remark that the doctor s̓ residence is “in Holborn, within 3 doors of Brownlow- 
street, next door to an Apothecarys, and over against the signe of the Magpy, 
who is to be spoken with from 8 a clock in the morning till 12 at Noon” (Anon. 
1660-85: 2).
If Rochester s̓ handbill had consisted merely of the advertisement, it would not 
only have persuaded his readers that Bendo was a genuine mountebank but also that 
he was knowledgeable and sincere. However, this persuasive quality does render 
the text ambiguous again: the writing is much better, in terms of its wording and 
structure, than that of authentic mountebank handbills. The effect of this ambiguity 
is wholly deliberate and very much in line with how Jonson and especially Dou use 
the mountebank as a vehicle to show off their illusionist virtuosity. In the opening 
of the handbill Bendo claims:
All I shall say for myself on this score is this, if I appear to any one like 
a counterfeit, even for the sake of that chieﬂy ought I to be construed a 
true man, who is the counterfeit s̓ example, his original, and that which 
he employs his industry and pains to imitate and copy. Is it therefore my 
fault if the cheat by his wits and endeavours makes himself so like me, 
that consequently I cannot avoid resembling of him? (Rochester 1676: 2)
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In the context of the opening, Bendo is of course comparing himself to cheating 
fellow mountebanks, but when the reader goes back to this fragment after he or 
she has read the satirical part, in which the text reveals its fictional nature, and the 
highly persuasive advertisement, it takes on a whole new meaning. Now that the 
reader has realized that Bendo cannot be anything but the fictional representation 
of a mountebank, Bendo s̓ remark becomes a reflection on the nature of artistic mi-
mesis as well as a showing-off of Rochester s̓ genius as a writer. If the counterfeit 
is understood to be the artist, who “employs his industry and pains to imitate and 
copy”, then the creation of Bendo is a true triumph, in the sense that Rochester, with 
his superior wits and endeavours, has created a character that is so convincing that 
Bendo not only appears to be real to the reader but also the ideal mountebank, of 
which real mountebanks appear to be mere copies. The effect implied here is simi-
lar to that of living presence, in which the work appears to the reader to be the living 
original, “a true man”, rather than the fictional representation.
Bendo s̓ handbill is commonly referred to as satire, possibly because of the 
traditional critical emphasis on this section of the text. This, however, is a shame 
because this perception neglects the text s̓ opening and the advertisement, neither 
of which are satirical or place the handbill as a whole firmly in the artist / mounte-
bank discourse. From its highly deceptive title page to its equally deceitful sign-off, 
Rochester s̓ handbill bounces back and forth between forgery, highly persuasive 
textual illusionism, and obvious literary fiction, thus creating a game between him 
and his readers that is more complex than the comparisons drawn by Jonson, Dou 
and other playwrights and painters. Where they compare themselves, either implic-
itly or explicitly, to the mountebank, the boundaries between Rochester and Bendo 
dissolve — to materialize again when the author reveals himself to assert his illu-
sionist virtuosity. As such, Rochester s̓ handbill echoes the motto that Jan Saen-
redam added to his print of Goltzius̓ image: “Me dys commendat facunde gratia 
lingue, Et varias rudibus monstro mortalibus artes” — The grace of my eloquent 
tongue recommends me to the gods, and I show the crude mortals various arts. 
In Latin, ‘artes’ refers to arts as well as tricks, and the ambiguity not only serv es 
Goltzius̓ image beautifully but also turns the motto into a rather apt description of 
Alexander Bendo s̓ handbill and Rochester s̓ virtuosity in deception.
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Aping the Master 
19 th-Century Voltaire Pastiches and  
the Anxieties of Modern Authorship
Manuel Mühlbacher (LMU Munich)
The Souvenirs de la Marquise de Créquy, published in 1834, relate the following 
anecdote: in Ferney, Voltaire receives the visit of a young clockmaker who has 
recently been convicted of adultery. Voltaire makes fun of him, giving him the 
nickname “Monsieur le Fornicateur”. Not understanding Latin, Voltaire s̓ servants 
mistake “Fornicateur” as the clockmaker s̓ surname and begin to call him by the 
same name. The clockmaker believes that they are deliberately aping Voltaire s̓ 
joke and rebukes them harshly: “est-ce que vous prétendez imiter votre maître et 
singer M. de Voltaire?” (Courchamps 1834: 218) Without consciously doing so, the 
ser vants have imitated Voltaire s̓ way of speaking, his personal style. In the termi-
nology of literary criticism, such imitation is called a pastiche.
Since the early days of his celebrity, many writers have imitated Voltaire and 
tried to have their works attributed to him. The Souvenirs de la Marquise de Cré­
quy are no more innocent in this respect. Not only are the memoirs themselves 
apocryphal (Courchamps tried to pass them off as being by the Marquise), they 
also contain an apocryphal Voltaire letter (209-11). For those readers who believed 
the Souvenirs to be authentic, the apocryphal Voltaire letter might have appeared 
so, too. And even if the reader did not regard the letter as authentic, this pastiche 
might have distracted his or her attention from the bigger forgery in which it stands. 
It goes without saying that the anecdote about “Monsieur le Fornicateur” is as un-
trustworthy as the letter.
Despite the huge number of acknowledged and unacknowledged pastich-
es in Voltaire s̓ style, it is only recently that Voltaire scholars have begun to 
address this corpus.1 In order to further explore it, this article will pay attention to a 
1 | Joseph Patrick Lee (2004) develops some categories for under-
standing how texts can be attributed to Voltaire and cites interesting 
examples of apocryphal texts that found their way into editions of Voltaireʼs 
collected works. Nicholas Cronk recently studied 18th-century Voltaire 
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specific and little known group of Voltaire pastiches: the apocryphal Voltaire letter 
in Courchamp s̓ Souvenirs de la Marquise de Créquy shows us that such pastich-
es continued to proliferate after Voltaire s̓ death. According to Paul Aron s̓ and 
Jacques Espagnon s̓ Répertoire des pastiches et parodies littéraires des XIXe et 
XXe siècles (2009: 520), Voltaire remains one of the most imitated and parodied 
authors of French literature in the 19th and 20th centuries.2 This article will argue 
that the 19th-century reactions to Voltaire s̓ practice of publishing and to the pas-
tiches written in his style reflect a fundamental change in conceptions of author-
ship. I will focus on some Voltaire pastiches written between 1800 and 1855, and 
in particular on the outstanding case of the pastiche writer Nicolas Châtelain. 
Furthermore, I will exclude parodies from the corpus and concentrate on two 
particular categories in Gérard Genette s̓ classification of intertextuality, the 
pastiche and the forgery (1982: 37). The former is the admitted imitation of an 
author s̓ style without satirical intent. The forgery differs from the pastiche only in 
so far as it breaks the “contrat de pastiche” (93) with the reader and tries to delude 
him or her into taking it as an original. In order to understand why Voltaire pastich-
es come to take on a new meaning after 1800, though, one must adopt a historical 
approach.
authorShIP anD PaStIChe WrItIng:  
froM the 18th to the 19th Century
As studies in 18th-century authorship have shown, to publish one s̓ texts anony-
mously or under a pseudonym was rather the rule than the exception before the 
French Revolution (Tunstall 2011: 674). In fact, “Voltaire” is a pen name of the man 
called François-Marie Arouet. But even in the context of Ancien Régime publish-
ing, Voltaire s̓ multifarious conception of authorship sticks out. As the catalogue 
of the French National Library tells us, Voltaire devised more than two hundred 
pseudo nyms to sign his works (Catalogue général 1978: 162-66). Furthermore, he 
was soon extensively and successfully imitated — Georges Bengesco s̓ bibliography 
of Voltaire s̓ works lists some 140 erroneous attributions (1890: 273-380) — and to 
make things even more complicated, Voltaire indiscriminately denied the author-
ship of any text that was attributed to him, including his own. If we take into con-
sideration the sheer mass of his writings, it is easy to imagine what reading Voltaire 
in the 18th century was like: except in the case of some famous works, there was 
often no way of making sure whether a text had actually been authored by him or 
apocrypha (2013) and published some seminal articles on Voltaireʼs 
practice of authorship (2007; 2009; 2011).
2 | The claim I make is based on the number of entries in the index of 
imitated authors.
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not. For instance, an apocryphal sequel to Candide, probably written by Henri Jo-
seph Du Laurens, was read as an original throughout the 18th century and succeeded 
in making its way into the 1880 edition of Voltaire s̓ complete works as compiled 
by Louis Moland.3 Nicholas Cronk has argued that Voltaire himself considered his 
“fakability” as a highly welcome side effect. According to Cronk, Voltaire “does 
not want to own his ideas; on the contrary, he wants to disown them, and so share 
them as widely as possible. Voltaire creates a distinctive style and voice that em-
body a distinctive worldview, and his name comes to stand for a style of thinking 
that reaches beyond him” (Cronk 2013: 573). Even those who successfully imitated 
Voltaire magnified his voice and disseminated his ‘brand’, as defined by a certain 
manner of writing, but also a set of ideas. Fakes thus increased the reach and the 
impact of the Enlightenment campaign run by Voltaire. For this enlightened print-
ing machine to work, the recognisability of the trademark was more important than 
authenticity.
This authorial practice clashes with the paradigm of modern authorship as it 
emerges at the beginning of the 19th century. The contrast between Voltaire s̓ and 
Rousseau s̓ conceptions of authorship, often discussed with regard to 18th-century 
publishing conventions (Sgard 2016: xxii), is equally insightful when considered 
retrospectively through the eyes of the 19th century. In contrast to Voltaire (and 
unlike most 18th-century authors), Rousseau signed his texts with his “real” name 
and thus turned his striving for personal transparency into a publishing practice. 
As Geoffrey Turnovsky writes with regard to Rousseau, “anonymity was an ab er-
rant, senseless gesture once the book was conceived as a medium whose primary 
function and value lay in its capacity to project an image of its author before a 
reader” (2003: 395). Whereas Voltaire s̓ strategy of systematic disorientation is firm-
ly root ed in the “somewhat chaotic freedoms of the publishing world of his time” 
(Cronk 2013: 575), Rousseau anticipates the modern conception of authorship: after 
the introduction of copyright in France in 1791, authors had an interest to sign their 
books with their real name in order to protect their intellectual property, but also 
to meet certain ideals of Romantic aesthetics as defined, for instance, by Germaine 
de Staël s̓ De l A̓llemagne in 1810 (Carpenter 2009: 11). One can thus speak about 
the advent of a new aesthetic and legal paradigm in the early 19th century. Through 
owning its texts and expressing its personality in writing, the author-subject rises to 
power (Edelman 2004: 378).
As a corollary, it becomes increasingly difficult for the readership to digest 
a work of literature without knowing the author s̓ name and identity. As Michel 
3 | According to Patrick Lee (2004: 267), Du Laurensʼ apocryphal sequel 
to Candide had originally been included in volume 32 of Molandʼs edi-
tion, but was then cut out. Until the completion of the Oxford edition of 
Voltaireʼs works in 2018, the one by Moland remains the best available 
reference for many texts.
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Foucault remarks, “[l̓]anonymat littéraire nous est insupportable” (1994: 800). In 
this respect we are all children of the 19th century. The desire to have certainty 
about the author s̓ identity seems to be significantly stronger in the 19th century 
than ever before. The emerging discipline of bibliography meets this need and is 
firmly committed to enforcing identifiable authorship. One of its most important 
tasks is to identify anonymous authors and to unveil literary mystifications, usually 
called supercheries littéraires. Although the first dictionary dedicated to anonymous 
authors, Vincentius Placcius Theatrum anonymorum et pseudonymorum, dates 
back to 1674, the first one in French is Antoine Alexandre Barbier s̓ Dictionnaire 
des ouvrages anonymes et pseudonymes (1806-1809).4 Barbier lays the foundations 
for a never-ending series of similar dictionaries: In 1834, Louis-Charles-Joseph de 
Manne publishes his Nouveau recueil d o̓uvrages anonymes et pseudonymes. The 
major 19th-century bibliographer, Joseph-Marie Quérard, joins in the campaign 
some ten years later with his five-volume dictionary Les supercheries littéraires 
dévoilées. Georges d̓Heylli s̓ more accessible Dictionnaire des pseudonymes, fo-
cusing exclusively on contemporary authors, went through three revised editions 
between 1868 and 1887. The bibliographer and Voltaire editor Adrien-Jean-Quentin 
Beuchot is also a major figure in this movement.
This network of newly emerging concepts and disciplines — intellectual proper-
ty, identifiable authorship and bibliography — has a common epistemological foun-
dation, which one could identify, following Jacques Rancière, as the aesthetic regime 
of the arts (2000: 31). According to Paul Aron, it is within this regime that the pas-
tiche arises as a genre in its own right (2008: 101). Since the pastiche is defined as an 
“[o]uvrage où l o̓n a imité les idées et le style d̓un grand écrivain” (Littré 1889: 999), 
the history of the concept of style provides a suitable perspective to retrace the rise 
of the pastiche in the modern sense. The predominant notion of style in the 18th 
century was a rhetorical one, the appropriateness of verba in relation to res. Voltaire 
himself is a good representative of this conception of style: “Rien n e̓st […] plus 
difficile et plus rare que le style convenable à la matière que l o̓n traite” (1879: 437). 
Throughout the 18th century, however, the concept of individual style gains currency. 
While Marmontel and Mercier are forerunners of this conception (Diaz 2010: 47-
48), the first entry in a French dictionary defining style as something personal 
dates from 1798: “On dit d̓Un Écrivain, qu I̓l n a̓ point de style, pour dire qu̓Il n a̓ 
point une manière d é̓crire qui soit à lui” (Dictionnaire de l A̓cadémie française 
1798: 603). Even though these two connotations of ‘style’ — the generic and the indi-
vidual — coexisted for a rather long time, the personal conception of style becomes 
4 | In his preface Barbier refers to a number of precursors, but also notes 
that the study of anonymous authors has been widely neglected in France 
(1806: xiii). The term “bibliography” becomes current at the end of the 
18th century, when the discipline undergoes an increasing professional-
ization (Malclès 1956: 75-84).
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more predominant around 1800. The increasing number of pastiche collections at 
the end of the 19th century would be inconceivable without this transformation.
Juxtaposed against the background of modern authorship, the pastiche remains 
riddled with paradoxes. As an original and identifiable creator, the author imprints 
his style on the text like an individual minting (“empreinte de l̓âme”, “cachet”; 
Diaz 2010: 48). But just as coins and seals can be forged, so can a personal style 
of writing. Having become an autonomous genre in the context of modern aes-
thetics, the pastiche also threatens to subvert the assumptions that made it possible. 
The pastiche, as an imitation of individual style, is the disquieting other of modern 
authorship. Charles Nodier, who played a crucial role in distinguishing the pas-
tiche from other practices of mimetic writing such as plagiarism, argues that one 
can only imitate “les tours familiers d̓un écrivain”, but not “la succession de ses 
idées” (2003: 89) — an argument already put forward by Marmontel in 1781 (Aron 
2008: 100). Concerning only the superficial level of elocutio, the pastiche would 
be unable to mimic the overall intellectual structure of longer texts, even though 
Nodier is aware of some notable exceptions such as the apocryphal sequel to Ma-
rivaux s̓ un finished Vie de Marianne by Marie-Jeanne Ricoboni. Quérard tries to 
solve the same problem by maintaining that what can above all be imitated are 
the deficiencies of a literary text (1847: XXIX). But why, if this is true, have such 
supposedly excellent authors as Voltaire or Victor Hugo been most successfully 
pastiched? Given that it subverts the relation between author and text, the pastiche 
becomes the Achilles̓ heel of 19th-century authorship.
VoltaIrean authorShIP betWeen  
bIblIograPhy anD roMantICISM
When bibliographers such as Quérard and Beuchot set out to establish the canon 
of Voltaire s̓ works, they are bound to encounter a resistance inherent within 
Voltaire s̓ conception of authorship and in his publishing practices. While Voltaire 
aims to create “the illusion of collective authorship” (Cronk 2013: 572), the task 
of his 19th-century editors is to obliterate this fact by creating an order centred on 
the individual. And yet the task of exhaustively cataloguing all the texts belonging 
to ‘Voltaire’ imposes itself not only for epistemological and aesthetic, but also for 
political reasons: with his ‘panthéonisation’ in 1791, Voltaire had become a part 
of the national heritage and his work was now considered to contribute to French 
cultural prestige. The numerous connections between politics and bibliography 
are by no means coincidental: Barbier, for instance, was nominated Napoleon s̓ 
personal librarian in 1807.5 As for Quérard, his La France littéraire, published in 
5 | On Napoleonʼs personal endorsement of bibliography see Malclès 
1956: 77.
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1827, is the first national bibliography of France and therefore “un monument” to its 
literary wealth (1827a: IX). Modern authorship, bibliography and nation-building 
form an alliance to clear up the disorder the Ancien Régime book market has left 
behind.
Voltairean techniques of blurring identities pose a threat to such an enter prise. 
This is the reason why Quérard takes issue with Voltaire in the preface of his monu-
mental dictionary Les supercheries littéraires dévoilées:
Vint ensuite le dix-huitième siècle, et avec lui Voltaire qui, en le traver-
sant, a jeté près de deux cents pseudonymes dans la littérature de son 
époque, et a fait naître un grand nombre de singes.
Lʼadmiration pour Voltaire au XVIIIe siècle fut si grande, quʼon imita jus-
quʼà sa manie de travestissements. […] Le dix-neuvième siècle compor-
te encore assez dʼimitateurs de Voltaire, en moins grand nombre, à la 
vérité, sous le rapport de lʼesprit, que sous celui de sa manie de se 
déguiser. (Quérard 1847: LI)
Even though Voltaire is not the first literary mystificator, Quérard regards him as 
the model of those who resist the standard of identifiable authorship. Seen from 
the viewpoint of a 19th-century bibliographer, Voltaire thus becomes the founding 
father of authorial mystification. In this case, the ‘original’ is already constituted by 
procedures of faking and counterfeiting, namely the blurring of stable relationships 
between author and text. The very act of forging Voltaire thus involves a twofold 
process of imitation: one in terms of style and one in terms of authorial practices.
The fact that Voltaire s̓ highly recognizable style invites pastiche also elicits a 
certain amount of irritation from modern readers outside the field of bibliography. 
In his Tableau de Paris, Louis-Sébastien Mercier dedicates a chapter to Voltaire, 
entitled “Écrits de Voltaire”. The account Mercier gives of Voltaire s̓ writing is not 
a flattering one: “Brillant, ingénieux, vif, plaisant, gracieux, il n a̓ aussi aucune sorte 
de profondeur; il ne touche jamais qu a̓ux superficies” (1994: 1440). Mercier then 
relates Voltaire s̓ supposed superficiality to his brilliant style: “Les idées étroites de 
l̓âge de vingt ans le dominaient à soixante: il ne travaillait pas sa pensée, mais son 
style” (1443). Voltaire s̓ counterpart — implicit here, but explicit in other texts — is 
once again Rousseau, whom Mercier exalts for his “génie méditatif” (1766: 103).6 
Mercier thereby inaugurates a whole series of comparisons between Rousseau and 
Voltaire, which predictably result in the disparagement of the latter. Bernardin de 
Saint-Pierre s̓ and Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin s̓ comments on both authors are 
6 | On Mercierʼs life-long allegiance to Rousseau see Rufi 1995: 69-115. 
As Quérardʼs entry on Voltaire in La France littéraire shows, the compar-
ison between Voltaire and Rousseau becomes a commonplace around 
1800 (Quérard 1827b: 429).
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couched in exactly the same terms and oppose Voltaire s̓ protean superficiality to 
Rousseau s̓ profound and steady genius (Saint-Pierre 1818: 111-20; Saint-Martin 
1807: 319-31).
The stylistic criticism directed at Voltaire thus hinges on the concept of depth, 
which plays a crucial role in German literature of the Romantic period7 and which 
Germaine de Staël imports into France. In De L A̓llemagne, Voltaire s̓ bril liance 
constantly serves as a point of contrast to highlight the profundity of German 
poetry: “Le poëte français [= Voltaire] a su mettre en vers l e̓sprit de la société la 
plus brillante; le poëte allemand [= Goethe] réveille dans l̓âme par quelques traits 
rapides des impressions solitaires et profondes” (Staël 1958: 182). Seen through the 
lens of Romanticism, Voltaire s̓ writing can be characterised thus: a vivid style cov-
ers a lack of intellectual and emotional depth. Voltaire s̓ writings are thus associ-
ated with certain aesthetic shortcomings (stylized, superficial), which make them 
appear akin to what a pastiche — according to certain preconceptions — can do. A 
pre-modern kind of authorship and an inferior literary genre end up in the same 
category at the lower end of the aesthetic hierarchy. This also implies that Voltaire s̓ 
texts should perfectly lend themselves to stylistic imitation because they fit neatly 
into the domain of the pastiche as traditionally described.
At this point, the aesthetic ideology of Romanticism seems to converge with the 
facts of literary history: Voltaire, a widely and successfully imitated author, writes 
in a light and superficial style. However, this might also be a case of wishful think-
ing: as a matter of fact, a major Romantic author like Victor Hugo turned out to 
be at least as imitable as Voltaire, judging from the enormous number of pastiches 
and parodies written in his style (Aron/Espagnon 2009: 505-06). One could thus 
reverse the perspective and argue that Voltaire simply takes advantage of a possibil-
ity inherent in every recognizable style, namely that it is liable to being pastiched. 
Voltaire is not by nature more imitable than many other famous authors, but he is 
one of the few to deliberately exploit the fact that any individual style can give rise 
to deceptive imitations. Yet this is exactly what arouses the anxiety of a certain 
form of Romantic aesthetics. The analogy between Voltaire s̓ style and the pastiche, 
based on the common denominator ‘shallowness’, should not be taken for granted: it 
rather serves to suppress the fact that any personal style, not only Voltaire s̓ ‘super-
ficial’ brilliance, can be forged. Voltaire thus comes to represent everything the 
new regime of the arts attempts to exclude. What is at stake in imitating Voltaire, 
then, is not only a random case of pastiche writing, but a powerful subversion 
of modern aesthetics.
7 | Vera Bachmann (2013: 12, 25-26) shows that depth is increasingly 
conceived in relation to a surface around 1800 and that it becomes a 
pivotal metaphor for the literary text. The earliest example analysed by 
Bachmann is Schillerʼs “Der Taucher”, written in 1797, only a few years 
before Mme de Staëlʼs visit to Weimar.
Manuel Mühlbacher84
MoMentS of unCertaInty:  
nIColaS ChâtelaInʼS VoltaIre PaStICheS
The sheer number and diversity of 19th-century Voltaire imitations — they include 
stylistic parodies, explicit pastiches as well as forgeries — would surpass the limits 
of this study. The purpose of this article, however, is less to give a comprehensive 
account of this corpus than to examine some cases that pertain to the concept of 
personal style and to its implications for modern authorship. A glance at Aron s̓ and 
Espagnon s̓ Répertoire des pastiches tells us that the majority of the texts imitating 
Voltaire in the first decades of the 19th century use him either as a mouthpiece of dif-
ferent political claims (Delisle de Sales 1802) or as an easy model for writing fiction 
(Sewrin 1809), but do not aim at a convincing or even deceptive stylistic imitation.
The interest in writing Voltaire pastiches seems reinvigorated in 1828, when 
Scipion Du Roure, president of the French Bibliophilic Society at the time, publish-
es his Réflexions sur le style original, the first collection of pastiches in the modern 
sense of the term, which also features a parody of a Voltairean conte philosophique. 
One has to wait until 1842, though, to see the first hoax based on an imi tation of 
Voltaire s̓ style, Arsène Houssaye s̓ “L̓Arbre de science”. Appearing anonymously 
in the Revue de Paris, this compelling pastiche of a conte philosophique is a so-
phisticated literary mystification. An ‘avant-propos’ tries to clarify the question 
how a conte by Voltaire could have remained unknown for such a long time and 
how it was rediscovered. But Houssaye seems to have been aware that what had the 
potential of a publishing sensation was not quite convincing. He therefore attenu-
ates the claim of authenticity by mentioning his own “doutes renaissans” (Houssaye 
1842: 75) and states that he simply submits his discovery to the public judgment. At 
any rate, Joseph-Marie Quérard was not deceived. The corresponding entry in La 
littérature française contemporaine cites “L̓Arbre de science” as being by Hous-
saye and as being “mis sous le nom de Voltaire” (Quérard 1848: 324). But even if 
we can assume that Houssayes s̓ pastiche is a hoax, intended to be unveiled after a 
certain time, it involves the possibility of being read as a text written by Voltaire. 
Although Houssaye s̓ pastiche neither ends up contaminating the canon nor aims to 
do so, it produces a moment of uncertainty and blurs the boundary a bibliographer 
such as Quérard strives to render as watertight as possible. And even after the mo-
ment of bibliographical demystification, uninformed readers might have continued 
to wonder whether it is authentic or not.
In the case of Nicolas Châtelain (1769-1856), these moments of uncertainty are 
much more pervasive than in Houssaye.8 Châtelain made a literary career of writing 
pastiches. Given that Quérard extensively takes issue with Châtelain s̓ hoaxes in the 
8 | Paul Aron (2008: 125-30) gives a short overview of Châtelainʼs work 
as a pastiche writer. I will focus on those of Châtelainʼs pastiches that 
involve questions of authorship.
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preface to the Supercheries littéraires dévoilées (1847: XXVIII-XXXII), one could 
even consider him as the most famous literary pasticheur in the first half of the 19th 
century. Born in Holland, he settles in Switzerland in 1812 and acquires “une sorte 
de réputation bizarre et passagère” (Thierry 1911: 211). In the highly specialised 
domain of literary mystification, Châtelain s̓ pastiches have repeatedly attracted 
critical attention. Augustin Thierry depicts him as the archetypal pastiche writer: 
“il dérobe constamment sa personnalité sous un masque d e̓mprunt” (210). He is 
erudite, witty and has a strong sense of irony, but he fundamentally lacks imagina-
tion and is “[i]mpuissant à créer” (211). Measured against the paradigm of origi-
nality, the pastiche writer must appear as a bizarre and deficient character, even 
though one cannot dispute him a certain skill. As someone who plays with masks 
and identities, he is also close to his Voltairean model.
Châtelain achieved his major supercherie littéraire in 1837 when he anony-
mously published a Voltaire pastiche, the Lettres de Voltaire à Mme du Deffand au 
sujet du jeune Rebecque, devenu depuis célèbre sous le nom de Benjamin Con stant. 
Again a preface undertakes to prove the authenticity of the letters. Châtelain s̓ para-
textual strategy is much more firmly rooted in history than Houssaye s̓, but no less 
spectacular: The four apocryphal letters from Voltaire to Mme du Deffand concern 
Benjamin Constant, whom Voltaire — according to the preface — met in Ferney in 
1774. Voltaire gives Constant a letter of recommendation to Mme du Deffand and 
subsequently corresponds with her on the subject of the young Constant. The letters 
then pass to Horace Walpole, Benjamin Constant himself and finally to the editor. 
The preface discusses a further problem of plausibility: The editor maintains that, 
according to the testimony of two relatives, Benjamin Constant was born in 1759, 
whereas the Bibliographie universelle indicates 1767 as his date of birth. As a last 
proof, the publisher of the letters announces that the original letters can be found 
“chez M. Chevillard père, notaire, rue du Bac, n° 15” (Châtelain 1837: 10).
The reaction of the public best shows how convincing Châtelain s̓ pastiches 
of Voltaire s̓ style are. Not only were several newspapers and erudite readers de-
ceived,9 but the supercherie itself could only be unveiled when Beuchot undertook 
to go to the rue du Bac: “J é̓tais tenté d a̓ller à Morges faire mes remercîmens à 
l é̓diteur anonyme; mais avant de faire le voyage, je suis allé à l a̓dresse où l o̓n 
disait qu é̓taient les originaux” (1838: 126, 1317). Since the notary did not exist, the 
supercherie was evident. Given that Beuchot was editing Voltaire s̓ complete works 
at the time, his scrutiny prevented him from inserting four apocryphal letters 
into his edition. As Beuchot s̓ key role in unveiling the hoax shows, supercheries 
littéraires in the 19th century are based on a three-part relation between the fraudu-
lent author, the public and the bibliographer. But instead of being antagonistic, the 
relationship between author and expert seems rather symbiotic. If the mystification 
9 | E.g. the Revue Britannique and Alexandre Vinet, see Thierry 1911: 210, 
224.
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were never discovered, it would be absolute and therefore inexistent. This might 
be the reason why Châtelain chose to construct his supercherie in such a way that 
it could be unveiled: Such compromising details as the mistake in Constant s̓ date 
of birth and the address of the notary could easily have been replaced by a more 
likely story.
The fact that Châtelain s̓ hoax could only be uncovered by recourse to extra- 
textual points of reference is deeply unsettling for those who proclaim a general dis-
tinguishability between original and pastiche. Augustin Thierry, for example, puts 
Nodier s̓ dictum that one can imitate an author s̓ style, but not her or his train of 
thought, as a disclaimer at the beginning of his chapter on Châtelain. The pastiche, 
generally conceived as playful and unserious, becomes threatening as soon as it can 
no longer be distinguished from what it imitates. In the case of the Lettres de Voltaire 
à Mme du Deffand, Sainte-Beuve was maybe the last to be undeceived: it was only in 
1862 when he noticed that he had quoted Châtelain s̓ pastiche as being by Voltaire 
in his Portraits littéraires (Aron 2008: 125-26). Even bibliographical demystification 
does not prevent the supercherie from exercising its power over decades.
In 1855, one year before his death, Nicolas Châtelain publishes his last 
collection of pastiches: Pastiches ou imitations libres du stye de quelques écrivains 
du XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, a series of pastiches in the style of Rousseau, d̓Hol-
bach, d A̓lembert, Voltaire (of course) and some others. As apparent from the title, 
Châtelain this time concludes a contrat de pastiche with his readers. The preface 
thus seems to serve exactly the opposite purpose than in the case of a supercherie 
littéraire: In a very humble manner, Châtelain pays respect to the inimitability of 
these great authors. He distinguishes two kinds of pastiche writers: Some are driven 
by an “amour-propre excessif” and hope to equal their model, whereas others write 
pastiches only as an innocent amusement. He himself, the reader is to understand, 
belongs to the innocent class and merely pays a tribute to the “magie de leur style 
qui nous séduit” (Châtelain 1855: VI). In addition, Châtelain develops a theory of 
personal style which takes individualism to an extreme:
Le style […] nʼest autre chose que lʼexpression fidèle des conceptions 
intellectuelles et morales de lʼindividu, manifestées au dehors et aussi 
nettement rendues quʼun cachet en cire représente en relief la ciselure 
dʼune intalgie, lʼempreinte dʼune cornaline, ou de toute autre pierre pré-
cieuse. Or cette intalgie, cette image intérieure, nous lʼavons au dedans 
de notre esprit, nous la portons pour ainsi dire au fond de notre âme, et 
en écrivant, bagatelle ou chose importante, nous ne faisons que la mani-
fester dehors, la rendre en relief. (VII)
Given that a writer, according to this stylistic hyper-determinism, cannot imprint 
anything other than his static character, one might wonder how a pastiche can be 
possible. Does the pastiche writer subsequently become all the authors he imitates? 
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He does not, Châtelain answers, and this is the reason why he will never equal his 
model, with whom he can only ‘identify’. One could conclude that everything is 
now ordered in the way a bibliographer desires it to be: a domesticated pastiche. 
The boundaries of individuality are strictly preserved since “Châtelain” is printed 
on the title page and since he openly explains his purpose. This might be why 
Quérard s̓ review of the book lavishes praise on the Pastiches. Châtelain possess-
es “une habileté singulière à saisir le cachet distinctif de chaque style” (Quérard 
1855: 562). After two decades of hoaxes and pseudonymous publishing, Châtelain 
seems to have given up the trade of mystification.
Yet all of Châtelain s̓ commentators overlook one decisive passage at the end of 
the preface and take for granted his claim that the Pastiches are only an innocent 
“exercice de style” (Aron/Espagnon 2009: 129). It seems a leçon d̓humilité when 
Châtelain writes that he has inserted some unmarked originals among his own pas-
tiches:
Enfin pour ménager à la sagacité du lecteur un plaisir piquant, celui de 
découvrir de temps en temps une page des originaux mêmes, jʼen ai glis-
sé quelques-unes qui prouveront mieux que chose au monde que, quoi 
que lʼon fasse, on demeure toujours, comme lʼa si bien exprimé Mme de 
Sévigné, à neuf cents lieues dʼun cap, auquel on avait follement essayé 
dʼatteindre. (1855: IX)
The deep irony of this announcement, however, becomes apparent when the reader 
undertakes to distinguish the Voltaire pastiches from the original letters in the col-
lection. The Lettres de Voltaire à Mme du Deffand have sufficiently proved that Châ-
telain s̓ imitations of Voltaire s̓ letters cannot be distinguished from the originals on 
the basis of the text alone. In the case of the best pastiches in the recueil — those of 
Voltaire and Mme de Sévigné — the presence of original letters among the imitations 
effects just the opposite of what Châtelain announces in the preface. His Voltaire 
imitations do not show that he remains “neuf cents lieues d̓un cap”, but rather that it 
is impossible to distinguish his pastiches from the original. Thanks to the Electron­
ic Enlightenment database, today it is easy to track the originals. Two letters from 
Voltaire to the Comte de Schouwalow are indeed authentic (11 August 1757 and 
23 September 1758; Châtelain 1855: 70-72, 77-80). Since the letters in Châtelain s̓ 
Pastiches are not dated, it seems unlikely that any 19th-century reader would have 
been able to do this without a considerable expense of time.
Châtelain s̓ Pastiches thus turns out to be just the opposite of what it seemed 
to be. It announces itself as a collection of controlled pastiches, which clearly 
acknowledge their inferiority to the original. The name “Châtelain” on the cover, 
how ever, is laid as a trap to reassure and then deceive the reader. Given that Voltaire 
himself frequently published volumes of mélanges, where the authors of the un-
signed texts were no longer clearly distinguishable (Cronk 2013: 575; 2011: 781-
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82), Châtelain s̓ puzzling mixture of originals and pastiches is based on a highly 
Voltairean device. In the age of Quérard s̓ Supercheries littéraires, the format of 
the recueil also offers the advantage of escaping the demystifying grasp of the bib-
liographer. In the absence of bibliographical certainty, the reader has to make her 
or his own decision — at the risk of false attribution.
Due to such figures as Châtelain, the 19th century has been called the century 
of mystification (Dousteyssier-Khoze / Vaillant 2012). Even if this claim has never 
been empirically proven, most bibliographers of the time lament an increase in 
literary hoaxes. Obviously, the standard of identifiable authorship and the prolif-
eration of literary fakes are two sides of the same coin. As Scott Carpenter writes, 
“trans gression is entirely dependent on the presence of a line to cross” (2009: 11). It 
is the rule of identity that produces its own violation. Pastiche writers like Châtelain 
therefore represent the uncanny double of modern authorship. And Voltaire, who 
seems so close to the 19th-century aesthetics of fraudulence, becomes the patron 
saint of literary mystification in modernity.
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Fracture, Facture and the Collecting   
of Islamic Art
Margaret S. Graves (Indiana University Bloomington)
The latter part of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th were the colonial 
heyday of international collecting in the art of the Islamic world. During that peri-
od an enormous number of portable objects were dug out of the ground or brought 
out of above-ground collections and entered into the art market, the vast majority 
of them migrating westwards to Europe and some of them later to the US. Moving 
through an international network of diggers, dealers, brokers and institutional and 
private collectors who enjoyed open season in a comparatively unregulated market, 
these objects were transformed within the colonial programme s̓ great project of 
knowledge and classification into “artifacts, antiquities and art” (Cohn 1996: 76).1 
In the burgeoning international market in Islamic art, several factors acted to-
gether to give rise to significant industries of faking and forging. In the first place, 
the sans­papiers status of much of the material created an economic environ-
ment receptive to doubtful objects. For example, the vast majority of archae-
ological pieces were not ‘scientifically excavated’ in the modern sense of the 
term, and undoubtedly many of the things that surfaced on the art market were 
the product of illicit excavation; accordingly, they usually entered that market 
with little or no truly verifiable documentation of their origins. Regulations on 
the movement of antiquities began to tighten noticeably in the first decades of the 
20th century, as central authorities in the Ottoman Empire, Iran and elsewhere 
sought to stem the flow of artefacts, but this did not stop illegal exportation and 
all of the obfuscation that accompanies it (Jenkins-Madina 2006; Pancaroğlu 
2011: 410; Ghiasian 2015: 892). 
The escalating popularity of artworks from the Islamic world on the interna-
tional collectors̓ market from the later 19th century onwards also pushed prices up 
to the point where sophisticated faking and wholesale forgery became financially 
1 | A useful overview of Islamic art collecting is given in Vernoit 2000; 
more detailed studies of individual cases are included in Bahrani / Ce-
lik / Eldem 2011 and Kadoi 2016.
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rewarding. Historical artworks from Turkey, Egypt, North Africa, the Levant and 
what is now Iraq were all widely traded, but Iranian art was increasingly elevated 
above that of all other cultures of the Islamic world by collectors and tastemakers 
during the great early 20th-century era of collecting. This occurred for a number 
of reasons, including its promotion by several notable scholars, brokers and deal-
ers (Vernoit 2000a: 41-43; Hillenbrand 2016). Chief amongst these was Arthur 
Upham Pope (1881-1969), of whom more below. Accordingly, Iranian art seems to 
have accumulated more than its fair share of fakes — a circumstance that applies 
to pre-Islamic Iranian art as well (Blair n.d.).2 In this essay I have chosen to explore 
forgery, faking and the early 20th-century market in Iranian art using examples 
drawn from the collections of my own institution, Indiana University, and elsewhere 
in the American Midwest. Not only are these pieces near to hand, but the colossal 
distances between their places of creation and their current institutional homes also 
highlight precisely the processes of dislocation that render this material so vulner-
able to the vicissitudes of the market.
SPeCtaCle: the ballaD  
of the AndArz-nāmA ManuSCrIPt
The infamous Andarz-nāma manuscript is — or rather was, since it is now dismem-
bered and dispersed — an illustrated copy of a Persian text, originally composed in 
the 11th century, that details guidelines for ethical conduct and princely manners. 
The manuscript surfaced in two parts on the international art market at the start of 
the 1950s, and caused a sensation (Frye 1971: A / 16). With an inscribed date of 483 
AH or 1090 CE, and 109 miniature paintings all executed in a consistent style, the 
manuscript represented a potentially huge discovery for the history of Persian art 
as well as literature. If genuine, its paintings would be the earliest known examples 
of Persian miniature painting by well over a century, and would reshape the story 
of that medium; its text, meanwhile, would be the earliest manuscript version of a 
prose work which was probably completed only a few years before the manuscript’s 
putative date of 1090 (de Bruijn n.d.). Part of the manuscript was sold, with involve-
ment from Arthur Upham Pope, to the Cincinnati Art Museum (Gluck / Siver 
1996: 413, 425). It remains in the possession of that institution.3 The whereabouts 
of the rest of the manuscript, bought by the dealer and collector Hagop Kevorkian 
in the early 1950s for $ 70,000 (according to Pope’s published correspondence), are 
unknown to me (Gluck / Siver 1996: 413; Frye 1971: A / 16).
2 | On the pre-Islamic material, see also Frye 1977; Carter 2001: 175; 
MacKenzie / Ménage 1963; Gignoux n.d.
3 | Email correspondence with Lisa DeLong, Assistant Registrar at Cin-
cinnati Art Museum, January 2017.
Fracture, Facture and the Collecting of Islamic Art 93
Over the decade and a half that followed its first appearance on the art market, 
the manuscript was discredited as a modern forgery. It remains a notorious touch-
stone in the history of Islamic art, and yet one that has been curiously neglect ed: 
“What is remarkable is that no one even talks about the manuscript any long er, 
however interesting the lessons may be which can be drawn from it” (Grabar 
2006: xxviii-xxix). Fear of visiting personal and institutional embarrassment upon 
one’s colleagues, as well as of litigation, are certainly common motivations for 
avoid ing debates about authenticity in art history. But given the length of time that 
has elapsed since the day in 1960 when art historian Richard Ettinghausen dra-
matically opened the envelope containing the laboratory analysis results for the 
pigments in the paintings, the former at least must be ceasing to hold much sway in 
this case (Blair / Bloom 2009; Grabar 2012: 22). 
As with certain other artworks that passed through Pope s̓ hands and into Amer-
ican museums and private collections, it is hard to know if he was fully aware, from 
the start, of the manuscript s̓ problematic nature (Bloom 2004; Rogers 1997: 456; 
Bloom 2016: 94). As Oliver Watson has dryly observed, “it is clear that his in come 
depended on an optimistic view of the field”. Today it is hard to read Pope s̓ polemics 
against “negative generalizations” and the danger of being “made over-cautious 
by the threat of forgeries” without wondering about the extent to which he was 
trying to convince himself as much as anyone else (Watson 2013: 68; Pope 1939; 
Pope 1971a). Soon after the manuscript s̓ first appearance on the international stage 
damning rumours began to circulate, and these doubts were strongly expressed 
in a letter sent to the literary historian Mojtaba Minovi by a scholar who wished 
to remain anonymous. Minovi subsequently published a pamphlet in Persian that 
denounced the manuscript as a modern forgery (Minovi 1956-7). Pope, meanwhile, 
defended the codex loudly and publicly, eventually calling in a number of scholars 
to present papers on various aspects of the manuscript at the New York Internation­
al Congress of Iranian Art and Archaeology in 1960.
A special publication of these papers was first brought out in 1968, by which 
point Pope had presumably given up hope: the evidence presented in that publi cation 
makes a much better case against the manuscript s̓ authenticity than it does for it 
(Pope 1971; Montgomery 2016: 406). Direct and indirect defences of the manu-
script are offered by Pope, his wife and associate Phyllis Ackerman, Linda Bettman 
(who appears to have been a graduate student at Columbia University), and (slightly 
more ambivalently) Oleg Grabar. However, these are overwhelmed by the evidence 
for the prosecution brought to bear by the philologist Ehsan Yarshater and historian 
Richard Frye, the technical analysis of the pigments made by Rutherford J. Gettens 
(head of the Freer Gallery s̓ conservation laboratory), and the circumspectly word-
ed but quietly damning iconographic analysis by Richard Ettinghausen. 
The case against the Andarz-nāma manuscript rests on three major points, and 
together they are fairly devastating. Firstly, textual analysis showed that the manu-
script included a number of “pseudo-archaic words” (Yarshatar 1971: A / 23) and 
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incorporated mistakes consistent with those found in a history of Persian prose pub-
lished in 1942, strongly suggesting that the copyist had used the latter as a source 
(Smith n.d.; Richard n.d.). Secondly, Richard Ettinghausen pointed out that the 
paintings in the Andarz-nāma manuscript include settings, compositions and indi-
vidual motifs borrowed from 13th- and 14th-century manuscripts that were available 
in published reproduction by the time the manuscript first surfaced on the market. 
At the same time, the figures are drawn, rather clumsily but quite identifiably, from 
the figural painting found upon a type of 10th-century decorated pottery that had 
been excavated in large quantities at Nishapur in Iran and in Central Asia, and sold 
on the art market by the 1930s (Ettinghausen 1971). Given the number of the so- 
called ‘Nishapur buffwares’ that evidently underwent extensive restoration prior to 
their accession to various museum collections, it is possible that the figural designs 
on some of those ceramics were being touched up or redrawn at the same time that 
the painter of the Andarz-nāma manuscript was working. One wonders if the two 
might even be in some way connected.4
Thirdly, synthesising a convincing use of colour seems to have presented the 
creator(s) of the manuscript s̓ illustrations with particular problems, probably 
because they were copying their images at least in part from greyscale reproduc-
tions. In fact, colour formed the most powerful part of the case for the prosecution: 
paint in some of the images was found to contain Prussian blue, a modern synthetic 
pigment only discovered in the early 18th century (Gettens 1971). This was the final 
nail in the coffin of the defence case. The technical evidence of the Prussian blue 
seems to be the point most often cited on the rare occasions that the manuscript is 
discussed: as is often the case in disputes around art forgery, it is the scientific evi-
dence, with its wonderful appearance of certainty, that looms largest in the imag-
ination (Lowenthal 1990: 19).5
By this point the story of the Andarz-nāma manuscript has almost everything: 
money, deception, showmen, squabbling scholars, scientific revelations, and inter-
national intrigue. The only thing missing is a forger. Richard Frye first saw the 
manuscript in the house of Fakr al-Dīn Naṣīrī Amīnī, who hailed from a line of 
scholars and calligraphers. The names of Fakr al-Dīn Naṣīrī, his father and his 
grandfather have all been linked with various seemingly doctored manuscripts, 
although their roles in the production of these remain unclear (Richard n.d.; Simp-
son 2008: n. 78). Fakr al-Dīn Naṣīrī himself claimed that his father s̓ calligraphic 
talents were exploited by unscrupulous dealers who would remove the signature and 
date from his historicising creations in order to sell them as antiques (Richard n.d.). 
4 | I am currently conducting research on two such pieces in the collec-
tion of the Eskenazi Art Museum, Indiana University.
5 | On antagonisms between scientific analysis and connoisseurship 
over questions of authenticity, see Eastaugh 2009; Kemp 2014; Johnson 
2015.
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Looking beyond the particular case of the Andarz-nāma manuscript, this statement 
raises the complicated question of culturally specific practices of copying and their 
awkward assimilation into a globalised art market.6 Reliance on modern binaries of 
authentic / inauthentic or original / imitation, aligned most often in this context with 
the Arabic word tazwīr (falsification or embellishment of the truth), fails to account 
for cultural practices that value emulation in obeisance to tradition. This latter con-
cept is, in the Islamic tradition, given primarily legal expression in the term taqlīd, 
but historically it also had significant currency in literary and artistic realms, such 
as calligraphy, where the mastery of tradition and master-student ‘chains’ were con-
stituted through emulation and reconstruction (Gacek 2009: 108-9; Adamova 1992; 
Roxburgh 2003). The intention to deceive, which we are accustomed to using as a 
kind of malign diagnostic for the category of forgery, could even in some historical 
circumstances meet with a positive rather than a negative reception (Rice 1955: 7-8; 
Roxburgh 2003: 41-43).
Cultural contingencies notwithstanding, the intention to deceive remains a crit-
ical issue in the story of the Andarz-nāma manuscript. It entered the international 
art market as an 11th-century artefact, not a 20th-century one, and managed to pass 
as such — at least for a while. And this is where the spectacle of the Andarz-nāma 
manuscript is arrested. The ‘picaresque aesthetics’ that drive so much popular in-
terest in art forgery would now have the figure of the forger, that master trickster, 
leap centre stage and reveal to us all, with a wink, how he pulled the wool over 
everyone s̓ eyes — even if only for a short time (Radnóti 1999; Hay 2008: 7). But 
there is no-one to take the spotlight. A finger is pointed, but nothing more: the 
identity and methods of the forger are not triumphantly revealed, and the audience 
is left shuffling its feet and looking around uncomfortably for either a moral or a 
punchline. Perhaps what is truly unforgivable about the Andarz-nāma manuscript 
is that it has supplied neither.
tranSaCtIonS: PageS anD PIeCeS
The spectacle of the Andarz-nāma manuscript reveals a moment when the often- 
invisible systems that assign value to artworks were made suddenly and awkwardly 
apparent. Scholars and collectors desired certain things, and the market responded: 
rarity combined with familiarity (a known text, a painting style seen on other arte-
facts); a date; the documentation of a text close to its time of origin; completeness. 
The vulnerability of these desiderata was revealed when they became the mecha-
nisms of malfeasance. After that, exposure of the manuscript was the only way 
the value-systems of scholarship and the market could be rehabilitated. Jonathan 
6 | Instructive parallels can be found in the 19 th-century market for Italian 
art: see Helstosky 2009.
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Bloom has pointed out that this self-regulation was in some ways effective: once 
the Andarz-nāma was publicly ‘exposed’, further forgeries of complete manuscripts 
from the Islamic world did not appear (at least, not as far as we know!), although 
one can point to whole-cloth forgeries in other media that have since come to light 
(Bloom 2004; Jones 1990: 12; Blair / Bloom / Wardwell 1992). To explore the impact 
of collecting upon that alarmingly nebulous thing, authenticity, from a different 
angle, the second part of this essay turns to the extraordinarily populous realm of 
doctored objects, meaning those that have been ‘enhanced’, ‘completed’, or other-
wise physically transformed somewhere along the way to becoming collected art-
works.
One of the most significant factors for faking in the field of Islamic art is the 
fetishisation of the individual, autonomous object in art collecting. This preference 
is still strongly evident in display practice in this field. Paradoxically, fixations on 
the aestheticised and self-contained display object have had two directly opposed 
but equally far-reaching effects on the modern-day corpus of collected art from 
the Islamic world. One is the fracturing and dismemberment of things — buildings, 
certain types of objects such as textiles, and most notoriously manuscripts — into 
pieces that are now dispersed all over the world. The other is the synthesis of whole 
objects, especially ceramics, from fragments.
On the one hand, the late 19th and first half of the 20th century — in fact right up 
until the 1970s — saw many of the most famous illustrated and illuminated Arabic 
and Persian manuscripts and albums dismembered. Typically, their illustrated leaves 
were cut out and sold, a few at a time, on the art market. If a page had paintings on 
both front and back, the paper was sometimes split to separate recto from verso. 
The point of this was of course that the cumulative profit from selling individual 
illustrated pages was greater than a complete manuscript could ever fetch, however 
magnificent it was, because there is an upper limit to what the market can bear for 
any single item (Welch 1985; Roxburgh 1998).
Dismemberment had the effect of converting manuscripts into discrete and dis-
located fields that were more susceptible to the forger s̓ art than intact manuscripts 
would have been. As demonstrated by the Andarz-nāma manuscript, forgery of a 
whole manuscript is a high-risk venture. But by breaking down the physical in-
tegrity of an existing manuscript, dispersing its image cycle, and removing any cer-
tainty about what went where within its original structure, dismemberment greatly 
facil itated new interventions into the fabric of the book. An eye-catching case was 
explored in Mohamad Ghiasian s̓ recent study of the dispersed illustrated manu-
script of the Majmaʼ al-tawārīkh (“Assembly of Histories”) by Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū (d. 
1430). This codex, probably created in the early 15th century, was exhibited whole in 
1926 and cut up shortly afterwards; its leaves have long been treasured possessions 
in a number of major collections. Ghiasian demonstrated that many paintings in 
this manuscript are almost certainly post-production additions, probably added in 
the early 20th century, for which space was created by simply wiping out passages 
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Figure 1: “The maids slice their hands upon seeing Yusuf s̓ beauty”, illustrated 
manuscript of the Haft awrang (“Seven thrones”) of Jāmī. Kabul, text transcribed 
959-960 AH / 1552-1553 CE, illustrations possibly early 20th century. Page 35. 
9 × 23.2 cm.
Margaret S. Graves98
from the text. While at least some, and possibly all, of the modern miniatures were 
added before the book was quickly dismembered for sale on the art market, it is 
only through Ghiasian s̓ painstaking reconstruction of the now globally dispersed 
leaves of the manuscript that many instances of repetition, copying and stylistic 
infelicity in the paintings can be recognised (Ghiasian 2015).
We are usually inclined to judge this kind of market-driven forgery very 
harshly, particularly when it is accompanied by the dismemberment and defacing 
of the original object. But what of those who effected very similar acts, probably 
for similar reasons, but without incurring the same kind of destruction in the pro-
cess? A 16th-century manuscript of the Haft Awrang of Jami in the Lilly Library 
of Indiana University has been ‘enhanced’ by the addition of what are probably 
early 20th-century paintings in a kind of pastiche of 17th-century Perso-Indian styles 
(fig. 1). These were presumably intended to convince the collector that they were 
buying an illustrated 16th-century manuscript with what the connoisseurs̓ litera-
ture would call ‘fine paintings’, thereby elevating the market value (Simpson 2008). 
The thick impasto of the white paint in some of these images reveals their recent 
manufacture; real 16th-century miniatures were made with water-based paints that 
do not have built-up surfaces. Closer inspection reveals failings of symmetry in the 
architectural decoration, overmodelled facial features and other stylistic traits that 
most likely point to recent manufacture, albeit with high production values.
In fact, the manuscript was copied in Kabul in 1552 / 53, according to its colo-
phon information, which would make it one of the earliest dated manuscripts of 
the Mughal dynasty (Gruber 2009: 31-32). Analysis performed by Laura E. Parodi 
with near-infrared light indicates that the miniatures were not painted over text, nor 
do they seem to have been painted on top of pre-existing images, but instead into 
blank spaces: it seems likely that the manuscript came down to the modern era with 
illuminations but no illustrations.7 Failure to complete the image cycle is certainly 
not an unknown phenomenon in pre-modern manuscript production; depending on 
the stage at which the book project faltered, this could result in pages where the 
margins and text are completed but blank boxes remain without illustrations.8
If the paintings in the Indiana manuscript had been executed after the manu-
script s̓ creation but prior to the advent of the international art market, they would 
most likely be regarded as simply an interesting node in the object s̓ life history 
(Soucek / Çağman 1995). As it is, the fact that they were most likely created with 
7 | Laura E. Parodi examined the manuscript in 2011 and will be publish-
ing her research in the near future. I am grateful to her for sharing some 
of her unpublished findings with me.
8 | For example, the image cycle of the British Libraryʼs 1386-88 Khamsa 
of Nizami stops partway through the Haft Paykar, leaving framed blank 
spaces, ready to receive images, throughout the second half of the text: 
see Graves 2002.
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the intention to deceive in a modern marketplace means that they physically super-
impose present conditions of commodity exchange onto those of the past. In the 
collectors̓ literature there is a tangible sense that such 20th-century incursions into 
a 16th-century artefact taint the past with the present. Lying at the heart of these 
anxieties is that elusive thing, ‘authenticity’, a concept that is, at least in the ways we 
use it now, inextricably bound up in post-Enlightenment European frameworks of 
taxonomy, documentation and historical time. Time, however, can also be a neutral-
izing agent: the early 20th-century modernity that the paintings probably represent 
has now begun to recede into the historical past, permitting a greater sense of schol-
arly objectivity to grow up around such interventions.
At the same time that some of the most notorious cases of manuscript dis-
memberment were occurring, and probably around the same time that the Indi-
ana manuscript was receiving its images, the market demand for complete objects 
was distorting another type of historical material from the Islamic world. Medieval 
ceramics are by their very nature usually recovered in fragmentary form, and yet 
most museum display pieces in this medium are presented as whole objects. In the 
vast majority of cases they were acquired that way from dealers or agents rather 
than being reconstructed within the institutions that now hold them.
The additive process of ‘completing’ fragmentary ceramics, or building new 
wholes from disparate parts, was such a widespread practice that most scholars 
who work on premodern Islamic ceramics will develop sceptical reflexes about the 
integrity of any of the pieces they encounter. This is particularly true of pieces from 
Iran. Many early collectors had a taste for figural designs as well as the glitter and 
fine draughtsmanship found in the Persian lustre and mināʼī techniques of ceramic 
decoration. Moreover, they liked their ceramics to be whole. These proclivities led 
to a significant market for doctored objects (Watson 1999: 426-27). More than one 
scholar reports having encountered the construction of ‘complete’ ceramics from 
boxes of disparate sherds, sorted by type, in dealer s̓ workshops in Tehran in the 
1950s and 1970s, making it clear that this practice cannot be entirely consigned 
to the early 20th century (Sigel / McWilliams 2013: 38; Watson 2004: n. 25). And 
yet there remains some unwillingness within the field to acknowledge publicly the 
extent to which almost all of the ceramic corpus has undergone intervention of one 
form or another at some stage in its history. 
In the first place, there are institutional tensions about revealing the true con-
dition of some pieces. With such a premium placed on the pristine integrity of the 
self-contained object, visitors, collectors and funders alike can find it painful to 
be told that beloved pieces are not what they seem. Furthermore, curators are very 
restricted with regards to the amount of information that they can present with an 
object, and there seems to be a collective consensus, amongst Anglophone muse-
ums at least, that post-production interventions on the object need to be carefully 
explained in order to turn them into source of interest rather than shame (McWil-
liams 2012: 169). Many major institutions have established norms in conservation 
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practice that aim to clearly differentiate between original and modern material in 
historic ceramics, but this entails a substantial conservation department and a size-
able budget — not things that every museum has.9 And in spite of this, a quick look 
at any recent auction house catalogue will show that market standards, and by ex-
tension display standards in many contexts, continue to prioritise whole objects and 
invisible and even deceptive repairwork.
I will use a single bowl to illustrate the varied means by which agents at work in 
the 20th century crafted whole ceramic pieces for sale on the art market. The piece 
is now held in the Eskenazi Art Museum of Indiana University, where it is part of a 
47-piece teaching collection of Islamic ceramics accessioned in the 1960s and 70s 
(fig. 2). None of the pieces in this group has undergone any major conservation work 
during their half-century in the museum and they still bear all of their 20th-century 
art market restorations, much of it becoming increasingly obvious with age and 
discolouration.
Some of this bowl, at least, is from late 12th-century Iran, decorated in the paint-
ing technique known as mināʼī. The principal painted design is at first glance a 
fairly standard radial pattern of seated figures and trees. However, it does not take 
any specialist equipment, or even a very trained eye, to see that the piece is com-
posed of fragments from more than one object — a condition it shares with a large 
number of mināʼī vessels as well as lustre-painted ones (Pease 1958; Norman 2004; 
McCarthy / Holod 2012; Sigel / McWilliams 2013; Michelsen / Olafsdotter 2014; 
Masteller 2016: 276-81). For example, the oddly-oriented harpy, appearing where 
we would expect to see a fifth figure, is manifestly from a different object: some 
of the painting is considerably finer than that of the figures on the rest of the bowl, 
the palette is different, and the use of fine white highlights distinguishes it from all 
other figures (fig. 3). Below the harpy, the knee of the human figure who once occu-
pied this position, clad in a dark purple robe, is still visible, although an attempt to 
disguise it has been made through the application of dots of modern red overglaze 
decoration. Above the harpy s̓ head a mish-mash of different fragments and patches 
of fill make up the rim.
The figure next to the harpy is equally inharmonious (fig. 4). The upper parts of 
the body and the head have been painted onto a greyish, rather putty-like fill. To the 
right of the figure is a bilateral foliate design that has nothing to do with the rest of 
the composition and is manifestly an unrelated sherd; on the other side of the figure 
there has been an attempt to give this inclusion some design logic by painting in a 
crude bilateral sprig. The rim is clearly a patchwork all the way around. What is un-
9 | The Metropolitan Museum of Art has done some exemplary work in 
this field, most notably in the 2016 special exhibition curated by Mar-
tina Rugiadi, Transformed: Medieval Syrian and Iranian Art in the Early 
20th Century. See also the case studies presented online and in print: de 
Lapérouse n.d.; id. n.d. a; id./ Stamm / Parry 2007.
Fracture, Facture and the Collecting of Islamic Art 101
usual about this mināʼī bowl is not the extent to which it has been doctored, but how 
openly it declares that process. The poor quality of the workmanship announces 
itself so clearly that in this case examination under ultraviolet light largely con-
firms what one could already divine from examination with the naked eye (fig. 5). 
UV does however make it easier to see the likely extent of the largest continuous 
fragment of the original bowl (this includes the foot and the right-hand side, except-
ing most or all of the rim). This substantial portion was presumably deemed large 
enough to make the job of rather sloppily building up the rest from sherds, plaster 
and paint financially worthwhile.10
The undocumented interventions visited upon objects like the Indiana mināʼī 
bowl are very often treated by collectors and scholars alike as something that 
10 | Further investigation of this object will be included in a future 
publication.
Figure 2: Glazed fritware bowl painted in mināʼī technique. Iran, late 12th / early 
13th century with modern additions. Height 20.3 cm. Eskenazi Museum of Art, 
Indiana University, 60.54.
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Figures 3 and 4: Detail of figure 2.
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comes between the viewer and the authenticity of the object. Curiously, this 
is quite often framed as a betrayal on the part of the object — as if the ob-
jects themselves have lied to us. There is a recurring discussion of both ‘in-
nocent’ and ‘deceptive’ objects in the scholarly literature that speaks of a pe-
culiar tendency to assign moral agency to the artworks themselves (Kennick 
1985: n. 16). My point here in explor ing the interventions that have taken place 
upon this rather disparate collection of objects is not to single them out as 
shameful, nor to wag the finger of reproach at those who forged or doctored 
them and moved them through the art market. Rather, these pieces are an ex-
emplary means of exposing and recording the direct effects of collecting cul-
tures and the art market upon the material that we study (Jones 1990: 11, 13-
14; Radnóti 1999: 6). One has only to look to Oliver Watson s̓ research on 
changing fashions in the collection of medieval Middle Eastern ceramics to 
Figure 5: Photograph of figure 2 under UV lighting.
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witness the dramatic effects of taste — capitalism s̓ market force par excellence — 
on what has been kept and what has been discarded (both figuratively and literal-
ly) from the art historical master-narrative. Ceramic types that are not ‘recogni-
sed’ and therefore not saleable have been written out of art history because they 
never make it onto the market, in spite of their presence in archaeological sherd 
deposits (Watson 1999).
One can only speculate upon the extent to which each object in this essay was 
intended to deceive credulous buyers. Such speculations are ultimately dependent 
not only on the current condition of the objects themselves but also on circumstan-
tial documentation from their lives as collected objects: how much was paid for 
them, what do we know about the careers of the dealers from whom they were 
bought, and what kind of information accompanied them at the time of purchase? 
For, perhaps counterintuitively, deception is borne out not at the moment of inter-
vention upon the object, but at the moment of transaction: whether that be the 
moment of financial transaction through purchase, or the moment of publicati-
on — itself a form of scholarly transaction. Moreover, the entanglement of schol-
arship and the market in Islamic art is not a historiographic issue that can be made 
palat able by isolating it from the present: the two things continue to exist in sym-
biosis (Graves 2012). Not only does the art market continue to shape the canon of 
art history, but time and again it has also wrought physical changes upon the objects 
making up that canon, as the pieces in this essay can mutely attest.
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Shape-shifters of Transculturation 
Giovanni Bastianiniʼs Forgeries as Embodiment  
of an Aesthetic Patriotism
Tina Öcal (Heidelberg University)
Just what is it that makes art forgeries so different, so appealing, as long as 
they are considered original? one could ask, thus quoting and adapting the 
title of Pop artist Richard Hamilton s̓ famous collage Just what is it that 
makes today s̓ homes so different, so appealing? from 1956. Yet, after a 
forgery has been revealed as such, it loses the favour of the beholder and the 
once “true, beautiful and good” appears tainted.1 While the artwork itself 
remains un changed, the process of ex posure changes the way we look at the 
artwork. So it is the context — such as art historical classifications — rather 
than the artwork itself that changes perception and valuation. To this effect 
art forgeries can be thought of as semantic shape-shifters, since they shift 
their shape in our gaze from supposedly authentic to false, once exposed 
(Öcal 2014: 176).
In contrast to the ambiguous images also known as reversible figures, this 
metamorphosis in the reception of forgeries is irreversible, since we will never 
look at a forgery the same way we did when we considered it to be original. So, 
what defines the uniqueness of an artwork, when we can see it in a forgery as 
well, provided it is considered to be original? Therefore, the pastiche-like char-
acteristics of Hamilton s̓ work can quite well be applied to forgeries, which 
combine several recognisable aspects of already existing, original artworks 
to a kind of modernised hyper-version of these originals, what in turn makes 
forgeries ‘so appealing’. Thus, as a child of his time, the forger paraphrases the 
prevailing taste and gaze of this time into the pictorial expression of the forged 
artist, so that he resembles a translator, who not only reproduces the model but 
1 | Initially rooted in Platoʼs philosophy, the trinity of the “true, beautiful 
and good” originates from a new reception and interpretation of Platoʼs 
writings from the early 18th to the 19 th century, when it became a concept 
of 19 th-century art, literature, and culture (Kurz 2015).
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recontextualises it into a new form.2 Accordingly, a forgery emulates the orig-
inal, re-presenting that original from a contemporary point of view and taste.
This can be illustrated particularly with reference to the example of the Flo-
rentine sculptor and forger Giovanni Bastianini (1830-1868), whose busts, reliefs 
and statuettes claimed to originate from the Quattrocento, while simultaneously 
fulfilling the stylistic expectation of the European and American audience of the 
19th century.
“a tuSCan Worthy to StanD by  
the SIDe of hIS PreDeCeSSorS”
Bastianini s̓ portrait bust of the Florentine Renaissance Dominican friar and 
preacher, Girolamo Savonarola, that he made in 1863 in the style of the Quattro­
cento, is a striking example (fig. 1). The lively expressions, the affective posture, 
and the detailed composition of the traditional habit are comparable to Donatello s̓ 
bust of Niccolo da Uzzano from 1432 (fig. 2). Both busts are distinguished by their 
emotive posture and naturalness, illustrated by their gaze to the upper right or 
left as well as by their detailed drapery. This preference for lively expressions is 
rooted in the Florentine Renaissance and fostered by its resurrection in Bastianini s̓ 
period, so that Quattrocento busts were classified according to how pronounced 
their naturalism was. But Bastianini s̓ works not only adopt this preferred 
naturalism, they carry it to extremes by appearing to be torn from real life. Indeed, 
Bastianini shaped most of his busts after living models such as friends and workers 
in nearby factories.3 Thus, he applies a contemporary artistic method which blends 
Renaissance models with modern techniques. This is also found in the staging 
of a painting s̓ composition by Stefano Bardini, an artist, forger and one of the 
most famous art and antiques dealers of the 19th century in Florence.4 Like a 
re verse tableau vivant, Bardini, who was equipped with the latest photographic 
in struments, dressed several people in Renaissance costumes, placed them in 
2 | Following Denis Diderot, an artist who reproduces paintings in engrav-
ings is not just copying but rather creating a new artwork: “le graveur […] 
est un prosateur qui se propose de rendre un poète dʼune langue dans 
une autre” (Diderot 1984: 314).
3 | One of them is Giuseppe Bonaiuti a worker of the nearby tobacco 
factory, who was the model for Bastianiniʼs bust of Girolamo Benivieni 
(Schüller 1959: 46). Furthermore, Bastianini made a portrait bust of his 
friend and fellow artist Gaetano Bianchi (Florence, Biblioteca Laurenzia-
na) whom he dressed in Renaissance costumes.
4 | See the current research and recent publications of Lynn Catterson 
(New York) on Stefano Bardini (2015; 2016).
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Figure 1: Giovanni 
Bastianini, “Girolamo 
Savonarola”, 1863, 
Victoria & Albert 
Museum, London.
Figure 2: Donatello, 
“Niccolò da Uzzano”, 
1432, Museo Nazionale 
del Bargello, Florence.
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historical surroundings, and photographed them so as to later paint these con-
trived sceneries in oil (figs. 3; 4).5
In this sense, Bastianini s̓ skilful imitation of the stylistic and technical charac-
teristics of the Quattrocento are significant for the great revival of the imitatio and 
aemulatio tradition during the Ottocento.6 Rooted in a long artistic tradition as well 
as in historical circumstances, this reborn concept also indicates the different atti-
tudes of Italians and non-Italians towards copies and imitations. In contrast to other 
European and American collectors, Italians did not regard them as intentionally 
deceptive. In fact, imitatio and aemulatio were forms of playful competition of dis-
tinguished artistic and technical skills and a tribute to the ideal of the Renaissance 
respectively of the Antiquity. The aim was to resituate the golden era of the Rina­
scimento in the contemporary Ottocento and in its national context so that “Italian 
art in the nineteenth century was diverse in subject matter and rich in regional 
variation, paying homage to the past as well as experimenting with the technologies 
of the future” (Helstosky 2009: 804).
Hence, the ‘discovery’ of the larger-than-life bust of Savonarola was a real 
sensation, because until then only two-dimensional profile portraits of the Do-
minican friar existed.7 Bastianini took these portraits as a model, illustrated by 
the striking resemblance of his bust to Fra Bartolomeo s̓ Ritratto di Girolamo 
Savonarola from 1498 (fig. 5). Following Bastianini s̓ contemporary Alessandro 
Foresi, he also modelled characteristic parts of his bust, like the habit revealing 
the forehead and hairline, after an ancient bronze medal (fig. 6).8 Furthermore, 
Bastianini s̓ bust was perfectly timed for a public resurgence of admiration for 
Savonarola during the Ottocento. Accordingly, Bastianini s̓ busts of Marsilio Fi-
cino, Girolamo Benivieni and Dante, who sooner or later became ardent followers 
of Savonarola, illustrate that Bastianini specifically selected figures of the Ital-
ian Renaissance who belong ed to Savonarola s̓ followers. Benivieni for instance 
rewrote his profane poems and translated Savonarola s̓ writings into Italian 
5 | I would like to thank Stefano Tasselli and Giuseppe Rizzo for their help 
in gaining access to archival material on Stefano Bardini and for sharing 
their valuable insights.
6 | On aemulatio, both as artistic and social concept during the Renais-
sance see Müller et al. 2011.
7 | Savonarola rose to fame with his prophecies and his so-called ‘bonfire 
of the vanities’, which was part of his plan to make Florence the centre 
of Christianity. His open antagonism to Rome and Pope Alexander VI led 
to his excommunication and execution in 1498. To avoid the possibility 
of Savonarolaʼs posthumous martyrdom, Pope Alexander VI aimed to de-
stroy every image of Savonarola.
8 | “dʼaprès une ancienne médaille, le buste en terre cuite du célèbre 
moine qui fut brulé vif sur la place della Signoria” (Foresi 1868: 33).
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Figure 3: Stefano 
Bardini, staged group 
of persons, undated, 
photograph, Archivio 
Stefano Bardini, 
Florence.
Figure 4: Stefano 
Bardini, painting 
after his photograph, 
Archivio Stefano 
Bardini, Florence.
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Figure 5: Fra Bartolo-
meo (Baccio della 
Porta), “Ritratto di 
Girolamo Savonarola”, 
1498, Museo di San 
Marco, Florence.
Figure 6: Florentine 
school, “Portrait 
Medal of Girolamo 
Savonarola” (obverse), 
15th century, The 
Metropolitan Museum 
of Art (Ann and George 
Blumenthal Fund),  
New York.
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such as Della semplicità della vita cristiana. Consequently, Bastianini s̓ forgeries 
are largely based on a blend of reception history, stylistic expectations and histor-
ically documented scarcity value. 
Eventually, the patriotic artists Cristiano Banti and Giovanni Costa bought the 
Savonarola bust for 10,000 Lire in order to keep it in Italy. Yet, after its exposure as 
a forgery they felt no remorse. Quite the contrary, Costa claimed to be “glad to find 
that such a distinguished artist was living and not dead” (after Barstow 1886: 506). 
Thus, Bastianini s̓ works were appreciated even as forgeries, as Sir Frederic Leigh-
ton s̓ letter to Sir Thomas Armstrong, the former director of the South Kensington 
Museum, now the Victoria and Albert Museum, demonstrates: “Bastianini was a 
man of impressive talent — a Tuscan worthy to stand by the side of his predecessors 
of the quattrocento; it is no concern of ours that poverty drove him to use his rare 
gifts in the service of vendors of spurious works” (in Department of science and 
art 1888).
forgerIeS In the MeltIng Pot  
of Cultural traVelS anD natIon buIlDIng
In fact, after the exposure of a forgery there is generally a two-stage reaction: 
initially, the deception apparently devalues the artwork entirely. But secondly, 
the new criminal context bestows a newly-historicising value upon the forgery. 
Just as the graffitied signature of Vladimir Umanets, the founder of the Yellow­
ism movement, on Mark Rothko s̓ Black on Maroon in London s̓ Tate Modern 
was considered vandalism, understandably so, it also became an intrinsic part 
of that painting s̓ history (Barrett 2014). Accordingly, Umanets and his fellow 
artist Marcin Lodyga assert in their “Manifesto of Yellowism”: “We believe 
that the context for works of art is already art” (Umanets / Lodyga 2010). With 
its 2010 exhibition “Close Examination: Fakes, Mistakes and Discoveries”, the 
National Gallery in London made this concept presentable by exhibiting forg-
eries specifically on account of their contexts that is to say of the histories be-
hind them, or as stated on the museum s̓ website: “The exhibition will showcase 
some of the most intriguing stories behind paintings in the Gallery” (National 
Gallery 2010).
The reasons for this appreciation of a forgery precisely because it is a forg-
ery have been changing since the 19th century. While in the 19th century pri-
marily the aesthetic quality defined the value of a forgery, it is the historicising 
context that adds value to a forgery today. This is why they can increase in value 
over time, or forgers are regarded as con-artists who have beaten the market. 
The case of the German art forger Wolfgang Beltracchi, who after forging for 
approximately thirty years in the style of such artists as Heinrich Campendonk 
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or Max Ernst now has his own show on television, is a notable contemporary 
example.9
And yet the debate about whether Bastianini should be thought of as a forger or 
an artist continues to the present day. While some experts and art historians refuse 
to accept Bastianini as a forger and portray him as a skilful artist and victim of 
the ruthless art dealer Giovanni Freppa, others describe Bastianini as a forger who 
enjoyed deceiving others.10 But the fact that Bastianini signed and dated his original 
works, which were exhibited throughout the 1850s at the Promotrici Fiorentine and 
at the annual exhibitions of the Florentine Academy, and that he didn̓t sign and date 
but rather artificially aged his forgeries, shows that Bastianini clearly differentiated 
between an original and a forgery.11 With Jeremy Warren s̓ detection of a letter from 
Alessandro Foresi to the French collector Charles Davillier, there can be no doubt 
remaining that Bastianini continued forging even after the end of his contract with 
his art dealer Giovanni Freppa (Warren 2005: 741).
It has, however, been argued that the true narrative about Bastianini is not the 
typical story of a frustrated genius or exploited victim, but rather about the contest 
of power between France and Italy (Helstosky 2009: 795). Bastianini s̓ forgery of 
the bust of Girolamo Benivieni is virtually a paradigm for this argument (fig. 7). 
Exhibited at the ‘Exposition Rétrospective’ of the Palais de Champs-Elysées in 
Paris in 1865, the art critic Paul Mantz praised the terracotta bust as an excellent 
work of the Quattrocento.12
9 | “Der Meisterfälscher. Wolfgang Beltracchi porträtiert…” is the name 
of a series which is now broadcasting in its third season at 3Sat. 
(https://www.3sat.de/page/?source=/sfdrs/179706/index.html, last ac-
cessed on 12 June 2017) For an interdisciplinary view of Beltracchiʼs 
forgeries see Keazor/Öcal 2014.
10 | The narrative of victimisation about Bastianini felling prey to the 
unscrupulous art dealer Giovanni Freppa, first was published in an article 
in the British Magazine of Art by Nina Barstow in 1886. However, a wide 
range of opinion regarded Bastianini as having the intent to deceive 
and not being a victim at all. They furthermore portrayed him as con-
spiring with his art dealer (Helstosky 2009: 797). With her aim to baptise 
Bastianini as an artist and not a forger, Anita F. Moskowitz unfortunately 
delivered a rather fragmentary, partly outdated and biased presentation 
that does not consider current research such as Barbara Bertelliʼs 2012 
published PhD thesis, which investigates the art market of the Florentine 
Ottocento in general and Bastianiniʼs art dealer and accomplice Giovanni 
Freppa in particular (Moskowitz 2013; Bertelli 2012).
11 | On Bastianiniʼs exhibitions see Sani 1973 and Helstosky 2009.
12 | Accordingly, Paul Mantz worships the bust in the Gazette des beaux 
arts: “Die ganze italienische Feinheit offenbart sich in der ausdrucks-
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Figure 7: Giovanni Bastianini, “Girolamo Benivieni”, 1863,  
Musée du Louvre, Paris.
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In 1866 Alfred Émilien O̓Hara van Nieuwerkerke bought the bust at an auc-
tion at the Hotel Drouot in Paris and resold it only a year later for 14,000 Francs 
to the Musée du Louvre in Paris (Hôtel Drouot 1866: 15). The participation of the 
sculptor and collector Nieuwerkerke brought a heightened political emphasis to the 
so-called ‘Benivieni affair’, as he was the most powerful individual in the French 
art world during Napoleon III s̓ reign. With the assistance of Princess Mathilde, 
Napoleon III s̓ cousin, Nieuwerkerke rose to power and was appointed superinten-
dent of the Imperial Museums. Due to his long-standing affair with the Princess, 
his questionable acquisitions of public art and his arrogant way of dealing with 
artists he was the subject of controversies throughout the 1860s and eventually fell 
from favour in 1870 (Helstosky 2009: 800).
After Giovanni Freppa revealed the Benivieni bust as a forgery in Decem-
ber 1867, followed by Bastianini s̓ confirmation soon afterwards, a polemical 
con troversy broke out involving not only art experts and dealers, but also Italy 
and France as nations.13 The possession of Renaissance art supposedly reflected 
France s̓ ad vanced level of civilisation, implying the strength of Napoleon III s̓ 
regime (Helstosky 2009: 804-05). In particular, the acquisition of large parts of 
Giampietro Campana s̓ Collection for the Louvre had been considered a big coup 
for Napoleon III, whereas for Italy it had been a humiliation, forcing them to 
part with significant artistic treasures. Whilst foreign collectors regarded picture 
hunting as a good opportunity, for Italians a feeling of incapacity around their abili-
ty to protect their cultural heritage arose. In turn foreign art collectors rationalised 
their purchase of Italian art by asserting that Italians wouldn̓t appreciate or care for 
their artistic heritage properly or would be unable to inherit their past; similar argu-
ments justified the “civilised” British in their ongoing quest to protect their cultural 
heritage, as being on the behalf of humankind (Black 2003: 159-60). France s̓ hunt 
for artistic emblems of past civilisations was likewise based in the megalomaniacal 
desire to safeguard the world s̓ treasures for the benefit of mankind (McClellan 
1994: 7). In his letter to the Times, Bernard Berenson stated that Italians had a 
greater appreciation for forgeries, copies and replicas than for their own artistic 
patrimony (Berenson 1903).14
Yet on the contrary, in the spirit of unification during the Risorgimento a new 
patriotism gathered strength in Italy, so that Italians defined themselves main-
ly through their own cultural heritage. The issue was to locate, categorise and 
vollen Physiognomie. Wir kennen Benivienis Portrait nicht; wir möchten 
schwören, daß es gut getroffen ist” (Mantz 1865: 339; also Schüller 
1959: 44).
13 | Further details of this controversy that mainly took place in the print 
media are documented in Becker 1889: 30-34.
14 | This position was also represented in contemporary literature such 
as Nathaniel Hawthorneʼs The Marble Faun (1860).
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protect existing art, antiquities and architecture, which led to a more urgent need 
for coherent art policies (Helstosky 2009: 812). But whilst Italians were trying to 
determine the extent of Italy s̓ cultural and artistic heritage, tourists and art collec-
tors were contributing to its steady depletion. In 1880 the British art dealer William 
Le Queux determined that most valuable art works had disappeared from Italy. 
The only objects that remained were forgeries and imitations, as Le Queux noted 
(Le Queux 1904: 8). Although his descriptions may be exaggerated, it can be seen 
that even Italian art dealers had to travel to other European countries in order to 
refill their stock with genuine Italian art for the next wave of tourists. Significant 
examples are plaster models of reliefs by Giovanni di Bologna, which were pur-
chased by an Italian dealer for £ 20 in an antique shop in London and taken back to 
Florence where they were sold to a British buyer for £ 300. Later, the Victoria and 
Albert Museum acquired them for £ 470 (Helstosky 2009: 814).
In the framework of unification and cultural travels, forgeries not only responded 
to an increasing demand, but also acted as a means of protection for Italy s̓ own 
cultural heritage, so that it remained within the Italian frontiers while at the same 
time benefitting from foreign currencies. Therefore, Italian forgers used the visual 
expectation of their foreign audience as mediums for a culturally-coded pictorial 
expression. In turn this procedure is comparable to Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala s̓ 
use of the Spanish language in The First New Chronicle and Good Government 
(1980), which Mary Louise Pratt, Professor of Spanish and Portuguese Languages 
and Literature, describes as “an example of a conquered subject using the conqueror s̓ 
language to construct a parodic, oppositional representation of the conqueror s̓ 
own speech” (Pratt 1991: 35). As an autoethnographic text it addresses both the 
author s̓ own community and the Spanish conquerors, adopting and foiling the 
observations the Spanish have made of Guaman Poma de Ayala s̓ nation (Pratt 
1991: 35). Therefore, Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala wrote his new chronicle in a 
mixture of Quechua and ungrammatical expressive Spanish (Pratt 1991: 34). This 
is comparable to Alessandro Foresi, who wrote about the “Benivieni affair” in 
quite an amusing and polemical way (Foresi 1868). But instead of Italian, his first 
language, Foresi used French in order to directly address his parody to the French 
connoisseurs.
Hence, 19th-century Italy and its art market represent a multi-national social 
space, where cultures of different times and nations of different places meet or 
clash. As a result this period of highly flourishing cultural transfer generated “con-
tact zones”, to use a term coined by Pratt (1991), in which forgeries reflect this trans-
culturation as a specific pictorial language diverging between the Italian Renais-
sance model and the foreign 19th-century view.15 Thus, in the nation-building process 
15 | The notion of ‘transculturation’ derives from the book, published 
in 1940, Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y el azúcar (the English trans-
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of the Risorgimento, authenticity had an existential significance for Italy, while art 
collectors considered authenticity as an increase in value of their art trophies. In 
this melting pot of identity remembrance and picture hunting, forgeries become 
objects of the ‘contact zone’, by commingling the transculturation of the European- 
American gaze of the 19th century with the works of the early Renaissance. 
Accordingly, Bastianini s̓ bust of Piccarda Donati had been praised for its 
resemblance to Quattrocento works, although or even because it follows the 
stylis tic expressions of the Pre-Raphaelites (fig. 8). Alexander Munro s̓ bust of 
his wife Mary for example bears striking similarities to Bastianini s̓ bust, par-
ticularly the facial expression (fig. 9). A comparison of both works illustrates 
how precisely Bastianini adapted to foreign taste and transformed it into a 
Quattrocento style by dressing his bust in Renaissance costumes. It is unknown 
whether Bastianini ever saw works by British Pre-Raphaelite sculptors. How-
ever, both the Pre-Raphaelites and the artists of the Ottocento share the same 
model, which is the art of the Quattrocento, precise ly pre-Raphael. Given that 
Bastianini shaped his bust in 1855 and therefore prior to Munro, the question 
arises, who actually influenced whom? Was it the Florentine Neo-Renaissance 
sculpture, seen by the Pre-Raphaelites as a genuine work of the Quattro cento? 
Or was it the taste of British cultural travellers, who brought the stylistic ex-
pressions of the Pre-Raphaelites to Florence and in doing so, influenc ed the 
artworks of the Ottocento?
Furthermore, the desires and visual expectations of the cultural tourists were 
generated both by the rise of connoisseurship, as well as the emergence of art his-
tory as a scientific discipline. At the latest with the rise of museums and collections 
the Italian art market had been structured by an unrestrained demand for valuable 
genuine yet inexpensive Italian art especially of the Trecento to Seicento, while 
contemporary Italian art played almost no role in the realm of European art during 
the 19th century. Therefore, Italy was confronted with the quandary of being praised 
for its past but not its present. Even the honouring of the artist Stefano Ussi at the 
“Universal Exposition” in 1867 had been dismissed by French art critics as a po-
litical rather than aesthetic choice.16 It was considered as a symbolic act of French 
support for the Italian Risorgimento.
la tion Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar was published 1947 in 
New York) by the Cuban essayist and anthropologist Fernando Ortiz. 
Exemplified by the devastating influence of colonalism on Cuba, which 
Ortiz describes as failed transculturation, he uses the term to describe 
merging cultures in general (Ortiz 1995: 100).
16 | “Critics even pointed out how Ussiʼs work was little more than 
a debased form of history painting. Given Italyʼs prior history of clas-
sical artis tic tradition, such mediocre work was tantamount to treason” 
(Helstosky 2009: 804).
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The “desire for inexpensive authenticity” (Helstosky 2009: 817) of Renaissance 
masterpieces inevitably created the market in which forgers operated. Thus, the 
resurgent aemulatio and imitatio traditions developed their own dynamics evolving 
into an aesthetic patriotism where international visual expectation met national cul-
tural heritage. By unifying the Quattrocento model with the Ottocento gaze, Bas-
tianini s̓ forgeries had been compounded as a kind of pasticcio of different epochs 
and cultures, so that their success was mainly due to cultural transfer and aesthetic 
patriotism. On the one hand, his works could be perceived as a tribute to Italy s̓ own 
history, and on the other hand they enabled Italy to benefit from foreign currencies 
and to preserve its cultural heritage by selling forgeries as substitutes for the origi-
nals to foreign travellers.
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Fake Supreme 
William Gaddis and the Art of Recognition1
Klaus Benesch (LMU Munich)
In his 1759 essay “Conjectures on Original Composition”, the English critic Edward 
Young argued that novelty and originality should be the most important categories 
for evaluating a work of art.2 “Originals”, Young declared, “are, and ought to be, 
great favourites, for they are great benefactors; they extend the republic of letters, 
and add a new province to its dominion. Imitators only give us a sort of duplicates 
of what we had, possibly much better, before” (1975: 319). By valorising original 
contributions over popular, slightly disguised copies of earlier texts, Young sʼ essay 
paved the way for modern discourses on authorship and copyright. Annoyed by an 
increasing number of books that were basically “duplicates of what we had,” he sep-
arates the mechanically manufactured text from the truly inspired, original work of 
art. Imitative artists are then dismissed as a sort of mechanics, mere manual labour-
ers who manipulate and piece together material that is already there. “Imi tations”, 
1 | This essay is an abridged and revised version of a chapter originally 
published in Joseph Tabbi and Rone Shavers, ed. (2007): Paper Empire: 
William Gaddis and the World System. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Al-
abama Press, pp. 28-45.
2 | Writing about the value that our culture puts on originality, progress and 
innovation, the Austrian historian of science Paul Feyerabend sees this 
myth of “creativity” already at work in Platoʼs Phaedrus, where in his seventh 
letter, Plato explains how “understanding or building a work of art con-
tains an element that goes beyond skill, technical knowledge, and talent. 
A new force takes hold of the soul and directs it […] artistic a chieve ment” 
(1987: 701). Feyerabend criticises “the view that culture needs individ-
ual creativity [as] not only absurd but also dangerous” (701). It is ab-
surd because of its underlying assumption that “human beings are self- 
contained entities, separated from the rest of nature” (708) and it is 
dangerous because, on a larger historical scale, it “led to tremendous 
social, ecological, and personal problems” (711).
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Young concludes, “are often a sort of manufacture wrought up by those mechanics 
[…] out of pre-existent materials not their own” (333).
If much of modern literature thrived on the aesthetic ideals articulated by Young 
and his Romantic followers, Postmodern writers seemed to be at odds with the be-
lief that great art is constituted solely by original acts. In a programmatic essay 
reviewing the appearance of Postmodern writing in America titled “The Literature 
of Exhaustion” (1967), novelist John Barth denied that the so-called ‘newness’ of a 
work of art has anything to do with its originality as such; rather it is the critical use 
of tradition, the creative rewriting of existing artistic concepts and inherited forms 
and techniques that guarantee the uniqueness of the individual artist. As he later ex-
plained, literary production has the potential to constantly reinvent itself without hav- 
ing recourse to an essentialist, reified and highly ideological notion of originality.3
In what follows, I discuss the dialectics of repetition and originality by focus-
i ng on The Recognitions, a 1955 novel by American Writer William Gaddis. The 
Recognitions is perhaps the first American novel to deal at length with the problem 
of assessing originality in a cultural environment that thrives on an abundance of 
copies, representations and simulacra. As a prime example of what critic Thomas 
LeClair has called the “Art of Excess” (1981-82), it represents and, at the same time, 
amplifies the confusion about the ‘real’ and its double in contemporary, mediated 
society. While educated readers still experience moments of recognition when trac-
ing some of the novel sʼ obscure references to their possible historic origins, such 
interpretative efforts are constantly subverted by the shifting meaning of unique-
ness itself. Unable to pin down the narrative sʼ complexity to a single, encompassing 
design, we are left with nothing more than the sobering realisation that the more 
adroit we become at deciphering the intricate web of textual doubling, the more 
confused we are about the epistemological value of origins and originality.
By rewriting the history of Western art as a history of doubling and counterfeit-
ing, The Recognitions turns into a sort of literary echo chamber bustling with the 
cacophonous reverberations of Europe sʼ greatest masterpieces — we might call this 
the ‘Joycean mode’ — while, at the same time, constantly obfuscating their histor-
ical context and questioning their referential authenticity. If Gaddisʼ “Carnival of 
Repetition” (as John Johnston called the novel sʼ redundant, cross-referential style, 
1990) foreshadows Postmodern narrative techniques, it also provokes a deeply hu-
manist critique of its own hypertrophied use of fleeting repetitions / recognitions.
3 | In particular, Barthʼs argument was directed against what he saw as 
an ideological superimposition of a single, rather limited literary tradition 
upon all of literature: “What my essay ‘The Literature of Exhaustion’ was 
really about, so it seems to me now, was the effective ‘exhaustion’ not 
of language or of literature, but of the aesthetic of high modernism: that 
admirable, not-to-be-repudiated, but essentially completed ‘program’ of 
what Hugh Kenner has dubbed “‘the Pound era’” (Barth 1982: 39).
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Yet to approach The Recognitions as a brilliant, but basically unreadable, 
literary ‘borderline’ case between Modernism and Postmodernism does not do 
justice to the novel sʼ obsession with reproductions, doubling and forgery. Instead I 
try to overcome the various fault-lines of the Modernist / Postmodernist paradigm 
by emphasizing a concept of repetition that appears to be Gaddisʼ own ‘original’ 
solution to the crisis of originality in modern and postmodern cultures. Responding 
to the shifting conditions of artistic production during the latter half of the 20th cen-
tury The Recognitions, I argue, sets out to redefine the very act of repetition itself.
The form of repetition I find most interesting in Gaddisʼ text is primarily philo-
sophical and spiritual. At its most general level, the multiplying acts of repetition 
in the novel conjoin to evoke a single regenerative practice of “re-petitioning”.4 My 
model for this kind of repetition as the ‘re-capturing’ and, subsequently, unfolding 
of an existential truth, is Kierkegaard sʼ short philosophical narrative ‘Repetition’, 
originally published in 1843, a text that is strikingly absent from critical discussions 
of Gaddisʼ novel.5
In his introduction to the Penguin edition, fellow writer William Gass notes that 
“following the hubble bubble of its initial reception, The Recognitions was left in a 
lurch of silence, except for those happy yet furious few who had found this fiction 
[…] about the nature, meaning, and value of ‘the real thing’ […] found it to be the 
real thing” (1985: viii). Gassʼ ironic, marvelously convoluted remark articulates an 
important truth about the nature of writing in general: any literary text, regardless 
of cautionary stylistic devices such as irony or self-referentiality, is likely to be 
taken by readers as more authentic than the reality it reflects upon. Even if the 
frame of reference, as in Postmodern writing, is the flimsy status of authenticity 
itself, we are reticent to deconstruct the act of criticism in the same way that we 
deconstruct the concepts represented in the text. The reason for this, I believe, is 
not so much that upon entering the realm of art we give the author the benefit of the 
doubt or suspend, as Coleridge has it, our commonsensical disbelief but that we all 
4 | The term “regenerative re-petitioning” is LaCapraʼs (1986: 35). I have 
borrowed it here because it strikes a nice balance between the various 
meanings and wordplays of the German term wieder-holen, which consti-
tutes the philosophical core of Kierkegaardʼs The Repetition (as I discuss 
above).
5 | To this intertextual panorama, one may well add Gilles Deleuzeʼs cre-
ative appropriation of Kierkegaard in Difference and Repetition (1968), a 
text that raises similar questions about the nature of repetition to those 
raised in The Recognitions. By the same token, it would also be possible 
to speak of Gaddisʼ novel as a precursor text to Deleuzeʼs, even though 
the latter does not seem to have been conscious of his American ances-
tor (which is actually quite surprising, given Deleuzeʼs explicit interest in, 
and frequent references to, American literature).
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participate in a pervasive culture of authenticity in which writing is considered an 
important means to ‘authenticate’ the modern subject.6
It is important to recall that the modern valorisation of artistic authenticity 
did not prevent an increasing confusion about the real and its false, mechan-
ically reproduced double. In a perceptive study of the history of doubling, 
copying, and counterfeiting in Western culture, Hillel Schwartz argued that 
the emphasis on originality was accompanied by an equally widespread ten-
dency to reproduce the unique work of art in order to make it available to a 
larger, mass audience.7 What sʼ more, it seems that rather than working against 
the practitioners of doubling and copying, the modern need for originality 
actually signaled the end of uniqueness on a scale that could barely have been 
imagined by even the most avid copyists of earlier times, of which, as Edward 
Young complained, there were plenty. With the turn of the 19th century — a 
century famed for the invention of key technologies in reproduction such as 
photography, lithography, stereotyping, the typewriter, telegraphy, the tele-
phone and the phonograph — uniqueness and originality were reduced, slowly 
but surely, to a sort of aesthetic ‘gold standard’: appreciated by many as a wise 
rule yet utterly removed from cultural practices and the material demands 
of the marketplace.
This is not to say that there had always been an agreement on what precisely 
originality is and how it might be distinguished from its negative twin, repe-
tition. From Edward Young sʼ rather practically minded “Conjectures on Ori-
ginal Composition” to Emerson sʼ patriotic call for an original, i.e. ‘American’ 
literature, from Coleridge sʼ highly gendered organicist view of art that fatally 
ricochets in much of the 19th and 20th century discourse on authorship, to T. S. 
Eliot sʼ praise of individual talent and its place within the hierarchies of tradi-
tion, or, more recently, John Barth sʼ postmodern rewriting of that very tradition, 
there had always been a striking vagueness as to the trappings of originality 
in the arts and, more specifically, to the extent to which artists could ‘borrow’ 
from their predecessors. Most commentators have attempted to solve this prob-
lem by defining, or rather, redefining originality, while only a few have used 
6 | In an early interview with Tom LeClair, Gaddis himself points out that 
we “still cling to art as order, at the same time, that one hopes that art is 
a destructive force” (LeClair 2007: 26).
7 | While Schwartzʼs assessment of copying and twinning practices in 
Western society is admirable for its wide range and almost encyclope-
dic approach to the topic (cf. 1996), there are numerous studies that 
deal more specifically with the history of forgery and counterfeiting in the 
visual arts (a topic especially pertinent to The Recognitions). For a his-
torical overview, see Matthew Rutenbergʼs essay “The Charms of Decep-
tion” (1991).
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the concept of repetition as cornerstone for a new theory of artistic creation.8 
Because its negative connotations — stagnation, imitation, mechanisation, pri-
mitivism, etc. — are perceived as irreconcilable with the very idea of creativity, 
it is often taken for granted that repetition per se cannot generate new insight 
or meaning.9
If much of what has been said so far turns on the juxtaposition of originality 
and repetition as mutually exclusive concepts, Gaddisʼ novel deliberately blurs 
the boundaries between these concepts. Before taking a somewhat closer look at 
how The Recognitions defies the various negative connotations of repetition — 
stagnation, imitation, mechanisation, etc. — a brief synopsis of the novel sʼ intricate 
plot(s) seems in order.
Gaddisʼ first novel takes the form of a quest. In a carefully wrought series of 
plots involving more than fifty characters across three continents, we follow the 
adventures of Wyatt Gwyon, the son of a clergyman who rejects the ministry in 
favour of the calling of the artist. His quest turns on the problem of making sense 
of reality, to find some form of order in the world through art. His initial failure as 
an independent artist leads him to paint in the style of old masters who, in their own 
time, had found the beauty and order Wyatt fails to reach. His talent for forgery is 
exploited, however, by a group of unscrupulous art critics and businessmen who 
hope to make money by passing his works off as ‘originals’. As the novel develops, 
these artistic forgeries become a profound metaphor for all kinds of fraud, counter-
feiting and fakery: aesthetic, scientific, religious, sexual and cultural. Towards the 
end of the novel, Wyatt seems to gain some insight from repudiating the widespread 
circulation of false images and mechanical reproductions, but the nature of this 
revelation is highly ambiguous and does not allow for easy distinctions between the 
real and the counterfeit artifact, between originals and fakes. Extended portions of 
the novel are set in contemporary Greenwich, New York, with references to ‘real’ 
artists and writers of the 1950s.
8 | Deleuze, in Difference and Repetition, names only Kierkegaard, Nietz-
sche, and the French catholic writer Charles Péguy as having recog-
nized repetition as a pivotal philosophical and creative concept: “Each 
of the three, in his own way, makes repetition not only a power peculiar 
to language and thought, a superior pathos and pathology, but also the 
fundamental category of a philosophy of the future” (Deleuze 1994: 5). 
Obviously, the list should also include Deleuzeʼs own attempt to recon-
ceptualise repetition vis-à-vis a cultural environment predicated upon 
difference and change.
9 | With the exception, perhaps, of its classic variant emulation (repetition 
as improvement), which was revived in America during the early nation-
al period to vindicate the lingering importation of ideas and technology 
from Europe.
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To manage the various, interrelated patterns of repetitions and recognitions, 
Gaddisʼ novel sets out to redefine the concept of repetition as re­cognition; that is, 
as a second cognition (from recognoscere, which means to examine or investigate 
a lost or hidden truth).10 The structural and epistemological dynamic which Gaddis 
sees at work between the two activities is reminiscent of Kierkegaard sʼ analysis of 
repetition as a spiritual and poetical mode of knowing. It is to these resemblances 
or, if you like, repetitions, which I will now turn in more detail.
In a brief article titled “Stop Player. Joke No. 4”, which appeared in The At­
lantic Monthly in 1951, Gaddis ridicules the monotonous movement of the player 
piano and, in particular, its popularity among middle class Americans who smugly 
assume that possession of the automated instrument can be at all compared to mas-
tering a piece of classical music.11 Because of its dehumanising, crippling effects 
on the individual repetition, being merely the imitative, mechanical process of dou-
bling (or aping), it is equally scorned in The Recognitions. References to technical 
means of reproduction abound, from the radio, the telephone or the record player to 
print reproductions of Wyatt sʼ paintings, the burning of effigies and, in one of the 
10 | In a very broad sense, The Recognitions can be read as a modern ad-
aptation of the themes (and title) of a 1st century, anonymously published 
theological romance, also known as the Clementine Recognitions. As one 
of Gaddisʼ prominent characters, Basil Valentine, remarks, this “first Chris-
tian novel” (1955: 373) is already linked to yet another core narrative of 
Judeo-Christian culture, namely, the Faust legend or the fatal quest for 
truth outside the sanctioned avenues of, initially, Christian theology and, 
in later renderings, Enlightenment thought. Yet even though the search for 
redemption and the search for truth — as highlighted in the Clementine 
Recognitions and the Faust legend respectively — constitute an important 
undercurrent of meaning in Gaddisʼs text, the novel as a whole seems to 
be driven more specifically by a self-reflexive inquiry into the wide-ranging 
ramifications of repetition/recognition as pivotal techniques in the cultural 
accretion of knowledge, including the composition of the text at hand. It 
is worth noting, however, that the meaning and function of both catego-
ries — repetition and recognition — vary considerably. Whatʼs more, they 
are embedded in a series of contradictory, if not mutually exclusive, nar-
rative contexts, which need to be thoroughly distinguished.
11 | This brief piece is actually the first instance of Gaddisʼ lifelong ob-
session with the history of the player piano as a glaring manifestation 
of cultural and intellectual decline. It foreshadows the use of the same 
theme in JR (1975) and the posthumously published novella Agape Aga-
pe (2002a). See also the notes on this and related material in The Rush 
for Second Place (2002b) and the afterword to Agape Agape by Joseph 
Tabbi.
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novel sʼ funniest scenes, the naïve attempt to directly apply set phrases from Dale 
Carnegie sʼ bestseller How To Win Friends and Influence People (1936) to real-life 
situations. The list could easily be extended. On one level, then, The Recognitions 
clearly resonates with traces of Arnoldian cultural critique; and on another, it adum-
brates, if in a subtler, poetic register, the harsh analysis of contemporary postindus-
trial society by Herbert Marcuse in One Dimensional Man (1964). Consider the 
following incident:
The cab had turned east. As it stopped at a corner […] he looked out the 
closed window. People who passed, passed quickly and silently, leaving 
behind a figure barely taller than the barrel organ mounted on a stick, 
whose handle he turned, his only motion, the hand, clockwise, barely 
more enduring than the sounds he released on the night air, sounds 
with out the vanity of music, sounds unattached, squeaks and drawn 
wheez es, pathos in the minor key and then the shrill of loneliness related 
to nothing but itself, like the wind round the fire place left standing after 
the house burned to the ground. (Gaddis 1955: 264)12
The description of the barrel organ highlights Gaddisʼ interest in the history of me-
chanical instruments (especially the player piano), yet it does so by condensing the 
far-reaching symbolic ramifications of ‘mechanised’ music into a single, compelling 
image. Juxtaposed with the cranking motions of the hand that ‘plays’ the instrument 
are sounds — pathetic “squeaks and wheezes” — that appear to be entirely detached 
from human agency or a physical center; the groaning murmur of the barrel organ, 
produced not by natural forces (as in the aeolian harp) but by the repetitive move-
ment of a metallic cylinder scarred with dents and protrusions, has ceased to relate 
to anything but itself. As a fine example of ‘repetition as mechanical reproduction’, 
the image powerfully cuts across a wide range of concerns about the course of con-
temporary society. Most prominently, the concern about the loss of a centre or refer-
ent, of being caught in an endless loop of self-reflexive, autistic repetitions of a plot 
in which, as Wyatt puts it, the “hero fails to appear, fails to be working out some plan 
of comedy or, disaster” (263). As an artist, Wyatt has an acute sense of the tragedy of 
12 | The above scene occurs towards the end of a crucial encounter 
between the protagonist, Wyatt Gwyon, and Basil Valentine, the priest-
turned-critic and barely veiled mouthpiece of the author. The two men 
initially met at the offices of Recktall Brown, who commissions counterfeit 
paintings from Wyatt, and Valentine offered to take Wyatt to his apart-
ment where he wants to show him blown-up photographs of paintings by 
Flemish masters. The incident is further contextualised by a reference to 
Thoreauʼs Walden, a book that Wyatt stealthily places on Valentineʼs lap 
while both are riding uptown in a cab.
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this failure, of his being inextricably linked to a larger society that has lost its ability 
to deal with ‘original’ art in any other way than by endlessly reproducing it.
The difference between Wyatt sʼ copying of Flemish masterpieces and the 
reproductions of these paintings in the art magazine Collectors Quarterly, which 
he dismisses as sham, “mechanical reproductions,” is not easy to grasp. The am-
biguous, if not paradoxical, definition of repetition as, on the one hand, a viable 
artis tic technique and, on the other, a sign of cultural deprivation, can be traced 
through out The Recognitions. They appear to be most pertinent in the novel sʼ 
self-reflexive discourses on art and artistic production. In a crucial conversation 
with Esther, his first wife, Wyatt defends his obsession with copying against the 
modern, self-righteous emphasis on originality. The words here are those of his 
Munich art teacher Herr Koppel:13
That romantic disease, originality, all around we see originality of incom-
petent idiots, they could draw nothing, paint nothing, just so the mess 
they make is original […]. Even two hundred years ago who wanted to be 
original, to be original was to admit that you could not do a thing the right 
way, so you could only do it your own way. When you paint you do not try 
to be original, only you think about your work, how to make it better, so 
you copy masters, only masters, for with each copy of a copy the form 
degenerates […] you do not invent shapes, you know them, auswendig 
wissen Sie, by heart […]. (89)
Wyatt sʼ / Koppelʼ s argument strikingly synthesises the divergent aspects of repetition 
in Gaddisʼ text, and it provides the key to an alternative, philosophical understanding 
of the term. This alternate meaning of repetition pivots on the German expression 
“auswendig wissen,” which translates as knowing by heart, but contrary to its En-
glish equivalent derives from the verb “aus-wenden” or to turn something inside out. 
“Auswendig wissen” thus is a form of knowing that involves the turning of something 
inside out or looking at it from both sides, to know it by heart but also to know it 
‘inside out’. It is an activity that implies simultaneously the immersion in as well as a 
distancing from the phenomenon you intend to learn or know more about. According 
to Wyatt sʼ reasoning, originality cannot be understood by way of difference, that is, as 
being different from what is already in existence, nor should repetition be reduced to a 
similarity with some pre-existing design or work of art. While the mass reproduction 
or copying for the sake of copying will lead to degeneration and decline, copying of 
a great work of art to the point where you begin to know it by heart — because you 
have become immersed in it, looked at it from the inside out — demarcates a mode of 
repetition of a different order.
13 | “The First Turn of the Screw” and “The Last Turn of the Screw” are 
Gaddisʼs titles for the very first and last chapters, respectively.
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enter: kIerkegaarD anD rePetItIon
In his philosophical narrative Repetition, Kierkegaard proposed a radical reval-
uation of repetition as “the new [philosophical] category that will be discover-
ed” (1983: 148). His complex use of repetitions and recognitions — both true and 
false — resembles Gaddisʼ technique in The Recognitions. It also triggered a host 
of critical interpretations of which Gilles Deleuze sʼ post-structuralist re-reading 
Différence et répétition (1968) marks the beginning of a renewed interest in Kier-
kegaard as one of the most important thinkers of modernity.
In a very broad sense, Kierkegaard sʼ Repetition is primarily concerned with 
re-conceptualising our relationship with time. Rather than explaining time as fol-
lowing a linear axis from past to present to future, as in Hegel sʼ philosophy, Kier-
kegaard posits that we cannot experience time (including future time) other than 
through a recollection of things past, and that therefore our whole life comes to rest 
on the act of repetition:
When the Greeks said that all knowledge is recollecting, they said that all 
existence, which is, has been; when one says that life is a repetition, one 
says: actuality, which has been, now comes into existence. If one does 
not have the category of recollection or of repetition, all life dissolves into 
an empty, meaningless noise. (149)
Put simply, the argument runs as follows: repetition is life because without repeti-
tion the present would be irrecoverably past or perpetually passing. Yet if reality 
is made of repetition, then the form by which repetition becomes manifest is re­ 
collection, or the act of remembering. Repetition, therefore, does not just happen; it 
is neither mechanical and automatic nor does it freeze human agency in a series of 
passing, identical moments. “The dialectic of repetition”, Kierkegaard argues, “is 
easy; for that which is repeated has been — otherwise it could not be repeated — but 
the very fact that it has been makes the repetition into something new” (149). Rather 
than marking the end of human life before it has even begun, repetition represents 
a powerful instrument to overcome death. “It may be true,” Kierkegaard contends, 
“that a person sʼ life is over and done with in the first moment, but there must also be 
the vital force to slay this death and transform it to life” (137).
Kierkegaard sʼ definition of repetition as an ongoing process of remembering 
and representation is essentially poetic. To repeat (in German wieder­holen, to col-
lect again) is an act of wilful recovery by way of re-imagining the past as pres-
ence. More over, the dynamics of repetition are volatile, it cannot be contrived or 
determined: repetition, according to Kierkegaard, “is and remains a transcendence” 
(1983: 186). By freeing repetition in this way from its negative material connotation, 
he is also able to posit a special place for the artist. If repetition is the driving force 
behind human existence, the artist — whose professional interests are centred in the 
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representation of being as ‘past’ time — becomes what Kierkegaard calls an ‘excep-
tion’, and a bridge to that other “aristocratic exception”, namely religion. Insofar as 
he re­petitions life as art, the artist constantly navigates the shifting boundaries 
be tween the paradox of repetition and the dreadful possibility of irretrievable loss. 
This, then, is what connects him to the sphere of religion and spirituality and, by 
way of ‘forward’ recollection, to that mid-20th-century priest-turned-artist figure, 
Wyatt Gwyon.
Towards the end of The Recognitions, Wyatt, who by now has re-appeared un-
der the name of Stephen, is seen in a Spanish monastery where he feverishly scrapes 
off layers of old paint from a 16th century genre painting. In keeping with the aus-
tere, spiritual surroundings, Wyatt is obsessed with “simplicity” (Gaddis 1955: 872), 
a reductive, self-annihilating approach to painting that he learned from studying 
Renaissance masters, who in turn had copied it from Titian (the American transcen-
dentalist writer Henry David Thoreau, who has a cameo appearance in the novel, 
is yet another important reference here). Wyatt has pushed this idea to an extreme, 
in which simplification becomes erasure or the removal of every existing layer of 
paint. His model, obviously, is Praxiteles, the Greek artist who defined the process 
of sculpture as the removal of excess marble to the point where one “reaches the 
real form which was there all the time” (875). If Wyatt sʼ search for perfection, 
purity and formal concretisation coincides with core modernist aesthetic values, his 
project can also be read as a re-petitioning of Kierkegaard sʼ definition of art to “ex-
pose what is hidden” (1983: 135). Whereas Kierkegaard sʼ protagonist Constan tine 
“shaves off the beard of all [his] ludicrousness” every morning only to learn that 
“the next morning [his] beard is just as long again” (214), since repetition cannot 
be avoided, Wyatt scrapes off heaps of paint only to arrive at the recognition that 
“we all studied […] with Titian” (Gaddis 1955: 873), and that all his life has been 
marked by a form of artistic theft: “I am lived as a thief,” he once remarks, “all my 
life is lived as a thief” (868).14
By positing repetition as a powerful, creative force, both Kierkegaard and Gad-
dis have attempted to relieve it of its negative cultural and philosophical image. 
From this perspective, reality is nothing but the repetition of an abstract idea, 
and artistic representations are always mere actualisations of the real. But even 
though it necessitates a series of repetitions, art is not — as in Plato sʼ understand-
ing — mere ly a mimetic imitation of life. Though ceaselessly actualising the real 
by way of repetition, art does not just reproduce what was there before. Rather it 
14 | One is also struck here by a parallel between Kierkegaardʼs quip 
on shaving as castrating (“I sit and clip myself,” 1983: 214) and Gaddisʼ 
mention of “that most extraordinary Father of the Church, Origen, whose 
third-century enthusiasm led him to castrate himself so that he might 
repeat the hoc est corpus meum, Dominus, without the distracting inter-
ference of the rearing shadow of the flesh” (1955: 103).
Fake Supreme 137
resembles Kierkegaard sʼ experience of re-reading the Book of Job: “Every time I 
come to it, it is born anew as something original or becomes new and original in 
my soul” (1983: 205).
According to an oft-quoted essay by Umberto Eco, postmodern media culture 
signals a shift from innovation to repetition, from the modern aesthetics of novelty 
to the postmodern aesthetics of recognition. In doing so, it also introduces a form 
of myth-making. Yet myth, Eco argues, “has nothing to do with art. It is a story, 
always the same. It may not be the story of Atreus and it may be that of J. R. Why 
not?” (Eco 1985: 182). Gaddis would not agree. To this relentless critic of mechani-
cal forms of reproduction, postindustrial man is veiled by an “undimensional dark-
ness”, a self-perpetuating, endless repetition of “static patternless configurations 
[that] recalled nothing” (Gaddis 1955: 286). To escape “the Diaspora of words” (85) 
associated with contemporary mediated society, Gaddis proposes a return to sim-
plicity, to that “unmeasurable residence of perfection, where nothing was created, 
where originality did not exist: because it was origin.” This, to be sure, entails both 
the process of making and that of un-making, of “scraping off” (cf. 873).15
The Recognitions may be seen as the next best solution to this challenging task 
of the postmodern writer to embrace repetition as a new category while simul-
taneously resisting the dangers of self-effacement. Given the increasing skepticism 
about the postmodern reduction of art as either a commodity or a site of conflicting 
ideologies, we might wish that Gaddis sʼ re-configuring of repetition as re-petition-
ing would finally be recognised as an original contribution in its own right to the 
ongoing debate about aesthetics and the place of art in contemporary society.
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Reflections on Plagiarism     
in Jorge Luis Borgesʼs Works  
The case of Pablo Katchadjianʼs El Aleph engordado
Florencia Sannders (LMU Munich)
In 2009, the Argentinian author Pablo Katchadjian published El Aleph engordado, 
(The Fattened Aleph), a rewriting of Borges sʼ classic short story “The Aleph”, from 
1945.1 As Katchadjian explains in a postface, his intervention consisted in “fat-
tening” Borges sʼ 4000-word text by adding 5600 more, without changing even a 
single full stop or comma of the base text: “el texto de Borges está intacto pero 
totalmente cruzado por el mío” (2009: 50).2
What seemed to be a very legitimate and even ‘Borgesian’ literary experiment 
resulted in scandal when, in 2011, Maria Kodama — Borges sʼ widow and the owner 
of his intellectual property rights — claimed that by re-writing Borges sʼ text and 
publishing it without asking her permission, Katchadjian had committed an act of 
plagiarism, and she initiated legal proceedings against him.3
This essay revolves around two main points. First, it aims to show how a new 
literary practice of experimentation on a classic text can be discredited as plagia-
rism via a predication of ‘unoriginality’ that derives from outdated aesthetic canons. 
Secondly, it highlights two different discourses that appear as irreconcilable in this 
1 | The year of its first publication in Revista Sur.
2 | “Borgesʼs text is intact but totally criss-crossed by mine” (my 
translation).
3 | The case was dismissed in the first instance, but was reviewed in a 
court of appeal. Katchadjian now faces the possibility of an oral trial. 
This is not the first time Kodama has accused an author of plagiarism; in 
fact, it seems to be her modus operandi when a writer dares to experi-
ment with Borgesʼs work. For example, in 2011 she also pressed charges 
against the Spanish writer Agustín Fernández Mallo for his book El hace-
dor (de Borges), remake. Her accusation obliged the publisher Alfagua-
ra, to withdraw the already-printed book from bookshops (Gelós 2015).
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dispute, the legal and the literary. While the plagiarism allegations against Katchad-
jian sʼ Aleph seem partly legitimate according to a century of Argentinian intellectual 
property law, they are absolutely risible in terms of artistic experimentation, largely 
because the ‘plagiarised author’ was one of the pioneers of this new literary practice.4
the fatteneD alePh
Citing the first lines of the scandalous book in question will give a closer view of the 
kind of “fattening” interventions that Katchadjian applies to Borges sʼ text, which 
are italicized here for the purposes of this study:
La candente y húmeda mañana de febrero en que Beatriz Viterbo final-
mente murió, después de una imperiosa y extensa agonía que no se 
rebajó un solo instante ni al sentimentalismo ni al miedo ni tampoco al 
abandono y la indiferencia, noté que las horribles carteleras de fierro y 
plástico de la Plaza Constitución, junto a la boca del subterráneo, habían 
renovado no se qué aviso de cigarrillos rubios mentolados; o sí, sé o 
supe cuáles, pero recuerdo haberme esforzado por despreciar el sonido 
irritante de la marca; el hecho me dolió, pues comprendí que el incesan-
te y vasto universo ya se apartaba de ella, Beatriz, y que ese cambio era 
el primero de una serie infinita de cambios que acabarían por destruirme 
también a mí. (7-8)5
4 | By contrast, it can also be said that Borges himself played with the 
notion of plagiarism in its most trivial sense. For example, in a speech he 
held in 1952 at the funeral of the writer Macedonio Fernández, Borges 
affirmed that he was such an admirer of his friendʼs work that: “I imitated 
him, up to the point of literal transcription, up to the point of passionate 
and devoted plagiarism” (Engelbert 1993: 382, my translation).
5 | “On the hot and humid February morning in which Beatriz Viterbo 
finally died, after a period of desperate and extensive agony that never 
for a single moment gave way to sentimentality or fear, nor to abandon or 
indifference, I noticed that the horrible iron and plastic billboards of Plaza 
Constitución next to the entrance to the subway had been renovated to 
an advertisement for I do not know which blond menthol cigarettes. Or 
I do, I know or I knew which ones they were, but I remember making an 
effort not to pay attention to the irritating sound of the brand. The fact hurt 
me, since I realised that the vast and unceasing universe was already 
moving away from her, Beatriz, and that this change was the first one in 
an endless series of changes that would end up destroying me, too” (the 
translation as well as the emphases are mine).
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One of the distinctive marks of Katchadjian sʼ intervention is the addition of a some-
what banal and quotidian language to Borges characteristic academic prose. For 
example, when Borges, the narrator and main character of “The Aleph”, visits 
Argentino Daneri sʼ house to finally see the Aleph — that is, the whole universe 
concentrated in a spot in the corner of Daneri sʼ basement — he lists a number of 
objects he sees: “nieve, tabaco […], convexos desiertos ecuatoriales y cada uno de 
sus granos de arena, […] en un gabinete de Alkmaar un globo terraqueo entre dos 
espejos que lo multiplicaban sin fin” (Borges 2009a: 753).6 Katchadjian adds in his 
story, among others: “los infinitos microbios de que estamos compuestos […], un 
sapo aplastado por un jeep” (2009: 43-44).7 These latter certainly clash with Borges 
far more elegant choice of words.
The plot of “The Aleph” revolves around the death of Beatriz Viterbo and her at 
first secret life, which is reconstructed as a puzzle over the course of the short-story, 
from the perspective of the main character, Borges, along with that of Argentino 
Daneri. The references to the sexual life of Beatriz Viterbo that Katchadjian adds 
play a similarly “irreverent” role, in view of the fact that in Borges sʼ oeuvre it is 
unusual to find eroticism of any kind: 
Beatriz (yo mismo suelo repetirlo) era una mujer hermosa, una niña de 
una clarividencia casi implacable, pero había en ella negligencias, dis-
tracciones coquetas, desdenes sensuales, verdaderas crueldades de la 
exhibición, que tal vez reclaman una explicación patológica […] Cierta 
vez, el doctor Sigui me había sugerido que Beatriz padecía un desorden 
sexual. (34)8
Not only is Beatriz Viterbo endowed with a much spicier personality in Katchad-
jian sʼ Aleph, but she is also documented as having sexual encounters with Ar-
gentino Daneri and other men: “vi en un cajón del escritorio (y la letra me hizo 
temblar) cartas obsenas, increíbles, precisas, que Beatriz había dirigido a Carlos 
Argentino, vi luego cartas de Beatriz, aun más obscenas, dirigidas al doctor 
6 | “snow, tobacco […], convex equatorial deserts and their every grain 
of sand […], in a study in Alkmaar a globe of the terrestrial world placed 
between two mirrors that multiply it endlessly” (Borges 2004: 130).
7 | “the infinite microbes we are made of […], a toad run over by a jeep” 
(my translation).
8 | “Beatriz (I myself often repeat it) was a beautiful woman, a girl of 
implacable perspicacity, but she could be careless, susceptible to 
coquettish distractions, sensual disdains, real cruelties of ostentati-
on — which may have a pathological explanation […] Once, Doctor 
Sigui suggested to me that Beatriz suffered from a sexual disorder” 
(my translation).
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Zunni” (44-45).9 Katchadjian s̓ interventions mostly live up to the name of his 
book: they work like “fatty tissue”, “unnecessary” additions to the canonic text, 
which go so far as to transform  Borges’s classical short story-form into a novella 
(Gelós 2015). 
Borge s̓ widow was by no means ignorant of Katchadjian s̓ avant-garde gesture. 
Moreover, she considered this “plagiarism” as an act of irreverence against her 
husband, one of Argentina s̓ most important and respected 20th-century writers, as 
she expressed in one of the many interviews she gave: “Se mete en una obra ajena 
en un plagio irreverente para deformarla: no lo voy a permitir” (Sánchez, 2015).10
“aPProPrIatIon lIterature”
Katchadjian’s fattening of ‘The Aleph’ is not an isolated phenomenon, quite the 
contrary, it can be contextualised within a series of recent and highly provocative 
literary experiments. Annette Gilbert dubs these “Appropriation Literature” in her 
2014 book, Reprint: Appropriation and Literature, in which she also makes spe-
cific reference to Katchadjian’s and Borges’s work.11 According to her theory, this 
new literature is characterised neither by copying or playing with the style of a 
canonical writer, nor by reusing a famous character or certain motifs, but rather by 
the use of the entire “materiality as such” of a text (Gilbert 2014: 51). What differen-
tiates appropriations from plagiarism is that they explicitly show the intervention 
performed by a work by “staging the act itself” (51). Gilbert also places particular 
emphasis on defining the controversy that is generated by these works’ refusal to 
fulfil traditional readerly expectations, principally the expectation of originality, in 
the sense that they have to be a “new” and “unique” product of the imagination of 
the writer:
Where exactly does the provocation of these books lie? […] we are con-
cerned with books for which no new, original text has been produced. 
Rather, these books are based on texts or complete books which already 
9 | “In a desk drawer (and the handwriting made me shiver) I saw ob-
scene, incredible, precise letters that Beatriz had written to Carlos Ar-
gentino, then I saw the letters by Beatriz, even more obscene, addressed 
to doctor Zunni” (my translation).
10 | “He messes with someone elseʼs work in an irreverent plagiarism in 
order to deform it: I will not allow that” (my translation).
11 | According to Gilbert’s theory, the kind of intervention applied in The 
Fattened Aleph could be that of “Interpolation”, which “[u]sually […] re-
fers to a subsequent (unauthorized) insertion of words or sentences in 
the text of a work” (Gilbert 2014: 68).
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exist, and which are appropriated and re-published under a new author-
ship. Hence, these works challenge the concepts of innovation and ori-
ginality dictated by our culture, a challenge that is usually answered with 
accusations that these works possess a disrespectful hubris or that they 
are brazen plagiarism — especially when they are concerned with canon-
ical texts of world literature or intellectual history. This applies both to 
appropriations in which the original text or book hasnʼt been modified, 
and to appropriations that modify a given text. (49-50)
It is exactly for this reason that the accusation of plagiarism has no validity Katchad-
jian’s case. There is clearly no intention to “deceive the reader” by concealing Bor-
ges’s authorship of the 1949 ‘Aleph’. On the contrary, not only does Katchadjian 
rewrite a literary classic precisely for a reader who is anticipated to surely know 
of its existence — and includes the original’s “fattened” title within the title of the 
new work — but he also explains how he performed his literary “appropriation” in 
the postscript,12 explicitly declaring that the text worked on is that of Borges. This 
means that, in terms of the Gilbert’s theory mentioned above, Katchadjian is explic-
itly staging the act of appropriation (51):
El trabajo de engordamiento tuvo una sola regla: no quitar ni alterar nada 
del texto original, ni palabras, ni comas, ni puntos, ni el orden. Eso sig-
nifica que el texto de Borges está intacto pero totalmente cruzado por el 
mío, de modo que, si alguien quisiera, podría volver al texto de Borges 
desde éste.
Con respecto a mi escritura, si bien no intenté ocultarme en el estilo de 
Borges tampoco escribí con la idea de hacerme demasiado visible: los 
mejores momentos, me parece, son esos en los que no se puede saber 
con certeza qué es de quién. (Katchadjian 2009: 50)13
12 | Kachadjianʼs extra prologue is indeed a reference to Borgesʼs work, 
who in his postfaces deploys multiple ‘tricky’ narrators, who sometimes 
contradict the main narrator, add new information about the story and 
‘confuse’ the reader.
13 | “The work of fattening had only one rule: not to remove nor to modify 
anything from the original, not words or commas, or a full stop, or the 
sequence. This means that Borgesʼs text is intact but totally crossed by 
mine, so that, if someone wanted to, he could go back to Borgesʼs text 
starting from this one. Regarding my writing, even though I did not try to 
hide myself in Borgesʼs style, I did not write with the idea of becoming 
visible: the best moments, I think, are those in which it is uncertain what 
belongs to whom” (my translation).
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the aCCuSatIonS
Disregarding current novelties in literary theory, María Kodama accused Katchad-
jian of plagiarising Borges. In an interview with El País from 2016 around the time 
when rumours of the case began to spread in literary circles, Kodama demonstrated 
her understanding of the concept of intellectual property in terms of possession, 
stating that Katchadjian should have asked for her permission to experiment with 
Borges sʼ work — that is, for ‘appropriating’ it:
P. ¿Por qué demandó al escritor argentino Pablo Katchadjian por su obra 
El Aleph engordado?
R. Ya solo la palabra engordado hubiera producido el desmayo de Bor-
ges. Yo fui criada por un padre japonés y tengo códigos que aquí no 
existen. Lo básico es preguntar, porque si yo quiero usar ese suéter te 
digo, ¿me lo prestás o no?
P. Si le hubiera pedido permiso para jugar con la obra de Borges, ¿Se lo 
hubiera concedido?
R. No, no. No se puede jugar con la obra de Borges. (Cué / Centenera 
2016)14
Nevertheless, plagiarism as such does not exist in the Argentinian penal code. The 
closest corresponding legal form is “Intellectual Property Fraud”, which was enact-
ed in the 1930s, a period in which these kinds of artistic “interventionist” experi-
ments were emerging. The legal strictures relevant to this case are:
se consideran casos especiales de defraudación y sufrirán la pena que 
él establece […]:
a) El que edite, venda o reproduzca por cualquier medio o instru-
mento, una obra inédita o publicada sin autorización de su autor o 
derechohabientes;
14 | “Q. Why did you sue the Argentinian writer Pablo Katchadjian for his 
work?
A. The mere word fattened would have caused Borges to faint. I was 
raised by a Japanese father and I have principles that donʼt exist here. 
The minimum is to ask, because if I want to use this sweater I say to you: 
can I borrow it?
Q. If he had asked for your permission to play with the work from Borges, 
would you have given it to him?
A. No, No, You cannot play with Borgesʼs work” (my translation).
Everything indicates that Kodama meant Argentina with the word “here”.
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b) El que edite, venda o reproduzca una obra suprimiendo o cambiando 
el nombre del autor, el título de la misma o alterando dolosamente su 
texto;15
Given the facts — that Katchadjian had changed the name of the original short 
story to The Fattened Aleph, intentionally erased Borges sʼ name as author, 
altered the text without distinguishing between Borges sʼ work and his own, 
which was precisely the whole point of the intervention, and finally that he 
offered the work for sale — the law could partly be interpreted in favour of 
Kodama.16
In this debate, two irreconcilable concepts start to become evident. The 
prob lem that comes to the surface here is as follows: how can literature and its 
possibilities of experimentation, legitimate in their own field and depending on 
their own rules, be judged according to an outdated law that does not take into 
account any change in that field since the 1930s?
the SCanDal
The scarce 200 copies of The Fattened Aleph that were published in Buenos 
Aires — a number of which were sold for a small amount of money, while 
the rest were given to friends as gifts — were enough to land Katchadjian in 
court. The scandal of the plagiarism accusation consequently sparked a debate 
among numer ous Argentine writers and academics (Gelós 2015). In respon-
se, they gathered in Katchadjian sʼ defence, highlighting the absurdity of jud-
ging The Fattened Aleph under such an obsolete law, and pointed out that the 
method Katchadjian used is consistent with literary-historical precedent, more 
specifically, interventions based on rewriting what can be called “original” 
texts. This panorama was articulated in an open letter they wrote for the 
gathering:
15 | “[The following] are considered special cases of fraud and will be 
punished with the penalty provided by law […]:
a) The editing, sale or reproduction of an unpublished or published 
work, by any means or instrument, without authorization of its author or 
copyright-holder
b) The editing, sale or reproduction of a work removing the name of the 
author, the title or deliberately changing the text” 
(Article 72 of law 11.723 of the penal code, my translation).
16 | In an interview with the newspaper La voz, Kodamaʼs lawyer, Fer-
nando Soto, said: “If Katchadjian is so creative, he should write his own 
books and then fatten them up” (Redacción LaVoz, my translation).
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María Kodama is the heir to Jorge Luis Borgesʼs literary estate. This estate 
includes short stories, poems, essays, prologues, articles and books 
written in collaboration, which fit into four volumes in a bookshelf: the 
remaining world literature, which Borges helped to renew from Argentina, 
and of which El Aleph engordado is legitimately a part, does not belong 
to María Kodama, nor does she have any veto power over it.17
The defence attorney Ricardo Straface, who is also a writer, asked Katchadjian to 
write a short essay explaining to the judge that the concept behind the appropriated 
Aleph, as well as its narrative procedures, are part of a tradition of art and literature 
which emerged a couple of decades ago. He makes reference to intertextuality, to 
Duchamp sʼ readymades, and indeed to the fact that Borges was a pioneer in this 
tradition (Castagnet / Salzmann 2012). Straface states in an interview: “Yo creo que 
fue importante esta explicación para que los jueces aceptaran el argumento jurí-
dico de que no había intención de engañar, y que este procedimiento tenía una 
gran tradición, de la cual Borges era un entusiasta cultor” (Zúñiga 2012).18 Borges 
dedicated an enormous part of his work to creating the “literature of literature”, or 
as Michel Lafon calls it, “le champ privilégié de l eʼxpérimentation borgésienne” 
(1990: 35). It is in this sense paradoxical to prosecute a contemporary writer who is 
experimenting with literary methods that Borges helped to develop.
In his fiction, Borges himself played with the idea of appropriation literature. In his 
much-cited short story — which Gilbert mentions in Reprint — “Pierre Menard, author 
of the Quixote”, a writer from the 20th century attempts to compose Don Quixote, repli-
cating Cervantes sʼ text word for word, but without copying the original:
No quería componer otro Quijote — lo cual es fácil — sino el Quijote. Inútil 
agregar que no encaró nunca una transcripción mecánica del original; 
no se proponía copiarlo. Su admirable ambición era producir unas pági-
nas que coincidieran — palabra por palabra y línea por línea — con las 
de Miguel de Cervantes. (Borges 2009b: 533)19
17 | “Support for Pablo Katchadjian [English version]. Open Letter” http://
alephengordado.blogspot.de/p/support-for-pablo-katchadjian-english.
html (last accessed on 31 May 2017).
18 | “I think this explanation was important for the judges to accept the 
legal argument, that there was no intention of deceiving, and that this 
narrative procedure had a long tradition, of which Borges was an enthu-
siastic promoter” (my translation).
19 | “Pierre Menard did not want to compose another Quixote, which 
sure ly is easy enough — he wanted to compose the Quixote. Nor, sure-
ly, need one be obliged to note that his goal was never a mechanical 
transcription of the original; he had no intention of copying it. His admirable 
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Gilbert also cites a work — as an example of appropriated literature — published by 
Éditions Lorem Ipsum in 2009, attributed to the author ‘Pierre Menard’ and en titled 
El ingenioso Hidalgo Don Quijote de la Mancha. Exactly as detailed in Pierre 
Menard sʼ notes in Borges sʼ short-story, only chapters 9, 38 and 22 are pub lished, 
and correspond “word by word and line by line” to Cervantes sʼ Quijote (Gilbert 
2014: 435-37). 
According to Gilbert, 21st-century appropriated literature puts into practice no-
tions and concepts of rewriting from the previous century. Thus, Borges sʼ work, as 
one of the touchstones of this tradition of rewriting, was (and still is) “appropriated”, 
as in the example mentioned above: “Borges sʼ fictions […] can be seen as the model 
case for contemporary appropriation literature, which is why authors always refer 
to it. Meanwhile, it has even become the trigger and object of real appropriation” 
(Gilbert 2014: 53).
re-WrItIng the argentInIan lIterary Canon
The Fattened Aleph is part of the “Trilogy of Argentinian Literature”, an unfinished 
project of Katchadjian sʼ that had emerged by the mid-2000s, and which consisted 
in intervening in or re-writing three Argentinian literary classics: El Martín Fie­
rro by José Hernández, El Matadero (The Slaughter Yard) by Esteban Echeverría 
and finally the text in question here, “The Aleph”. Borges himself also worked on 
Martín Fierro, not only writing several essays about a book which had become the 
Argentinian “National Epos”, but also writing an alternative ending for it in one of 
his short stories.
Published in 1872, Martín Fierro is a poem that tells the story of a gaucho20 
who is the eponymous narrator. The poem begins with Fierro recounting the per-
fection of his former rural existence with his wife and children in total harmony 
with nature. This equilibrium is soon destroyed when the state recruits him to fight 
on the frontier against the indios, the country sʼ native inhabitants. After deserting, 
Fierro begins an anonymous life of misery, pain and violence, until the end of the 
story of the second part (“The return”) when he meets his children again. In this 
scene, he is also confronted by the brother of a man that he brutally killed, who is 
seeking revenge. They start a discussion, but do not fight in a typical gaucho knife 
fight as they intended to, because Fierro sʼ children are present.
Even though the book was published with the aim of criticising the Argentinean 
state sʼ terrible treatment of recruited gauchos, many literary critics at the beginning 
ambition was to produce a number of pages which coincided — word 
for word and line for line — with those of Miguel de Cervantes” (Borges 
2000a: 37).
20 | A word commonly used to refer to inhabitants of the countryside.
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of the 20th century considered it the most representative text of Argentine literature 
due to the protagonist, Fierro, seemingly possessed of all the virtues of what could be 
called a ‘paradigmatic’ national hero. Leopoldo Lugones, one of the most influential 
poets of the beginning of the 20th century, was one of the advocates for transforming 
Hernández sʼ Martin Fierro into the national book of the Argen tineans (Sarlo 2007: 61).
72 years after the publication of the book that was transformed into a cen-
tral part of the Argentine literary canon, Fierro makes an appearance in Borges sʼ 
short-story “El fin” (“The End”), in Ficciones. Borges restages Fierro sʼ confronta-
tion with the brother of the man that he kills in the Hernández narrative, and com-
mits the sacrilege of killing off the ‘national hero’. In this case, ‘The End’ means an 
ending, redundancy intended, to the open story of Martín Fierro, and is a symbolic 
gesture of Borges sʼ critical attitude to the edification of Hernandez sʼ text as the na-
tional epic. Borges also expressed this attitude in more than one essay.21
Desde su catre, Recabarren vio el fin. Una embestida y el negro reculó, 
perdió pie, amagó un hachazo a la cara y se tendió en una puñalada 
profunda, que penetró en el vientre. Después vino otra que el pulpero no 
alcanzó a precisar y Fierro no se levantó. Inmóvil, el negro parecía vigilar 
su agonía laboriosa. Limpió el facón ensangrentado en el pasto y volvió 
a las casas con lentitud, sin mirar para atrás. Cumplida su tarea de justi-
ciero, ahora era nadie. Mejor dicho era el otro: no tenía destino sobre la 
tierra y había matado a un hombre. (2009c: 628)22
Borges not only questions the canonisation of Martín Fierro by writing a critical 
essay against it, but also through his fiction. Borges rewrites the ending of the na-
tional epic and initiates a new way of doing experimental literature in Argentina.
Martín Fierro is a poem in octosyllabic verse, with a very distinctive abbccb 
rhyme, which can be placed in the genre of ‘Gaucho Literature’. The following lines, 
which every Argentinian scholar could, at least in theory, recite by heart, appear at the 
beginning of the poem sʼ first book, when Fierro starts to narrate his bitter experiences:
21 | See Borges (1997): El escritor argentino y la tradición.
22 | “From his cot, Recabarren saw the end. A thrust, and the black man 
dodged back, lost his footing, feigned a slash to his opponentʼs face, 
and then lunged out with a deep jab that buried the knife in his bel-
ly. Then came another thrust, which the storekeeper couldnʼt see, and 
Fierro did not get up. Unmoving, the black man seemed to stand watch 
over the agonizing death. He wiped off the bloody knife in the grass and 
walked slowly back toward the houses, never looking back. His work of 
vengeance done, he was nobody now. Or rather, he was the other one: 
there was neither destination nor destiny on earth for him, and he had 
killed a man” (Borges 2000b: 141).
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Aquí me pongo a cantar
Al compás de la vigüela,
Que el hombre que lo desvela
Una pena extraordinaria 
Como la ave solitaria
Con el cantar se consuela […]. (Hernández 1945: 155)23
The alphabetically­sorted Martín Fierro (2007) was Katchadjian sʼ first work in 
the “Trilogy of Argentinian literature”. Katchadjian took every line of the poem 
and sorted them in alphabetical order according to initial letter, so that the rhyme 
and verse-structure typical of Gaucho Literature is lost, along with the order of 
the famous narrative. What remains after Katchadjian sʼ intervention is mere play 
of forms, in which the tale of the gaucho — even though the poem is deconstruct-
ed — is nevertheless latent for a reader familiar with the original Martín Fierro:
A andar con los avestruces
A andar reclamando sueldos
A ayudarles a los piones
A bailar un pericón
A bramar como una loba
A buscar almas más tiernas
A buscar una tapera 
[…]
Aquí me pongo a cantar
Aquí no valen dotores […]. (Katchadjian 2007: 7)24
Both authors work on Martin Fierro in a subversive way, Borges by questioning its 
canonisation as the national poem and killing its main character in a short story, 
Katchadjian by eliminating its rhyme and verse-structure, which are exactly what 
make the poem part of Gaucho Literature. Their methods are, however, very different: 
while Borges writes his own fictive story, restaging Fierro in “The End”, Katchadjian 
appropriates Martín Fierro by working with the whole materiality of the text. The 
creation process of El Martín fierro ordenado alfabéticamente is far from that of 
writing a story. As Katchadjian said in an interview, he just copy-pasted Martín Fie­
rro and the computer ordered it alphabetically within a few seconds (Terranova: n.d.).
23 | “Here Iʼll sit and sing / to the beat of my guitar: 
ʼcause a man whoʼs kept awake / by a heavy sorrow, 
like a lonely bird / consoles himself with song” (Hernández 1974: 11).
24 | As the purpose of Katchadjianʼs appropriation of Martín Fierro is to 
play with the mere forms of the language, that is, with the signifier, a 
translation of this passage is unnecessary.
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In the second part of the trilogy, a project that is still unfinished, Katchadjian 
experiments with The Slaughter Yard. A violent short story by Esteban Echaverría, 
written between 1838 and 1840 but not published until 1871, The Slaughter Yard 
concerns the cruelty of the despotic governor of Buenos Aires Province, Juan Ma-
nuel de Rosas, who ruled during the middle of the 19th century in a very turbulent 
and polarised political context. In an interview, Katchadjian explains how he in-
verted the narrative line of the short story, in which a group of Federales from the 
Mazorca — Rosas partisans, who are represented as barbarians — torture a Unita­
rio — one of their political adversaries, a group represented as civilized city-intel-
lectuals. Katchadjian sʼ version starts at the end, and ends with the beginning: first 
the Unitario dies, then the Federales undress him, after which he is tortured, then 
kidnapped, and so on (ibid.).
The thought here is not to imply that Borges and Katchadjian share a similar 
style, though both authors certainly share an impetus to question the classics of 
Argentinian literature through certain irreverent acts, whether killing the main 
character of the “national book” or fattening the text of one of the most important 
authors of the 20th century in Argentina. Thus Katchadjian finds himself in the 
paradoxical situation of being accused of committing the very ‘crimes’ that Borges 
himself admitted to, against Borges sʼ own work. One day, perhaps, Katchadjian will 
be able to publish a second edition of his scandalous book, including all of the legal 
documents and other writings that the trial generated. In this way, Katchadjian will 
be able to continue fattening his Aleph.
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“I have chosen to write notes    
on imaginary books” 
On the Forgery of Textual Sources
Laura Kohlrausch (LMU Munich)
Literature has engendered various techniques to create literary fakes or forgeries. 
The most common methods include autograph forgeries, where a material object 
is produced and passed off as another object (such as a lost original, very similar 
to the forgery of paintings), and plagiarism, where the close relation of one text to 
another — its source — is hidden. The phenomenon to be described here con stitutes 
yet another ‘literary forgery’, one that could be conceived of as the exact opposite 
of plagiarism: the detailed reference to a fictitious textual source, depicting it as real 
(existing in the reality of the reader) and prior to the manifest text.1 This procedure 
could be looked at as a narrative strategy of forgery, as it produces an object — the 
source — and gives misleading information about its composition. Compared to 
other forms of forgery, this procedure enters uncharted territory, as it often delib-
erately scatters traces of the falsification it commits.
One of the masters of this form of literary forgery is the Argentinean author 
Jorge Luis Borges. In his short story Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius, the first-person 
narrator and his friend Bioy2 search for an article about the fictitious country 
Uqbar that Bioy previously encountered in a book called “Anglo­American Cyclo­
paedia” (2009: 13), which is described by the text as a pirated copy of the Encyclo­
paedia Britannica. After they cannot find the article in the first Anglo­American 
Cyclopaedia they consult, it turns up in a second, otherwise identical copy. After a 
short summary of the article, we are given some of the content of its bibliography:
1 | As the aspect of the forged source being prior to the manifest text is 
essential to the technique of feigned intertextuality, this essay will use the 
term pre-text to refer to these textual sources hereafter.
2 | The name of this friend is undoubtedly inspired by the Argentinean 
author Adolfo Bioy Casares, a contemporary and close friend of Jorge 
Luis Borges.
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La bibliografía enumeraba cuatro volúmenes que no hemos encontra-
do hasta ahora, aunque el tercero — Silas Haslam: History of the Land 
Called Uqbar, 1874 — figura en los catálogos de librería de Bernard 
Quaritch.* El primero, Lesbare und lesenswerthe Bemerkungen über 
das Land Ukkbar in Klein-Asien, data de 1641 y es obra de Johannes 
Valentinus Andreä. El hecho es significativo; un par de años después, di 
con ese nombre en las inesperadas páginas de De Quincey (Writings, 
decimotercer volumen) […].
* Haslam ha publicado también A General History of Labyrinths. (17)3
Through various markers, the text suggests that all the textual elements in 
italics in this section are titles of books, and that these books exist outside of 
Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius, although most of them are in fact fictitious: Si-
las Haslam, both of the texts ascribed to him and the text ascribed to Andreä 
do not exist in extratextual reality.4 Andreä himself though did exist, as did 
the bookseller Quaritch and his cat alogs and of course De Quincey and his 
Writings. By inventing various book titles and locating the corresponding 
books outside of the manifest text, the short story simulates intertextual 
references. 
Hereafter, I want to describe the simulation of intertextual references 
as a form of forgery, as this linkage provides a useful theoretical frame 
for understanding this narrative procedure. Thus, after a short overview of 
vari ous forms taken by feigned intertextuality in different texts, the phe-
nomenon commonly known as pseudocitation will be redefined along the 
lines of current descriptions of forgery. This will allow us to focus on the 
authorial act of manipulating the reader sʼ expectations, rather than the mere 
object of the forgery, and lead to some insights on the aesthetic effects of 
feigned intertextuality.
3 | “The bibliography enumerated four volumes which we have not yet 
found, though the third — Silas Haslamʼs History of the Land Called 
Uqbar, 1874 — figures in the catalogues of Bernard Quaritchʼs book 
shop.* The first, Lesbare und lesenswerthe Bemerkungen über das 
Land Ukkbar in Klein-Asien, dates from 1641 and is the work of Jo-
hannes Valentinus Andreä. That fact is significant: a few years later, I 
came upon that name in the unsuspected pages of De Quincey (Writ-
ings, Vol. XIII) […].
* Haslam was also the author of A General History of Labyrinths” (Borges 
1964: 17).
4 | The terms “exist” and “reality” will here and below be used to define 
a point of reference that lies outside of the manifest text, in the per-
ceived reality of the reader.
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VarIety of feIgneD IntertextualIty
Contrary to the belief of some scholars, Borges wasnʼt the first to forge his own 
pre-texts.5 There is a broad variety of forms to this phenomenon, with different 
intensities as well as different functions and places within the texts.
Besides references to fictitious pre-texts, like in Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius, 
there are also references to a fictitious text that ‘re’produce part of the fictitious 
source. This is, for example, the case at the beginning of Herman Hesse sʼ Das Glas­
perlenspiel, published in 1943. Before the story begins, the text presents a Latin 
quote, accompanied by detailed information about the source-text, its author and 
editors and the chapter it was taken from:
… non entia enim licet quodammodo levibusque hominibus facilius at-
que incuriosius verbis reddere quam entia, verumtamen pio diligentique 
rerum scriptori plane aliter res se habet: nihil tantum repugnat ne verbis 
illustretur, at nihil adeo necesse est ante hominum oculos proponere ut 
certas quasdam res, quas esse neque demonstrari neque probari potest, 
quae contra eo ipso, quod pii diligentesque viri illas quasi ut entia trac-
tant, enti nascendique acultati paululum appropinquant.
Albertus Secundus
tract. de cristall. spirit. 
eds. Clangor et Colof. lib. I. cap. 28.
(Hesse 1972: 14)
Despite the bibliographical details, this motto was made up by Hesse himself, who 
had it translated into Latin by friends whose names, Schall and Feinhals, he turned 
into the Latin editor sʼ names here listed (Unseld 2012: 861; Ziolkowski 2002: ix).
Another version of this technique can be seen in the novel Amor se escribe sin 
hache by Enrique Jardiel Poncela, first published in 1928. In one of the chapters 
of this parodist romantic novel, the reader is given a quote seemingly taken from 
a poem called “El viaje en el tope”, imputed to the Spanish romanticist writer José 
de Espronceda:
Me parece oportuno copiar un trozo de la poesía “El viaje en el tope”, 
que tanta fama le dio a Espronceda, y que empieza así: 
“Cuando los procesos, que vienen de fuera,
Y avanzan lo mismo que avanza una ola,
Nos traigan los trenes, que es moda extranjera,
5 | The statement that Borges was the one to introduce the phe 
nomenon of the forged pre-text into fiction is for example made in Witt-
haus 2006: 164.
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Será una delicia pasar la frontera 
Sentado en un tope de furgón de cola.”
Siguen 222 versos más que no copio. (Jardiel Poncela 2011: 239)6
Just like Borges in Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius, Jardiel Poncela imputes his fictitious 
source to a real author, and just like Hesse, he not only refers to that source, but 
quotes from it.
Apart from those qualitative distinctions, there are also varieties in the quantity 
of the references to fictitious texts. Unlike Das Glasperlenspiel and Amor se escri­
be sin hache, which only reference a few forged sources, there are also texts mainly 
or entirely based on them. Roberto Bolaño sʼ La literatura nazi en América from 
1996 is one of the most examples of this. The text, described on the back cover as an 
“almost encyclopedic anthology of the pro-nazi literature” (2015, my translation), 
is composed of the descriptions of thirty fictitious authors, their lives, their works, 
literary influences and impact, complete with a thirty page long bibliographical 
appendix, the “epílogo para monstruos” (“Epilogue for Monsters”, 227), which lists 
fictitious and real books.
a DefInItIon of feIgneD IntertextualIty
The simulation of intertextual references hasnʼt yet been comprehensively treated 
on a theoretical level, but is mentioned in some examinations of the works of Bor-
ges and Pynchon. The terminology used therein can be roughly divided into two 
approaches: concept formation through the addition of adjectives oppositional to 
concepts of originality and authenticity, like ‘false references’, and concept forma-
tion through the use of the prefix ‘pseudo-’, like ‘pseudocitation’.7 However, nei-
ther terms built through the addition of adjectives like ‘false’, ‘erroneous’ or ‘apoc-
ryphal’ nor the various ‘pseudo’ derivatives offer an adequately clear terminology. 
6 | The sentences before and after the poem translate to: “This seems to 
me like a good opportunity to copy a part of the poem ‘El viaje en el tope’, 
that gave so much fame to Espronceda, and that begins as follows: […] 
222 verses ensue that I donʼt copy” (my translation).
7 | Maya Schärer-Nussberger for example speaks of the ‘false’ reference, 
that — in contrast to ‘true’ references — points to ‘false’ information 
(2008: 161-63). Gerárd Genette uses similar terminology when he talks 
about “apocryphal references” and “‘erroneous attributions’” in Bor-
gesʼ Historia universal de la Infamia. Genette moreover uses the terms 
“pseudo summary”, “pseudoscenario” and “pseudosketch” (1997: 251-
52). Peter Zima also uses the prefix ‘pseudo-’, commenting that pseudo-
citation is a phenomenon of postmodern literature (2000: 315).
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This points to an underlying problem in terminology that complicates conceptual 
clarity: the recourse to concepts of originality. Basing the definition on concepts 
like authenticity or falseness seems inadequate, as those terms have themselves 
been undergoing a constant crisis of definition in recent decades.8
A more promising approach might be to look at theoretical conclusions on forg-
eries, where researchers have worked on a similar problem. In his essay The Limits 
of Interpretation, Umberto Eco writes that forgeries are mainly a pragmatic problem, 
because it is not the forged object itself, but the claim of identity which accompanies it 
that turns it into a forgery (1991: 181). Similarly, Bernhard Dotzler defines forging as a 
propositional act and emphasises that it is not objects that are forged, but the informa­
tion on objects (2006: 78). In this sense, the simulation of intertextuality could even 
be seen as a forgery par excellence, being only a propositional act without object.
From this perspective, one could say that the simulation of references described 
here doesnʼt pertain to the inner quality of a falsified text, but rather to the attributes 
imputed to it. I thus propose to adapt a term that focuses on the implicit movement 
of referencing, and suggest the term ‘feigned intertextuality’ to describe the phe-
nomenon here observed: Feigned intertextuality is the reference to a fictitious pre-
text, simulating the gesture of ‘classical’ intertextuality, as the text feigns a claim 
to immediate referability in the (perceived) reality of the recipient.
The difference between feigned intertextuality and the citation of fictitious texts 
which are not presented as real (one might for example think of the magical school-
books in Harry Potter) lies precisely in this artificial claim to referability. But how 
is this claim raised? 
Manipulation of the ReadeRʼs expectations
According to Wolfgang Iser, every text creates expectations in the reader that will 
make him interpret the text in a certain way, until these expectations are inter-
rupted, forcing the reader to reevaluate (1976). Philippe Lejeune develops a very 
similar idea in his work about autobiographies:
As opposed to all forms of fiction, biography and autobiography are re-
ferential texts: exactly like scientific or historical discourse, they claim to 
provide information about a “reality” exterior to the text […]. All referential 
8 | In his examination of forgeries, Umberto Eco notes that “the defini-
tions of such terms as ‘fake,’ ‘forgery,’ ‘pseudoepigrapha,’ ‘falsification,’ 
‘facsimile,’ ‘counterfeiting,’ ‘spurious,’ ‘pseudo,’ ‘apocryphal,’ and others 
are rather controversial. It is reasonable to suspect that many difficulties 
in defining these terms are due to the difficulty in defining the very notion 
of ‘original’ or of ‘real object’” (1991: 74).
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texts thus entail what I will call a “referential pact,” implicit or explicit, in 
which are included a definition of the field of the real that is involved and 
a statement of the modes and the degree of resemblance to which the 
text lays claim. (1989: 22)
Whether we call it reader expectations or referential pact, both theories state that 
certain structures in a text make the reader perceive it under certain assumptions (in 
the case of biographies, the expectation that textual references to an extratextual re-
ality are to be trusted). The respective pact ‘valid’ for a text is conveyed to the read-
er by a certain repertoire of signals. Feigned intertextuality makes use of this set-up 
by imitating the repertoire of signals of an intertextual pact to create authentication 
strategies that induce the reader to locate the pre-texts in extratextual reality.
One of those ‘strategies of authentication’ logically follows from what Lejeu-
ne says about the referential pact, namely the imitation of what he calls referen-
tial texts — a group also containing texts like essays or encyclopedias (Ruthven 
2001: 149). This imitation can be achieved through the use of stylistic features 
commonly associated with referential texts or even through explicit (but false) in-
formation in the paratext. One example of this is Bolaño s̓ La literatura nazi en 
América, a text that imitates an encyclopedia of literature: The reader is presented 
with 30 chapters on 30 authors, in chronological order and thematically bundled up, 
followed by a vast epilogue containing an index of people, an index of editorials, 
journals and places as well as a very long bibliography. Additionally, the back cover 
tells us that the book is, in the words of its author, an “almost encyclopedic anthol-
ogy of the pro-nazi literature” (Bolaño 2015). All of these details are designed to 
shape the reader sʼ expectation that what he is reading follows the rules of a referen-
tial text and that the references point outside of the manifest text.
Another narrative strategy is the usage of detailed bibliographical informa-
tion for fictitious pre-texts. In most cases of feigned intertextuality, the reference is 
accompanied by bibliographical details such as the publication date, the editorial 
that supposedly published it and the place of publication. This can be seen in the 
bibliography of La literatura nazi en América, where the strategy has reached an 
excessive peak. Mostly though, the invented bibliographical details are not present-
ed in separate bibliographies, but are worked into the text, for example in Tlön, 
Uqbar, Orbis Tertius. The first reference to The Anglo­American Cyclopedia in this 
short story contains information on the city and date of publication: “la enciclope-
dia falazmente se llama The Anglo American Cyclopaedia (Nueva York, 1917) y 
es una reimpresión literal, pero también morosa, de la Encyclopaedia Britannica 
de 1902” (Borges 2009: 13).9 In the information about the pre-text given to the 
9 | “The encyclopedia is fallaciously called The Anglo-American Cyclo-
paedia (New York, 1917), and is a literal but delinquent reprint of the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica of 1902” (Borges 1964: 17).
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reader, be it bibliographical information or details about the content of the pre-text, 
fictitious and real elements are often mixed, thus further locating the fictitious pre-
text in extratextual reality. The most obvious example of this is the imputation of 
a fictitious text to a real author, as Borges does in Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius, with 
Johannes Valentinus Andreä. This strategy corresponds to the adding the imitated 
artist sʼ signature to a forged painting. According to Justus Fetscher, this is espe-
cially effective because the name of an author carries a certain authority that the 
recipient believes (2006: 316-21). But there are also various other ways to add real 
elements to the information about a fictitious pre-text, for example by stating that it 
deals with real texts, or that it is quoted in existing texts, like Lesbare und lesens­
werthe Bemerkungen über das Land Ukkbar seemingly being mentioned in De 
Quincey sʼ writings. Through this compound of extratextual and fictional elements, 
the fictitious pre-texts are being inscribed into the extratextual discourse of reality, 
likewise making the former more ‘real’ and the latter more ‘fictitious’.
When Texts quote from fictitious works imputed to real authors, imitating the 
style of writing of this author can also serve to generate authenticity. This strategy 
is the pivot of most forgeries ex nihilio, as Eco and many others have retraced 
(Eco 1991: 186-87). Amor se escribe sin hache exhibits a parodic example for this 
strategy in its appendix: displaying “opinions that the book has earned from some 
famous people”, this appendix ascribes fictitious citations to various famous con-
temporaries of Jardiel Poncela. Each citation is parodying the respective style of the 
writer it is imputed to (Poncela 2011: 393-96).
aeSthetIC effeCtS of feIgneD IntertextualIty
This situation of reception — the play with the expectations of the reader and their 
deliberate manipulation through strategies of authentication10 — correlates with 
what is commonly described by the terms ‘forgery’ or ‘fake’. As pointed out before, 
feigned intertextuality could even be seen as a forgery par excellence, because it 
illustrates the aspect of forgery as a propositional act. Thus, it proves interesting 
to look at this narrative phenomenon in the light of theories about forgeries. But 
the very aspect that makes it describable as a forgery, the lack of an object, is also 
the biggest contrast to common definitions of ‘forgery’, as the Oxford Dictionary 
reveals: “[Forgery is t]he making of a thing in fraudulent imitation of something” 
(OED 2015). While we have seen that feigned intertextuality could indeed be de-
10 | Through the manipulation of expectations, feigned intertextuality 
could be described — in a similar vein to Alexandre Métrauxʼs comments 
on forgeries — as a double deception: The textual deception is comple-
mented by the readerʼs self-deception, as he unconsciously disregards 
fictional markers up to a certain point (see 2006: 51).
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fined as a “fraudulent imitation of something” — although the term fraudulent 
might be unsuitable —, the “something” that is imitated is not an object or text 
itself, but rather the reference, the pointing to said text. No “thing” is actually made 
in the process.11
This lack of an actual object also leads to another difference between ‘classical’ 
forgeries (in the way the OED describes them) and feigned intertextuality: its pur-
pose. While normal strategies of forging mainly serve to increase the market value 
of the forged object, the narrative phenomenon of ‘forging’ pre-texts carries a broad 
variety of aesthetic effects that range from being purely ornamental to questioning 
concepts such as originality.
Borges himself mentions some of the possible effects and purposes of the forg-
ing of pre-texts. In the preface to his collection of short stories The Garden of 
Forking Paths, he states:
Desvarío laborioso y empobrecedor el de componer vastos libros; el de 
explayar en quinientas páginas una idea cuya perfecta exposición oral 
cabe en pocos minutos. Mejor procedimiento es simular que esos libros 
ya existen y ofrecer un resumen, un comentario. […] he preferido la escri-
tura de notas sobre libros imaginarios. (2009: 12)12
While this explanation of the use of feigned metatextuality out of ‘pure laziness’ is 
of course a form of captatio benevolentiae, it also makes a point: in commenting 
on fictitious books, “pretending they already exist”, whole worlds of literature and 
genres can be condensed into a few words.13
But feigned intertextuality is often also part of the narrative strategy of a text, 
as is the case in a parody or a fantastic story, where it paradoxically reaches its full 
potential only when the reader realises the ‘forgery’. This realisation (or doubt) is 
11 | Nabokovʼs Pale Fire constitutes an interesting exception for this, as 
the fictitious text is entirely quoted in the manifest text, but will at the 
same time remain a fringe phenomenon, as through the primary textʼs 
complete incorporation of the fictional text, the latter ceases to be ficti-
tious (2011).
12 | “It is a laborious madness and an impoverishing one, the madness 
of composing vast books — setting out in five hundred pages an idea 
that can be perfectly related orally in five minutes. The better way to go 
about it is to pretend that those books already exist, and offer a summary, 
a commentary on them. […] I have chosen to write notes on imaginary 
books” (Borges 1999: 67).
13 | Andreas Mahler elaborates on this in his recently published essay 
“Fingierte Intertextualität”, describing feigned intertextuality as an inter-
minable process of text formation (2016).
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integrated in the reception process by the text, as feigned intertextuality is usually 
not only surrounded by intertextual markers, but equally by subtle fictional markers 
that serve as hints to the fictitiousness of the sources and break the expectations of 
the reader regarding the pre-texts.
Thus, for example, the text of Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius various times empha-
sizes the fact that Uqbar is a fictitious country and that the article listing the books 
about Uqbar is forged, which makes the reader question the existence of the books 
mentioned — even if the text later reaffirms the existence of the book Lesbare und 
lesenswerthe Bemerkungen über das Land Ukkbar. In La literatura nazi en Améri­
ca, some of the dates of publication of the fictitious sources hint at their fictitious-
ness, as they are later than the publication of the actual text of La literatura nazi 
en América. The bibliography for example includes the title “El Nacimiento de 
Nueva Ciudad­Fuerza, de Gustavo Borda, México D.F., 2005” (Bolaño 2015: 240), 
although Bolaño sʼ book was originally published in 1996.14 Fictional markers like 
these, scattered in the text between the authorisation strategies of feigned intertex-
tuality, lead to an oscillation between trust and suspicion for the observant reader. 
In this process, the distribution of signals resembles the leaving of a trail that 
the reader follows in an increasingly investigative movement. The generation of 
an investigative reading in this sense reveals another characteristic of texts with 
feigned intertextuality: their proximity to detective novels. Through the use of 
criminalistic textual procedures, encouraging speculation on the part of the read-
er (scattering clues, hiding facts, providing conflicting information), the reader is 
called into the role of a detective searching for signs and inconsistencies to discover 
the truth of their pact with the text (Lejeune 1989: 14). This turns the reception into 
what Roland Barthes defines as the source of reading pleasure for the reader of 
modern literature: assiduous reading and rereading (1973: 22-24). 
By making way for the detection of the fictitiousness of the forged sources, 
feigned intertextuality can be functionalised in ways normal forgeries canʼt. In both 
La literatura nazi en América and Amor se escribe sin hache, the conflicting sig-
nals increase the parodic tenor of the text by exaggerating the traits of the imitated 
genres, thus leading to a parodic distortion.
Returning to the prior example of Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius, I would like to 
give a short sketch of the integration of feigned intertextual references into the 
fantastic narrative to generate a certain kind of receptional uncertainty that com-
bines the uncertainty Tzvetan Todorov attributes to fantastic texts of the 19th cen-
tury (1970: 34) and the epistemological metaphor Jaime Alazraki ascribes to the 
neo-fantastic texts of the 20th century as a central element (1975: 30), illustrating 
the subjectification of the concept of reality. This subjectification is treated by the 
14 | This example of fictional markers is especially fascinating as it loses 
its efficiency as a marker with time — a reader in 2050 will perceive this 
marker as much less prominent than a reader in 1998.
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plot of Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius, as the metafictional world of Tlön increasingly 
permeates the reality of the narrator. In the article about Uqbar, the narrator is 
informed that one of the main topics of the literature of Uqbar is the fictitious coun-
try Tlön, its culture and language. Later in the story, a whole encyclopedia about 
Tlön is discovered in the fictional world, seemingly written by a secret society of 
intellectuals. As more and more people read this encyclopedia, the metafictional 
country Tlön permeates the reality of the narrator, which itself then crumbles and 
reveals its constructedness.
By the use of feigned intertextuality, this wearing down of the border be-
tween fiction and reality is transposed from the boundary between metafiction and 
fiction, to the boundary between fiction and the reality of the reader. The constant os-
cillation of the references produces an uncertainty regarding the location of the refer-
ence points, blurring elements of fiction and perceived reality. If one looks at the bib-
liography of the article on Uqbar, it stands out how interwoven extratextual reality and 
fictitious elements are: for instance, although the author Silas Haslam and his book 
History of the Land Called Uqbar are fictitious, we are told that they figure in the real 
catalogues of the real Bernard Quaritch. Furthermore, Haslam is the name of Borgesʼ 
grandmother, thus also pointing outside of the text. The footnote further intensifies 
the oscillation between reality and fiction: despite the fact that the book A General 
History of Labyrinths named here is also fictitious, it can be found in extratextual 
works, as Borges published a review of said book in an anthology about architecture 
under the pseudonym of Daniel Haslam. In this review, the book A General History 
of Labyrinths is imputed to Thomas Ingrim, a real author who wrote the article about 
labyrinths in the Encyclopedia Britannica, thus circling back to The Anglo­American 
Cyclopedia that is presented as a pirated copy of the Encyclopedia Britannica in the 
beginning of the short story.15 Through this oscillation, the perceived border between 
fiction and reality is softened, and the subjectification of the concept of reality as a to-
pic of the plot is made tangible in the reception. Thus, through feigned intertextuality, 
fantastic uncertainty infects the reader sʼ perception of reality.
Thereby, the Borgesian “fantasia of the library” (Foucault 1977: 87) turns into 
a “metaphysical fantastic” (Bioy Casares 2011: 17, my translation) that attacks the 
15 | Fascinatingly, this movement between intra- and extratextual refer-
ence points doesnʼt stop there, as A General History of Labyrinths is 
quoted in two scientific, peer-reviewed articles about architecture and 
physics (that probably blindly took the quotation from ‘Daniel Haslamʼs’ 
article on the book), adding “Wien, 1888” to the bibliographical details 
(see Lindgren / Moore / Nordahl 1998; Hagberg / Meron 1998). The uncer-
tainty of the reader is also intensified by the internet and art projects in 
the case of Borges: Constantly, covers, summaries etc. ‘from’ the ficti-
tious books Borges invented pop up on the internet. From 1997 to 2006, 
an art collective even produced an actual Second Encyclopedia of Tlön.
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classical perception of reality as firm and objective. In his essay Avatares de la 
tortuga, Borges declares:
Nosotros […] hemos soñado el mundo. Lo hemos soñado resistente, mis-
terioso, visible, ubicuo en el espacio y firme en el tiempo; pero hemos 
consentido en su arquitectura tenues y eternos intersticios de sinrazón 
para saber que es falso. […] Admitamos lo que todos los idealistas ad-
miten: el carácter alucinatorio del mundo. Hagamos lo que ningún idea-
lista ha hecho: busquemos irrealidades que confirmen ese carácter. Las 
hallamos, creo, en las antinomias de Kant y en la dialéctica de Zenón. 
(2008a: 171)16
Just like the antinomies of Kant and the dialectics of Zeno, the feigned references 
in Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius serve as hidden irrealities, fantastic ruptures, that 
confirm the idealistic character of the world.
Such functionalisation of feigned intertextuality in the narrative strategies of 
texts can only be analysed on an individual basis, looking at each respective text, 
its genre, strategies and historical circumstances, but the example of Tlön, Uqbar, 
Orbis Tertius suggests that such entanglements can be observable.
In addition to being actively functionalised for the purpose of narrative strate-
gies, feigned intertextuality, just like any forgery that has been exposed, can also 
serve as a means to draw conclusions about the system it derives from (Reule-
cke 2006: 22-23). In the case of feigned intertextuality, this system is the cultural 
convention of textual referencing and influence. One of the most widely debated 
fundamental assumptions about literature in the 20th century is the notion of orig-
inality and uniqueness. In The Anxiety of Influence Harald Bloom claims that 
every literary text is struggling to overcome the inevitable influence of its pre-
decessors (1997), resulting in the hiding or suppression of intertextual references. 
The forgery of pre-texts could be understood as the strongest symptom of this 
anxiety: even in cases where a predecessor canʼt be found in reality, the author 
still invents one to process the insight that every idea comes from someone else. 
But Borgesʼ essay Kafka and his precursors points to yet another interpretation of 
the connection between the anxiety of influence and feigned intertextuality, when 
he states that
16 | “We […] have dreamt the world. We have dreamt it as firm, mysteri-
ous, visible, ubiquitous in space and durable in time; but in its architec-
ture we have allowed tenuous and eternal crevices of unreason which tell 
us it is false. […] Let us admit what all idealists admit: the hallucinatory 
nature of the world. Let us do what no idealist has done: seek unrealities 
which confirm that nature. We shall find them, I believe, in the antinomies 
of Kant and in the dialectic of Zeno” (Borges 1964: 183-84).
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[e]n el vocabulario crítico, la palabra precursor es indispensable, pero 
habría que tratar de purificarla de toda connotación de polémica o riva-
lidad. El hecho es que cada escritor crea a sus precursores. Su labor 
modifica nuestra concepción del pasado, como ha de modificar el futu-
ro. (2008b: 166)17
The use of feigned intertextuality is the culmination of this idea that every text 
metaphorically invents its own precursors: in effectively inventing the precursors, 
feigned intertextuality could also be seen as the overcoming of such authorial an x-
iety, as it frees the text from real precursors.
One way or the other, feigned intertextuality, with its strategies of authorisation 
and its various aesthetic effects, can be read as a symptom of the crisis of the con-
cept of authorship and originality, and is thus, just like any forgery, a symptom of 
our culture.
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Faked Translations 
James Macphersonʼs Ossianic Poetry
Yola Schmitz (LMU Munich)
SettIng the SCene
In 1760 James Macpherson published translations of old Gaelic poems under the 
title Fragments of Ancient Poetry.1 They were received with great enthusiasm and 
further titles followed in quick succession, including the two epic poems Fingal 
(1761 / 62) and Temora (1763). Yet, the debate about their authenticity began soon 
after their publication and was most prominently represented by the English writer 
and critic Samuel Johnson. He wrote to Macpherson in 1775: “I thought your book 
an imposture from the beginning, I think it upon yet surer reasons an imposture 
still. For this opinion I give the publick reasons which I here dare you to refute” 
(Johnson 2014: 169).
Today, James Macpherson is widely accepted to be the author of these texts, 
and the poems of Ossian themselves to be pseudo-translations, i.e. “texts which 
have been presented as translations with no corresponding source texts in other 
lan guages ever having existed” (Toury 1995: 40). According to Fiona Stafford 
“Macpherson drew on traditional sources to produce imaginative texts not mod-
elled on any single identifiable original” (1996: vii). He claimed to have found long 
lost manuscripts of Scottish heroic poetry from the 3rd century CE and presented 
them in form of his own ‘translations’. Although Macpherson based some of his 
alleged translations on collected material, no written source text could ever be pro-
1 | I use the phrase ‘poems of Ossian’ in accordance with Gaskill and 
others not as the title of the edition of 1773, but as an umbrella term for 
all the Ossianic poetry by Macpherson. For a quick overview of the pub-
lication timeline: Fragments of Ancient Poetry (1st and 2nd edition 1760), 
Fingal (1st edition 1761, 2nd edition 1762), Temora (1763), Works of Ossian 
(1765) including the “Critical Dissertation” by Hugh Blair, Poems of Os-
sian (1773), heavily revised edition. The 1996 edition edited by Gaskill is 
used for all references and citations.
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duced in order to refute the accusations of forgery, and in the second half of the 18th 
century the poems of Ossian became one of the most notorious fakes in literature, 
sparking an almost unparalleled controversy about their authenticity.
Nevertheless, Macpherson sʼ Ossianic poetry can be read as a translational process 
on many levels, even though the poems are not interlingual translations in the conven-
tional sense. He not only translated the material he had collected and the stories of his 
childhood in the Scottish Highlands into the dominant English lan guage, but he also 
transferred the oral tradition of Scotland into the written tradition of the superstra-
tum. By setting the poems of Ossian in a mythical pre-Roman and pre-Christian peri-
od, Macpherson moved the ‘epic genesis’ of Scotland as a nation into a time predating 
the British rule and the subsequent loss of nationally distinct identity.2
In this paper, I aim to describe Macpherson sʼ poetic strategies and his authen-
ticating methods. Therefore, I will look at the external and internal features that 
try to make the poems of Ossian appear as if they were genuine interlingual trans-
lations from ancient Gaelic sources.
MaCPherSon aS exPert  
anD the SCholarly eDItIon
Opportunity not only makes a thief, but also a forger. The right opportunity for 
Macpherson presented itself during his time at the University of Aberdeen and in 
Edinburgh, where he studied the classics and met scholars and mentors such as Tho-
mas Blackwell, Hugh Blair and John Home. Scottish literature was also beginning 
to be met with greater public interest, and research into these territories was encour-
aged. Home, an admirer of Scottish folklore, had to persuade an initially reluctant 
Macpherson to translate a few authentic pieces of poetry he had collected (Stafford 
1996: xii). Blackwell sʼ research was not only focused on the literature of the classical 
period, but also on the society and the environment that brought about that poetry, 
and Blair was to become one of the strongest supporters of Macpherson sʼ work and 
the authenticity of the poems of Ossian. This intellectual climate, combined with the 
contemporary interest in so-called primitive societies, must have inspired Macpher-
son to respond to a demand for fresh and equally meaningful northern poetry. This 
convinced him to compile ‘translations’ of so-called epic poems in the hopes of cre-
ating a national epic for Scotland, such as Milton had done for England.
2 | The characterisation of these poems as epic poetry is already a 
strong indication of Macphersonʼs ambition. The idea of nation states is 
of course a concept of the 18th century and much more symptomatic of 
Macphersonʼs own time. The poems of Ossian offered a basis for iden-
tification in the sense of Benedict Andersonʼs Imagined Communities 
(2006).
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Macpherson sʼ upbringing put him in the perfect position. He was born in Ruth-
ven, in the Scottish Highlands where he was brought up in a Gaelic-speaking 
community and accustomed to the oral tradition of the bards of the clans. Yet, he 
also experienced first-hand the serious effects of British oppression. In 1745, the 
nine-year-old Macpherson witnessed the Jacobite Rising with all its devastating 
consequences for the collective identity and the heritage of the Scottish clans. In 
its wake, many customs and traditions, such as the tartan plaid and playing the bag 
pipes, were prohibited.3 However, one of the worst consequences must have been 
the subsequent ban on using the Scottish Gaelic language. Therefore, Macpherson sʼ 
forgery can also be considered an attempt to recuperate what was left of the literary 
tradition of the Highlands and to rehabilitate a people, thought to be uncultured and 
uncivilised.
These circumstances provided Macpherson with all he needed to produce a 
successful forgery. He was an insider of Scottish traditions and, at the same time, 
he had profited from an academic education. He had not only learned how classic 
works of poetry were studied, but also how they were supposed to be presented. 
When the scholars in Aberdeen showed interest in this kind of poetry and offered to 
sponsor an excursion to the Highlands, Macpherson seized the moment and deliv-
ered. It was further to his advantage that a nostalgia for a different past and a long-
ing for new points of identification had coincided during the Renaissance and the 
Scottish Enlightenment. Ossian could draw on both. On the one hand, the poems 
constructed a past which might have even better suited to the contemporary taste 
than the real antiquity, because they were composed to exactly please that taste. On 
the other hand, Ossian provided a new frame of reference that worked as a canvas 
for projections of romantic longing as well as national identity.
On his excursions to the Highlands Macpherson did, in fact, collect material, 
on which he later based his alleged translations, but it is “reasonably clear” (Gaskill 
1991: 6) that the majority was fabricated by Macpherson himself. Although he never 
disputed that he had also collected some poems from oral sources, Macpherson 
insisted that he had found written sources of a previously unknown Scottish epic 
poem, in worth alike to those of Homer and Virgil. The Gaelic originals were, as 
reported by Macpherson, not all lost. He even offered to make them accessible to 
every public library, “but no subscribers appearing”, he simply announced their 
publication without following through in the hopes nobody ever would (Advertise­
ment preceding 1st edition of Fingal, 1761 / 62, in Macpherson 1996: 32). This was a 
very risky move, but anticipating the request for the originals and blaming the lack 
of interest from libraries apparently worked as a deflection strategy.
3 | The Jacobite Risings were a series of rebellions between 1688 and 
1746 with the aim to return Stuart kings to the throne of England and 
Scotland. “The Act of Proscription” (1746), especially the Dress Act, were 
introduced as forms of repression.
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By publishing the poems as a translation Macpherson styled himself as a le-
gitimate intermediary and interpreter of the originals. He claimed that the poems 
would not have found an audience in their original language. Therefore, Macpher-
son reasoned, they had to be translated into English to make them accessible and 
further their reach. If there were some irregularities within the work, they could be 
easily explained and openly addressed, because the texts were allegedly transferred 
not only from another era but also from another language. Textual authority is even 
further displaced from Macpherson himself through the narrator figure of Ossian, 
who is named as the author of the poems on several occasions. It is Ossian who 
relates the battles and adventures of his father Fingal and his son Oscar. But Os-
sian is blind, so his account cannot come from his eye-witness testimony, creating 
yet another margin, another space, through which contradictions or inconsistencies 
could be explained or justified.
The ideas, it is confessed, are too local, to be admired, in another lan- 
guage; […] It was the locality of his description and sentiment, that, prob-
ably, kept Ossian so long in the obscurity of an almost-lost language. 
(Macpherson 1996: 214)
As Macpherson explained, the reason why this discovery had been only made so 
recently and how the poems could have been lost for such a long time despite their 
importance to the history of Scotland and Ireland, is their style. The translation 
would also never do justice to the beauty of the original, but Macpherson argues it 
to be his scholarly and patriotic duty to the Highland tradition to make them avail-
able to the public.
Macpherson claimed to have only found fragments at first before ‘discovering’ 
the longer epic poems Fingal and Temora. So, it would be fitting that such old and 
recently-resurfaced manuscripts would need to be put in context. Typically, a forger 
must choose between either rejecting the canon or integrating their own forgery into 
it (Grafton 1990: 59). Macpherson fully embraced the latter. He created a corpus of 
references and commentary embedding Ossian sʼ poems deeply into the canon of 
classic European literature. Macpherson not only offered his own commentary to the 
poems and the events related in them, but he also added passages most notably from 
the Iliad, the Odyssey, the Aeneid, and Paradise Lost in the orig inal language as 
well as in translation. Additionally, he provided advertisements, prefaces, announce-
ments and dissertations by himself and Blair. The consequence of this elaborate 
corpus of references was that the editions using footnotes for all the annotations and 
comments were full of Macpherson, Homer, Virgil and Milton, and sometimes very 
little poetical text (Gaskill 1996: xxv). This strategy, to almost cover the text with 
quotations and further information, continued to divert the focus from Macpherson 
and towards the authors he used as his sources. The difficulty was to do so without 
revealing these prescursors to be, in fact, part of the sources of the Ossianic poetry.
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The annotations and commentaries were meant to suggest a serious scholarly 
interest in and debate of his material. By setting the whole project in the framework 
of a scholarly translation Macpherson created a context that was easily recognised 
by his intended audience. In addition to the footnotes in the text, Macpherson wrote 
two dissertations, which were added to the editions, as well as “A Critical Disser-
tation on the Poems of Ossian, the Son of Fingal” by Hugh Blair.4 The Scottish 
author and critic seems to have been Macpherson sʼ partner in crime. He came to 
the poemsʼ defence and wrote his “Critical Dissertation” to support their claim of 
authenticity, which was included in every edition after 1765. The cooperation of 
Blair and Macpherson contributed widely to the perception of the poems as ‘gen-
uine translations’.
These paratexts contributed to the work sʼ appearance as a well-researched 
and investigated publication in the tradition of contemporary editions of classic 
texts. In doing so Macpherson tried to situate Ossian sʼ poems before some of their 
sources. He established a timeline that created an interior logic, which supported 
the narrative of a vivid literary tradition in the Highlands, ‘primitive’ but compa-
rable to other ancient writing. With this twist, Macpherson was then able to sug-
gest that analogies between Ossian and Milton are based on Milton sʼ knowledge of 
Ossianic poetry and not the other way around.5 Milton, the epic poet of the British 
Empire, becomes by implication the imitator of Ossian.
Macpherson sʼ marketing strategy was, as we can see, just as important as the 
structure of the poems themselves. Apart from his upbringing and educational back-
ground, Macpherson continued to work on his image. He established himself as an 
expert and gave the poems the look of a proper historical edition. In the paratexts 
Macpherson went to great lengths to supply the reader with a lot of detail. In the ad-
vertisement to the second edition of Fragments of Ancient Poetry, Macpherson noted:
In this edition some passages will be found altered from the former. The 
alterations are drawn from more compleat copies the translator had ob-
tained of the originals, since the former publication. (1996: 3)
By adding this kind of information and by repeatedly discussing specific trans-
lation decisions in his footnotes, Macpherson created the impression of himself 
as a diligent researcher and translator, concerned with taking great care and willing 
to revise his translations based on new developments and discoveries made in his 
4 | It is not clear if or to what extent Blair knew that the poems were a for-
gery. Even Johann Gottfried Herder defended the poems authenticity in 
“Auszug aus einem Briefwechsel über Oßian und die Lieder alter Völker” 
([1773] 1968).
5 | References to Macphersonʼs literary precursors can only be found in 
the epic poem Fingal and the poems that were published alongside it.
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field. But Macpherson also informed his audience in detail about the process of 
his editorial and translational work. He continued in the advertisement with the 
following announcement:
It may be proper to inform the public, that measures are now taken for 
making a more full collection of the remaining works of the ancient Scot-
tish Bards; in particular for recovering and translating the heroic poem 
mentioned in the preface. (3)
His confident manner was not only boastful behaviour but also a way of measuring 
the interest of his audience and canvassing for sponsors for his next excursions.
tranSlatIon MethoD anD TranslaTese
Disguising his poems as translations provided Macpherson with the opportunity to 
realise another authentication method within the text. He had to make the poems 
look and sound like they were from the 3rd century, but by offering himself as an 
interpreter (in both senses), Macpherson constructed a narrative that allowed for a 
much greater margin of variation and cross-referencing. Simply imitating an older 
language could have made Macpherson sʼ texts much more vulnerable to being dis-
covered as fakes. By admitting his involvement in the texts as a translator, however, 
he had an already rich tradition of translation strategies to use and to learn from at 
his disposal. Chapman sʼ, Pope sʼ and Dryden sʼ then already famous translations of 
epic poetry had a great influence on Macpherson. Not only did they serve as a tool 
of validation and authentication for the poems through references in the paratexts, 
but they were also part of the canon of important translations into which Macpher-
son wanted to integrate his Ossian. Furthermore, openly naming his sources cre-
ated a self-referencing logic that, at first, dispersed any accusation of forgery. Any 
similarities between Ossian and their translations that could be argued, were a) due 
to the Scottish bards having the same level of literary sophistication as the Greeks 
and Romans, and b) because of completely justifiable translation decisions based on 
the study of predecessors in the field of literary translation. 
Ossian sʼ poetry is set in a pre-Christian era, but the poems are still full of spiri-
tual and transcendental episodes, such as ghost appearances and nature intervening 
in the fate of the heroes. Ossian was not only meant to tell a Highland story, but 
to create the legitimate historical and literary backdrop for the projection of a so-
phisticated and cultured Scottish nation before the invasion of foreign powers. The 
epic poems of Fingal and Temora even deal with the defence of Scottish territory 
against invaders. Appearing to be the sole translator also allowed Macpherson to 
tell a story of heroic resistance. Consequently, the poems had a much more signif-
icant message to convey. Macpherson claimed no less than that they “might serve 
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to throw considerable light upon the Scottish and Irish antiquities” (1996). To give 
the poems the necessary gravitas for the task, he drew on religious traditions, and 
especially the conventions of Bible translations.
Jerome, the translator of the Vulgate, famously coined the phrase: “non 
verbum e verbo, sed sensum exprimere de sensu”, which has often been un-
derstood as a general rule for translation. Nonetheless, he made an important 
exception for the translation of the Bible: “absque scripturis sanctis, ubi et ver-
borum ordo mysterium est.”6 In religious texts the word order is part of the 
divine message and should not be altered. While the translations by Chapman, 
Pope and Dryden are more fo cused on literary and aesthetic aspects, they are 
much freer and took much greater interpretative liberties regarding the source 
texts. They did not have to adapt their translation methods in accordance with 
theological dogma.
In the preface to Fragments of Ancient Poetry, Macpherson alleged that his 
translations are “extremely literal” and that “even the arrangement of the words 
in the original has been imitated” (1996: 6). By claiming to apply this method 
of translation, Macpherson positioned his poems in a religious context. Hugh 
Blair supports Macpherson sʼ claim in his “Critical Dissertation” as follows:
Though unacquainted with the original language, there is no one but 
must judge the translation to deserve the highest praise, on account of 
its beauty and elegance. Of its faithfulness and accuracy, I have been 
assured by persons skilled in the Gaelic tongue, who from their youth 
were acquainted with many of these poems of Ossian. To transfuse such 
spirited and fervid ideas from one language into another; to translate li-
terally, and yet with such a glow of poetry; to keep alive so much passion, 
and support so much dignity throughout; is one of the most difficult works 
of genius, and proves the translator to have been animated with no small 
portion of Ossianʼs spirit. (1996: 399)
Blair praised Macpherson sʼ approach even though he must admit that he does not 
know Gaelic. He stressed Macpherson sʼ ingenuity to remain truthful to the ‘origi-
nal’ and simultaneously create superb poetry. Not only did Blair consider the poems 
a work of genius, but he went so far as to suggest Ossian might be speaking through 
Macpherson.7
6 | “to render not word for word but sense for sense”; “except in the case 
of holy scriptures where even the order of the words is a mystery” (Jerome, 
395 BC: “Letter to Pammachius. On the best Method of Translating”, my 
translation).
7 | This remark by Blair, however, seems like a very broad hint at his 
involvement in the forgery.
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Based on these two premises, the canonical translations of epic poetry and the 
biblical translation theories, Macpherson created a form of translates.8 Translatese 
has gained quite a few connotations, predominantly negative ones. The OED — for 
example — defines the term as: “The style of language supposed to be character-
istic of (bad) translations; or unidiomatic language in a translation.” Wiktionary of-
fers: “awkwardness or ungrammaticality of translation, such as due to overly literal 
translation of idioms or syntax.” Macpherson described and explained his method 
of translation to justify the outcome, which is — as I want to show — a kind of deli-
berately employed translatese.
The consequences of Macpherson sʼ intention and method on the language of the 
poems can be seen in the following example. It is a dialogue from the beginning of 
Fingal, Book II, but it is worth keeping in mind that it is still related by the narrator 
Ossian. The passage is a typical example from Ossianic poetry. The ghost of the 
recently killed chief Crugal appears to Connal and reveals to him the outcome of 
the next battle. Connal asks for his spiritual support. Both paragraphs are in direct 
speech, yet this is not indicated by quotation marks. Instead, Macpherson used vari-
able length-dashes as rhythmic punctuation:
My ghost, O Connal, is on my native hills; but my corse is on the sands 
of Ullin. Thou shalt never talk with Crugal, nor find his lone steps in the 
heath. I am light as the blast of Cromla, and I move like the shadow of 
mist! Connal, son of Colgari, I see the dark cloud of death: it hovers dark 
over the plains of Lena. The Sons of green Erin shall fall. Remove from 
the field of ghosts.––– Like the darkened moonii he retired, in the midst 
of the whistling blast.
Stay, said the mighty Connal, stay, my dark-red friend. Lay by that beam 
of heaven, son of windy Cromla! What cave of the hill is thy lonely house? 
What green-headed hill is the place of thy rest? Shall we not hear thee 
in the storm? In the noise of the mountain-stream? When the feeble sons 
of the wind come forth, and, ride on the blast of the desart? (1996: 65)
In the poem sʼ case, the layout is of interest, because of the importance Macpherson 
put on the appearance of the text, including the typeset of the poems themselves. 
There are frequent exclamations, invocations and apostrophes, such as “O Connal” 
in the first line. Epithets, like “son of windy Cromla”, repetitions and rhetorical 
questions serve to authenticate the oral tradition and the epic style. The focus on the 
bardic figure and the oral tradition of the Highlands was certainly part of Macpher-
son sʼ agenda to promote his Scottish heritage. Yet, it also worked to highlight the 
8 | I use the term translatese, the OED and Wiktionary both use trans- 
la tese and translationese synonymously.
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similarities to his predecessors, like Homer, Virgil and Milton, in whose tradition 
Macpherson tried to locate Ossian, and whose epics were also narrated by bardic 
figures.
The choice of words is rather limited, but Macpherson managed to create an 
air of otherness and ‘raw’ tradition at the same time. The imagery of the passage 
works with very few variations but creates a mystical and strange scenery, espe-
cially through its use of colour terms. Darkness (“dark”, “darkened”, “dark-red”) 
and light are contrasted as metaphoric conflict between life and death. The green 
landscape of Ossian sʼ heroes provides the backdrop to their actions. It is the reason 
and support for their battles. The repetitions of certain colour terms and the use 
of hyphenated compounds, such as “green-headed” and “dark-red” could point to 
the difficulties the translator encountered during his work. As perhaps the precise 
colour term could not be found or was not available to the translator, he chose 
to approximate it by using a compound. Occasionally, it seems like Macpherson 
styled himself as a worse translator than he might have been, to lend credibility to 
the poemsʼ authenticity.9
On the other hand, hyphenated colour terms are a very familiar sight to rea-
ders of translated versions of the Iliad and the Odyssey in English. It became a 
feature closely identified with Homeric style. The interplay of apparently helpless 
trans lation decisions and the (apparently) involuntary references to characteristics 
of epic poetry run like a common thread through Macpherson sʼ whole project. 
The assertion Grafton makes in regard to the Renaissance forger Giovanni Nanni, 
therefore, seems to apply to Macpherson sʼ strategy, too. The intricate web of refe-
rences paradoxically gives the “texts an air of moral as well as factual superiority” 
(Grafton 1990: 61).
It is obviously possible to read the use of unidiomatic idioms and imagery, such 
as “shadow of mist” and “What cave of the hill is thy lonely house?”, as another 
factor pointing to the texts being a translation. They give the impression of being 
overly literal and seem to struggle with the conventions of their supposed target 
language, English. The structure and the concept of the similes are common enough 
for the reader to get the meaning Macpherson tries to convey. Yet, their choice of 
comparison carries enough foreignness and cause to question their meaning for 
them to bring across the intended mystic remoteness of an old and strange text in 
need of explanation. Macpherson provided this in his ample commentary on the 
poems.
The passage quoted above, for example, has two footnotes. In the first, Macpher-
son elaborated on the relation of names and epithets; thus, giving his readers more 
9 | In the revised edition of 1773 Macpherson put a much greater focus 
on his influence on the texts. It might be an indication that he, indeed, 
felt like selling his genius short by remaining in the shadow reserved for 
a translator.
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background information and raising the impression of scholarly effort and person-
al insight into Highland conventions. The second footnote is even more telling of 
Macpherson sʼ strategy. He added a quote from Pope sʼ translation of Homer, sug-
gesting a connection between this passage and Crugal sʼ ghost retiring like the 
moon: “Like a thin smoke he sees the spirit fly, / And hears a feeble, lamentable 
cry” (Macpherson 1996: 425 n.8). Macpherson succeeded in placing his Ossianic 
heroes alongside the Homeric pantheon, and subsequently invoking their shared 
‘primitive’ but pure origins.
Although Macpherson owed much to his literary predecessors, he did not 
imi tate their versification. Homer and Virgil wrote in hexameter, Milton in blank 
verse and Dryden used heroic couplets for his translation of the Iliad. Macpher-
son sʼ use of metric prose, on the other hand, was a rather modern feature. Kir-
by-Smith describes it as a kind of proto-free verse on several occasions, which is 
itself indebted to a translation tradition (1996: 260). It is a form that can also be 
found in Psalm translations and the King James Bible. Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that the poems of Ossian have a similar rhythm. Again, Blair supported 
Macpherson sʼ choice:
The measured prose which he has employed, possesses considerable 
advantages above any sort of versification he could have chosen. While 
it pleases and fills the ear with a variety of harmonious cadences, being, 
at the same time, freer from constraint in the choice and arrangement of 
words, it allows the spirit of the original to be exhibited, with more just-
ness, force, and simplicity. (1996: 399)
Yet, sometimes the poems tend to drone on. Macpherson sʼ syntax is paratactic, 
with rarely more than ten words per phrase, and the rhythm is mostly created 
by the interjections, repetitions and the regularity of apostrophes and epithets. 
The freedom Blair mentions was something Macpherson made ready use of. 
By occasionally using awkward word order, such as beginning phrases with a 
verb, Macpherson could further create the impression of a translated text. In 
doing so, he indicated that the source language had different syntactical rules 
than English.10 The ‘translator’ simply complied with his own translation theory, 
in which he clearly states his commitment to being as literal as possible, thus 
making them sound strange and unusual. At the same time these stylistic fea-
tures tried to subtly locate the poems in a tradition not at all uncommon to the 
readers of Ossian. Macpherson sʼ use of the outdated pronouns “thy” and “thee” 
(Lass 1999: 153), also typical of the lang uage of the King James Bible, served to 
make the poems sound archaic, but also estab lished a connection to well-known 
texts. It is worth remembering here, that ‘thou’ and ‘thee’ were, of course, not 
10 | Scottish Gaelic has a verb-subject-object word order.
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in use in the 3rd century either. Macpherson positioned his poems consciously 
in a religious context, specifically the Bible of a Scottish king who became the 
king of England and Ireland as well, making his political agenda a part of his 
‘translation’ strategy.
The language of Macpherson sʼ poems could well be described as ‘awkward or 
ungrammatical’, but above all their ‘idioms and syntax’ give the impression of an 
‘overly literal translation’. Through Macpherson sʼ creative use of language and his 
systematic mimicking of translation, he indeed developed a form of translatese, a 
language that does not affect the reader through structural complexity but through 
its expressiveness.
SuMMIng uP
Today, Macpherson sʼ translations seem to imitate their predecessors quite ob-
viously, and yet, they created a whole universe around the bard Ossian and 
the epic battle of bringing about the Scottish nation. Presenting the poems as 
translations and framing them with quotations from Homer, Virgil and Milton, 
and comments by Macpherson himself as well as by his ally Blair, gave the 
publication the same look as any other edition of a translation of classics. The 
use of Macpherson sʼ translatese and the advertised method of literal transla-
tion placed the texts in a para-religious context and gave them gravity. At the 
same time, this constructed language worked to imitate an allegedly primitive 
source language.
Macpherson negotiated between many different layers and various forms of 
translation. Sometimes he even managed to unite seemingly obvious contradic-
tions, such as imitation and creative invention. He did so by distributing them 
between different layers and weaving a complex net of references. All these as-
pects were designed to prove the poemsʼ authenticity and, according to Grafton, 
contradictions such as these can paradoxically give “texts an air of moral as well 
as factual superiority” (1990: 61). The poems, certainly, gained a lot of attention 
and a widespread audience. The fact that their melancholic longing seems to 
have struck a chord in a period that would soon birth Romantic poetry, similarly 
concerned with this sense of loss, has also been in their favour.
Macpherson mediated between a supposedly primitive culture of the past 
and the sensitivity of his own age. With the help of his bard Ossian, Macpher-
son man aged to satisfy the growing aesthetic demand for original genius and, 
by imitating an allegedly primitive source language without many descriptive 
passages, he was able to paint a surprisingly vivid picture of the ‘times’ of his 
bard.
Macpherson sʼ strategies worked like Edgar Allen Poe sʼ purloined letter. 
Even with all his sources and literary predecessors so obviously laid out, no-
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body noticed. In his prefaces and dissertations, he addressed his own short-
comings, trying to antic ipate any criticism so as to deflect it pre-emptively, 
causing many to overlook what was right in front of them. This method, para-
doxically, worked extremely well. The sympathetic reader wanted to see the 
connections and recognise the canon ical similarities as much as the idiosyn-
crasies of ancient Gaelic poetry. Therefore, the referencing and paralleling of 
other works created a tactical diversion that seemed to verify the authenticity 
of the poems.
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Creating a Cult, Faking Relics 
The Case of St. Dominic of Soriano
Laura Fenelli (Kent State University and Richmond College in Florence)
This paper will, through the case-study of the miraculous icon of St. Dominic of 
Soriano, analyse how thanks to a multifaceted layering of falsehoods, a modest 
16th-century painting was counterfeited into a miraculous icon, enabling a small 
convent in a marginal region of 17th-century Italy to become a leading cultural and 
cultic presence in the Dominican order in Italy, Spain and overseas. As Luisa Elena 
Alcalà has stated, “the history of religious images and the relationship of artists to 
them are similar across many geographical areas. Nonetheless, studying the local 
circumstances often allows us to identify cultural processes that distinguish how 
images were crafted to respond to the particular needs and situation of societies” 
(2009: 66).
The legend of the miraculous icon of St. Dominic of Soriano (fig. 1), as it is 
recounted in a hagiographical narrative,1 narrates that on a night in December 
1510, St. Dominic appeared three times in a vision to Brother Vincenzo, friar in 
the Dominican convent of Catanzaro, in Calabria, and invited him to leave his 
hometown and to visit Soriano, to build a new house. When Brother Vincenzo 
1 | This research has developed through years thanks to the scientific 
and economical support of many institutions that provided me fellow-
ships, libraries and fructuous exchanges with colleagues. I would like 
to thank the Kunsthistorisches Institut in Florence, the Warburg Institute 
in London, the Dutch Institute in Florence, the Ermitage Foundation in 
Ferrara and the Florentine Istituto Sangalli. A former version of this pa-
per has been presented to the International conference Beyond Italy and 
New Spain. Itineraries for an Iberian Art History (1440-1640), at the Ital-
ian Academy, Columbia, New York, in Columbia University, New York in 
2012. For an extended version of the research see the forthcoming book 
Saints, Miracles and the Image: Healing Saints and Miraculous Images in 
the Renaissance, edited by Sandra Cardarelli and Laura Fenelli, Turnhout 
(forthcoming 2017).
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Figure 1: Paolo di Ciacio di Mileto(?), “Saint Dominic”, before 1621,  
oil on canvas, San Domenico, Soriano.
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arrives in Soriano, he finds a small community in assembly, debating on where to 
build a new convent, a detail that may testify to a rivalry with the Franciscans, who 
have just refused to build a new house in town. This aspect of the story should be 
historically analysed in the context of the new Dominican settlement campaign in 
Southern Italy, after two centuries during which a variety of historical circumstan-
ces contributed to the scattering and diffusion of the Order of Preachers.2
Upon his arrival in Soriano, Brother Vincenzo is considered a celestial mes-
senger, and he promptly starts the building of the new house, characterized by sub-
sequent miracles, which pertain to the location chosen and the apparition of the 
building material.
Twenty years later, in 1530, on the night before the octave of the Virgin Na-
tivity, the sacristan, Lorenzo da Grotteria, descends into the church to light the 
candles, and sees three women of sublime aspect. He does not immediately realise 
that he is witnessing a celestial vision, and, upset, checks if the door is closed. 
Questioned by one of the three women for the church sʼ name and its main icon, 
he answers that the church is devoted to St. Dominic, but it only has a poor fresco, 
close to the altar. One of the women, giving him a canvas, instructs him to place 
the new icon on the main altar. Since the sacristan is not trusted by his superiors, 
the image ends up being placed in the sacristy. Because of this collocation, which 
does not satisfy the divine will, St. Catherine appears again: She reveals her iden-
tity, and explains that the image was not painted on earth; it has been brought to 
the convent by herself, together with the Virgin Mary, and St. Mary Magdalene.
forgIng a legenD
The first problem connected to this legend is the delay between the supposed 
mi racle and the first hagiographical official accounts. The tale of the miraculous 
arrival of the image in 1530 and the story of the convent sʼ miraculous origins (in 
1510) are in fact recounted together for the first time only in a text published in 
1621, the Raccolta deʼ miracoli fatti per lʼintercessione di san Domenico,3 by 
2 | On the history of the Dominican Order in Calabria and southern Italy 
see Longo 1991: 137-38; Cioffari / Miele 1993: 11-22; Pellegrini 2005: 64-
65, 98-115.
3 | Frangipane published the first version of the volume in Messina in 
1621 and the following year the book was reprinted in Florence. For the 
history of Frangipaneʼs text see Panarello 2001: 20-21, 24; 2009: 551. The 
most successful edition was the one issued in Florence, in 1622: The 
following quotes come from this version. The history of the miraculous 
foundation of the convent is told in Frangipane 1622: 42-45, the history of 
the arrival of the canvas, 45-48.
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Silvestro Frangipane, prior of the convent twice, between 1609-1610 and again from 
1620 to 1623 (Longo 1991: 138-51).
This retard leads to a complete critical rethinking of how we should date the 
creation of the Soriano miracle, and thus to the reasons behind manufacturing, or 
we may say faking, this cult. As it is recounted or rather ‘created’ by Frangipane, 
in 1609 Frate Agostino Galamini, Dominican general master, having witnessed the 
great multitude of miracles which happened in the sanctuary, ordered the friars to 
start to register them to increase the devotion towards the image and to spread its 
cult (1622: 52): In reality any written record of Galamini sʼ order does not exist, and, 
as I will clarify, no conclusive argument demonstrates that Galamini was aware 
of the miracle and the cult when he visited Soriano. In 1611, in fact, Galamini 
published a Vita et miraculi s. p. Dominici, which is a sort of collection of prints 
about the patron sʼ life. Surprisingly, the first one, Vera effigies S. Dominici, has no 
relationship with the Soriano icon, at a date when, according to Frangipane, Gala-
mini should already have known the Calabrese canvas and already have ordered 
the official enquiry.
The first written mentions of the miracle date back, in fact, only to 1612 and are 
very vague: In a letter dated 30th August, Serafino Secchi, provincial master, orders 
that the next general chapter should be held in Soriano because of the daily miracles 
which happen in the convent, “propter miracula quae quotidie Soriani fiunt”,4 and 
during this provincial chapter Frangipane is elected as master for the Calabrese 
area. The next year, 1613, Frangipane sends to Galamini, the general master, a de-
tailed relation on the Calabrese houses, and again, in this account no mention of 
the miraculous icon occurs (Longo 1991: 170-225). In 1620 Frangipane is back in 
Soria no (146) and in 1621 the first edition of the Raccolta dei miracoli is pub-
lished and it contains the detailed account summarised above. Instead of imagin ing 
almost 60 years of a ‘spontaneous’ cult, it is more likely the miracle was ‘manu-
factured’ in 1609-1610, and Frangipane sʼ narration is either a forged promotion of 
a local cult, or an immediate reaction to a spontaneous devotion. This hypothesis 
concerning the first emergence of the cult at the beginning of the second decade of 
the 17th century is present in the text of a friar from Antwerp, Nicolas Janssenius, 
who, writing in 1622 placed the miracle in 1610 (book II, chap. XII).
When it was founded, the Soriano settlement was not even technically a con-
vent, but rather a small vicar house, in a marginal region that saw a very late expan-
sion of the Dominican order; it was only during the general chapter of 1564, held 
in Bologna, that Soriano obtained the designation of ‘convent’ (Panarello 2001: 12). 
This marginality started to vanish in 1644, when Tommaso Turco was elected 
general master and the feast of Soriano was for the first time recorded in the act of a 
general chapter, together with the existence of a brotherhood devoted to the image. 
4 | The document [Roma, Archivio Generale dellʼOrdine dei frati predica-
tori, IV, 58, I, 14v. 18r] is quoted by Longo (1991: 142).
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Is it thus possible to conceive an intentional strategy behind the creation 
of the Soriano painting as a miraculous icon, a strategy that will promote the 
Soriano area as a counter-reformed leading religious centre? We can answer 
this question considering the effects of the icon sʼ presence in changing the 
denomination of the former small house of Soriano. Thanks to the active role 
of Frangipane in promoting the cult of the miraculous icon, the convent be-
came the centre through which the Observant reform was first introduced and 
later established in Southern Italy. The ‘localization’ of the Soriano image in 
a formerly marginal region, and the ways in which the Calabrese Dominicans 
came to feel identified with their most famous cult image over time, played a 
fundamental role in the promotion of the devotional cult. When the Raccolta 
dei miracoli was published in 1621 it became not only a key text for the con-
vent, but also, a key piece in promoting a new, clean and purified image of the 
Dominicans in Southern Italy, after the dramatic downfall of the Calabrese 
Dominican friar Tommaso Campanella. He was tried by the Inquisitions for 
his writings five times, and definitively condemned to death in 1601 by the Spa-
nish authorities for conspiring to establish an ideal republic in Calabria in 1599 
(Cioffari 2001). In fact, the ostracization of Tommaso Campanella from the 
Dominican order, and his subsequent condemnation, proceeded simultaneous-
ly with the invention and promotion of the cult of the Soriano icon, and the 
success of its main promoter or maybe counterfeiter, Frangipane, whose vision 
for the Dominican order in southern Italy had been strongly opposed by Cam-
panella (Longo 1991: 150). Within this struggle internal to the order, a struggle 
that Campanella was destined to lose, it is possible to find the reasoning behind 
a ‘retrospective’ hagiographical narration and the forgery of a miraculous cult. 
Counterfeiting a cult and back-dating the miracle to the thirties of 16th century 
meant, for Frangipane, rewriting a turbu lent past and reinventing a difficult 
memory.
The presence of the icon, and the cult devoted to it, in fact, changed the fate 
of the Dominican settlement: In 1652, the convent had become so powerful 
that it could buy from the Carafa family the fief of Soriano (Panarello: 15). But 
most importantly, the Soriano miracle was used to consolidate the relationship 
between the order and the Spanish crown, and to promote the small region of 
Soriano on an international and global scale (Caridi 2009: 55-67): In 1635, Phi-
lip IV sent as a votive gift a silver lamp, and placed the convent under his royal 
protection. Five years later, in 1640, again according to Philip IV sʼ will and 
after a miracle which happened to the viceroy sʼ son, St. Dominic was chosen as 
patron saint of the Naples Vicereame (Carrió-Invernizzi 2009: 190).
Earthquakes have also dramatically characterized the convent sʼ story: 
The first one, in 1659, destroyed the convent and badly damaged the church; 
the only chapel, which survived — miraculously — is the one that preserves 
the holy canvas (Lembo 1665: 158-59). Most of the donations that arrived to 
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help rebuild the convent came directly from the Spanish viceroy, the count of 
Peñaranda.5
The following century the convent was devastated by another earthquake: On 
the night of 7th February 1783 the building, whose ambitious reconstruction was 
completed only a few decades earlier on the model of the Escorial in Ma drid,6 
almost entirely collapsed. The region, ravaged by the Napoleonic invasions, re-
mained so poor and deserted that the convent was only partially reconstructed in 
1860, when the village became the site of a new miracle. When a statue of St. Domi-
nic miraculously came to life in front of the community, the old cult was revitalized.
forgIng the ICon
The convent sʼ turbulent story explains the very poor condition in which the painting 
is preserved: According to 18th-century sources, the survival of the painting was 
considered miraculous; however, the canvas, which was transferred to wood after 
the 1783 earthquake, has been heavily repainted, and it may be considered a fake in 
itself, a highly restored or rather completely repainted icon.
The painting is nearly two metres high and 1.25 wide (so that St. Dominic sʼ 
figure appears larger than life) and was initially preserved on the main altar, as 
prescribed by St. Catherine on her second apparition, and only later moved to a 
separate chapel, made of white marble, porphyry and bronze. The painting por-
trays the saint with the typical white Dominican dress and a dark mantel. The 
background showing a brick wall and an open window onto a landscape probably 
dates to a later stage of a so-called ‘restoration’, since it is absent from all the old 
copies, and appears for the first time in a print made in 1791.7 It is interesting to 
read the account made to justify this evident repaint: Giovan Bettista Melloni, Bo-
lognese priest and biographer of more than fifty saints, saw the image after 1783 
and considered the brick wall and the window as part of the original, that, covered 
through centuries, miraculously reappeared only after the earthquake (Melloni 
1791: 194). As reported again by Melloni, the 1783 earthquake had damaged the 
image so much that the canvas was broken into two separate parts and the redis-
covery of the lower part, at first thought missing, was considered a miracle (191). 
On that occasion, the restorations were massive — and they were again considered 
miraculous, since the painter called to ‘restore’, or, more accurately, to repaint the 
canvas, found his work divinely completed without his intervention, a miracle 
5 | On the viceré see Mauro 2007; 2009.
6 | The impressive building of the XVII century convent of Soriano is 
extensively reconstructed by various studies of history of architecture 
(Panarello 2001: 39-122; 2010).
7 | The print, by Bernardino Rulli, decorates Melloni.
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that recalls the famous topos of the SS. Annunziata in Florence.8 Maybe in one of 
those restorations the saint sʼ beard was cleaned, a detail which appears in many 
antique copies (fig. 2),9 but not on the present state of the icon. The beard is not an 
insignificant detail, since it is not typical of St. Dominic sʼ traditional iconography: 
The difference between the Soriano typology and the more common Bolognese 
type may explain why, at a later stage, St. Dominic of Soriano was perceived as 
a new saint.
The Soriano icon is probably a painting that was already present in the convent 
when Frangipane created the miraculous forgery, promoting it as an icon not made 
by human hands. Instead, the icon is probably a work by Paolo di Ciacio di Mileto, 
a modest local painter active around the mid-15th century, author of the so-called 
Madonna of the Pears, for the Dominican church of S. Maria della Consolazione in 
Altomonte. It is highly probable that this ‘old-fashioned’, archaic and static compo-
sition positively contributed to its ripeness for a miraculous activation, after initial-
ly poor reception or even contempt, for which possible background is provided in 
the account of St. Catherine sʼ second apparition.10
The painting started to have an increasingly outstanding role in the Dominican 
order, even displacing the saint sʼ relics, preserved for three centuries in Bologna 
in a monumental sepulchre, which hides and obscures the body itself.11 Unusually, 
St. Dominic sʼ body is preserved almost entirely in Bologna (only the head is in 
a separate reliquary since 1383) (Faranda / Rosetus 1998), but the image was 
the vehicle for the spreading and renewal of the 13th-century cult: It is basically 
through the Soriano icon — which fixes, and multiplies a new iconographical typo-
logy — that St. Dominic became a leading Counter-Reformation and thaumaturgi-
cal saint, whose only competition in Southern Italy was the increasing popularity 
of St. Francis of Paola.12 The Soriano case works as a visual paradigm: The mira-
culous image and its copies come to renew and later to substitute the cult of the 
relics preserved in Bologna, and St. Dominic of Soriano, who appears in numerous 
visions to believers and ill people, proudly affirms his identity (I am the St. Domi­
nic of Soriano and not of Bologna as it is written in many of the accounts of his 
miraculous epiphanies). 
8 | See, with previous bibliography, Holmes 2013: 57.
9 | The beard is very evident in the print by Nicolas Perrey “San Domeni-
co da Soriano fonte perenne di Grazie” datable at the beginning of XVII 
century (published in Panarello 2001: 35) and again in the anonymous 
print that illustrates the 1733 edition of the Acta Sanctorum, in which the 
saint actually has long and curious moustaches (present also in the copy 
by Raffellino in S. Chiara, Carpi).
10 | On this topic, see at least Alcalá 2009: 55-73; Holmes 2013: 160.
11 | On the Arc of Saint Dominic in Bologna see Moskowitz 1994.
12 | On the cult for San Francesco di Paola see Sallmann 1996: 83-120.
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Figure 2: Francesco Caivano, “Saint Dominic”, 1648, Museo Diocesano Antonio 
Marena, Bitonto.
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At the end of this complex devotional process, the icon was itself able to pro-
duce relics: In Palermo in 1741, the particula ex sacris ossibus Gloriosi sancti 
Dominici Suriani confessoris appears (literally: a small part of St. Dominic 
of Soriano sʼ bones). The saint of Soriano somehow became a new, independent 
saint, whose cult was promoted by the Dominican order, and whose relics are also 
collected and venerated.13
CoPIeS anD forgerIeS
The phenomena of relic production had already begun in the 17th century, when 
contact relics were being documented. Contact relics are manufactured by a saint sʼ 
body, ‘touching’ the miraculous icon with a new material that, upon contact, be-
comes miraculous in itself. As already recounted in Frangipane, the oil of the lamps 
burning in front of the canvas was considered miraculous.14 The same happens to 
the misure, literally, the ‘dimensions’ of the icon: Small ribbons made of canvas, 
with the same length of the icon, were used particularly in cases of difficult preg-
nancies (Lembo 1665: 20-21). The relics were used to multiply the icon sʼ miracu-
lous power, and even to substitute the miraculous seeing of the icon for those who 
could not reach the sanctuary; but they also work as powerful material memories, 
helpful for those returning from a pilgrimage, who wanted to take home a fragment 
of the miraculous power for themselves, their family or even their animals, as is 
attested by a 17th-century blessing.15
The mechanism of copying and reproducing the miraculous image is part 
of this forgery: Focusing mainly on the miraculous activations of the copies in 
the last part of my paper I will describe some case studies taken from the network 
that I am reconstructing. Those examples will clarify how Soriano sʼ cult was used to 
promote the Dominicansʼ role not only in Southern Italy, but also, thanks to a mira-
culous copy in Madrid, the Iberian Peninsula, and, later, the Americas; and how tho-
se copies — sort of certified fakes — spread and popularized the devotion overseas.16
In the first descriptions of the image, the icon is described as being so beautiful 
that it couldnʼt have been made by human hands (Frangipane 1622: 48): That the icon sʼ 
13 | The authenticity of the relic is certified in 1741, as recounted by 
Casillas García 2006: 383.
14 | See for example the miracles listed by Frangipane 1622: 18, 27, 50, 
114, 228; Lembo 1665: 18-19.
15 | See for example the blessing for the animals: Benedizione deʼ Cor-
doncini tagliati alla misura dellʼimmagine del S. Patriarca S. Domenico 
per salvaguardare gli animali, quoted by Zucchi 1951.
16 | The issues of copying a miraculous image is addressed by Belting 
1994: 440; Freedberg 1989: 142; Holmes 2013: 145.
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beauty itself is evidence of divine production is obviously a topos which dates back 
to the acheiropoieta images attributed to St. Luke, an aesthetic observation clearly 
contradicted by the material evidences of the painting (Portús Pérez 2009: 40-43).
The Soriano icon, in Frangipane sʼ words, has another peculiar characteristic: It 
is not only so beautiful that it couldnʼt have been made by human hands, but also it 
is thanks to its divine beauty that is impossible to copy, despite the vain attempts of 
various artists (1622: 48-49).
Beyond Frangipane sʼ words, the cultic and performative reality of the mirac-
ulous icon of Soriano was very different: Between the 17th and 18th century, the 
Soriano image was continuously copied and multiplied.17
It is possible to subdivide the immense network of the copies into two ba-
sic groups. The first series consists of paintings that reproduce the Soriano icon 
exactly: The first copies appear in nearby Dominican convents, such as in 
Bitonto; where a linen dated 1648 and signed by its author, Francesco Caivano, 
is displayed in a massive baroque structure — a peculiar case of a miraculous 
image made and authenticated by human hands (fig. 2; Pasculli Ferrara 1998).
Despite the trope of the impossibility of the image sʼ reproduction by artists, the 
production of copies started in the Soriano sanctuary itself: In a description of the 
convent sʼ situation after the 1783 earthquake a reproductions atelier is documented, 
close to the convent itself, where a group of artists (or rather craftsmen) were dep-
utized to copy the image. Given the high number of copies, we can imagine that a 
similar set-up existed in the 17th century (Panarello 2001: 217-22). In fact, the text 
“this is the true portrait of St. Dominic of Soriano” which appears in many early 
Calabrese copies (but also in Bruges, Empoli, Liguria and Taggia),18 could be the 
proof of a ‘certificate of authenticity’ requested by Dominican convents and may 
refer to the copies manufactured directly in Soriano or at least approved by the 
convent. 
But in the 17th and 18th centuries, copying the Soriano icon usually meant not 
a simple reproduction of the icon, but a reproduction of the performative mise­en­ 
scene of the miracle related in Frangipane sʼ account, with a painting within a paint-
ing, an iconography that probably derives from the 17th-century clay frame, record-
ed by the sources and lost in the 18th century sʼ earthquakes.19
17 | In recent years, many studies on the copies have appeared: See the 
repertories drawn by Stagno (for the Liguria; 2009), Marías and Carlos 
Varona (on the Spanish copies; 2009) and Čapeta Rakić (for a Dalmatian 
copy that is derived from the Bertarelli print; 2013).
18 | Stagno 2009: 720-21, with useful reconstruction of the diffusion of 
the Soriano iconography in Liguria, where at least fourteen different 
canvases are documented.
19 | All the material pertaining to the baroque frame, with a possible 
reconstruction, is documented in Panarello 2010: 182-83.
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Figure 3: Saint Dominic of Soriano and his miracles, 18th century,  
Civica Raccolta Bertarelli, Milan.
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The Iberian success of this cult — thanks to a series of those copies and trans-
lations of Frangipane sʼ text — changed the fate of the convent and its icon. In the 
1620s — immediately after the publication of Frangipane sʼ text — a print of the So-
riano miracles, probably similar to the sheet now preserved at the Civica Raccolta 
delle Stampe Bertarelli (fig. 3), arrived for Padre Francisco de Sotomayor, prior of 
the Dominican convent of St. Tomas in Madrid, who asked the painter and Domini-
can friar Juan Batista Maino to paint the scene with the miraculous arrival (Pana-
rello 2009: 537-55). Maino sʼ altar was consecrated on 13th May 1629. The Madrid 
convent of St. Tomas became the first Spanish devotional centre. It was soon fol-
lowed by the female Dominican convent of Santo Domingo el Real, which hos-
ted from 10th July 1638 a painting of the same subject made by Vicente Carducho 
(Colocacion 1638). Both Carducho sʼ and Maino sʼ painting are now lost, but a print 
taken by Pedro da Villafranca after Charduco sʼ in 1638, together with the numerous 
other versions made by the two painters throughout their careers (fig. 4), clearly 
show their relationship and dependence on the model drawn by the Italian print.20
During the procession made to enshrine the painting, Carducho sʼ copy for 
St. Domingo el Real performed miraculous healings: In the presence of more than 
200 Dominicans, friars and nuns, the miraculous power of the Soriano icon was 
prodigiously transferred to the Madrid copy, a sort of fraudulent activation that 
substituted for the forged original (Colocacion 1638).
What happened in Madrid is very different from what occurred in Naples, in 
1652. Here, as it is recounted in an anonymous libellus, the Trionfo di S. Domenico 
in Soriano, printed in Naples in 1653, a possessed woman was brought in front of a 
copy in the church of S. Maria della Salute, but the demons, once seeing the copy, 
considering it a fake, refused to leave and forced her to go on a pilgrimage to the 
true Calabrese icon. Despite the failure, the first attempt to heal the woman in front 
of a copy means that, except in peculiar cases that required the original power of 
the true icon, the practice of substituting the icon and its power with a manufactured 
copy was indeed common.
a SuCCeSSful DeVotIon oVerSeaS
The miraculous activation of the first Spanish copies moved the devotional centre 
of the Soriano cult from Southern Italy to the central Iberian Peninsula, and it is not 
by chance that in 1666 Antonio Gonzales was the first Spaniard who obtained the 
role of Dominican general master (Carrió-Invernizzi 2009: 190). From the Iberian 
Peninsula, a new “colonization of the imagery”21 began to play out in the Americas: 
20 | On the Maino paintings see Marías / Carlos Varona 2009: 71-73; 
Carlos Varona 2002. On the Madrid copies see Collar de Cáceres 2005.
21 | The expression is the title of a famous book by Gruzinski.
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Figure 4: Juan Bautista Maino, “Appearance of the Virgin to St. Dominic in 
Soriano”, 1630s, Hermitage Museum, Saint Petersburg.
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The icon was used to prevent a flood in Mexico City in 1630,22 and, when the Do-
minicans settled in Uruguay, they renamed the first Spanish colony Santo Domingo 
de Soriano, now known as Villa Soriano.23
In all Spanish copies, the core of the painting, the Soriano icon itself, seems to 
remain unchanged, at a moment when the true icon was in fact about to be repainted 
and completely forged by adding the brick wall as the background: A fake icon that 
had become a true relic, was offered through the narrative image to the devoteesʼ 
adoration.
To sum up and conclude: In this multifaceted stratification of fakes, firstly, we 
have a miraculous image that changed the role and the fate of a religious order in 
a formerly marginal region, an image that does not even exist anymore in its ori-
ginal conditions: Damaged by subsequent earthquakes and completely repainted, 
the icon is now a fake in itself. Secondly, the hagiographical account that popu-
larized the icon sʼ miracles is probably highly forged, at least in how it anticipates 
the cult, for specific political reasons. Thirdly, later in its veneration, the icon 
created fake relics, venerated in Palermo, such as the rather mysterious appari-
tion of a saint sʼ bone, whose body is venerated and preserved (presumably intact) 
elsewhere. More over, the mechanism that led to the production of many copies of 
the miraculous image — sort of certified reproductions, or true ‘fakes’ — raises 
issues about artistic reproduction of icons supposedly not made by human hands, 
but also with respect to the role of the artists who made, repaired, and restored 
the original image through the centuries, and were responsible for the copies that 
popularized this devotion.
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Desiring Fakes 
AI, Avatars, and the Body of  
Fake Information in Digital Art
Daniel Becker (LMU Munich)
On 3 November 1948, the Chicago Tribune led with the premature headline 
“Dewey Defeats Truman”. Thomas E. Dewey was expected to win the presidential 
election. Instead, the actual winner Harry S. Truman ironically held up a copy of 
the newspaper after his victory was announced (fig. 1). This historical false re-
port reached unimaginable relevance in 2016: According to most polls of the 45th 
US presidential election, Hillary Clinton would surely become the next president. 
Donald J. Trump sʼ shock victory was also attributed to widespread posting and 
sharing of so-called ‘fake news’ via social media. In light of this, even Facebook 
felt compelled to make a statement.1
The political dimension of fake news says a lot about forgeries in general: forg-
eries are not copies. Perpetrators of forgery fake evidence, obscure their sources 
and rewrite history. Famous art forgers in the 20th century — such as Tom Keating, 
Eric Hebborn and Edgar Mrugalla — have not copied pictures to compete with the 
originals, but to imitate the ‘style’ of other artists. What these painters falsified 
were not objects, but (art) history itself. In this essay I will propose an understand-
ing of forgeries much more as a formal process in the terms of information theory, 
rather than focusing on the process of their manifestation.
In most instances, the word “forgery” is used with negative connotations. How-
ever, forgers have often completed (art) history more than actual experts, who, in a 
way, have written this history with gaps: Forgers have created the missing pieces of 
the historical puzzle, even if they are false ones. In this context, the German art critic 
Niklas Maak writes about the spectacular case of the forger Wolfgang Beltracchi:
1 | See the statement by Mark Zuckerberg at https://www.facebook.
com/zuck/posts/10103269806149061 (last accessed on 14 June 2017). 
For an analysis of fake news in the 2016 presidential election see All-
cott / Gentzkow 2017.
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What Beltracchi painted are not classical forgeries but his own works 
of art, which reveal the mechanism of the art market — and which, 
because they are put so precisely in art-historical niches, in terms of 
market needs, painted in desideratum, give a precise portrait of the 
epoch. They say much about the present time, the image of art history, 
and about the economic preconditions of ‘masterpieces’. (2011, my 
translation)2
Summarising Maak, then, forgers fulfil the expectations and desires of the art 
market by analysing the art system and integrating themselves into its immanent 
mechanisms.
2 | “Was Beltracchi gemalt hat, sind keine klassischen Fälschungen, 
sondern eigene Kunstwerke, die den Mechanismus des Kunstmarkts 
offenlegen — und die, weil sie so präzise in kunsthistorische Nischen, 
in Marktbedürfnisse, in Desiderate hineingemalt sind, ein präzises 
Epochenporträt abgeben. Sie sagen viel über die Gegenwart, ihr Bild 
von Kunstgeschichte, und über die ökonomischen Bedingungen von 
‘Meisterwerken’”.
Figure 1: Harry S. Truman holding the issue of the Chicago Daily Tribune at 
St. Louis, Missouri on 3 November 1948.
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Accordingly, a key feature of forging is the supposed context. Antique forgers 
have always resorted to fabricated stories to make their alleged ‘discoveries’ seem 
plausible. Even in antiquity, ‘original’ writings were claimed to have been found 
“‘under the feet of Anubis’ or ‘in the night, fallen into the court of the temple 
in Koptos, as a mystery of this goddess [Isis]’” (Grafton 1990: 8). Such forged 
provenances were intended not only to make the discovery plausible through ap-
parent eye-witness accounts, but to add even more (false) credibility. Likewise, 
forgeries cannot be thought of without false collection labels or stories of adven-
turous find ings or invented provenances.3 Therefore forgeries are not so much an 
expression of craftsmanship as they are vehicles for the creation of a narrative 
with similarities to circular reporting, in which the original source is hidden be-
hind multiple other sources.
Following these considerations, here forgeries are understood as an aesthetic 
practice that reflects exactly this mechanism of desire and empty promises, where 
the ‘false’ serves the purpose of corroborating pre-existing expectations in order 
to make them ‘true’. Due to the information age, I will focus more on the false 
information which counterfeits an object as original or authentic than on the object 
itself. The focus of this essay will be on new media artworks which utilise fake 
identities, and reflect on and question the benevolent art system and its gaps. As 
a result, a connection to AI (artificial intelligence) and its history is fundamental: 
AI, similar to forgeries, is intended to fit and to satisfy the demands of an ana lysed 
environment. These programs work in a defined system, a system, like the art mar-
ket, that has been previously analysed.4 Today, AI has various uses, for instance 
in the financial sector as well as an instrument to spread ‘fake news’ in social net-
works. Google, for example, even managed to defeat the world class GO player Lee 
Sedol with its AI AlphaGO. The works discussed here do not reach such technical 
competence, but they do address a central aspect of the discussion of AI: decision- 
making.5 The mastery of GO, a game so complex that experience and intuition play 
3 | The importance of provenance shows the case of John Drewe. Drewe 
commissioned art forgeries and forged documents by way of their pro-
venance and partly smuggled them into museums and archives in order 
to sell the forgeries as originals.
4 | On this see for example an article by Bloomberg News from 22 
April 2015 about the Flash Crash, at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2015-04-22/mystery-trader-armed-with-algorithms-rewrites- 
flash-crash-story (last accessed on 14 June 2017).
5 | Daniel Dennett discusses this aspect in the early 1970s not as a 
category of AI itself but a stance in reception. The point in his essay is 
not his description of different kinds of stances — design, physical and 
intentional stance (1971: 88-91) — but that he reverses for his assessment 
of AI the machinable criterion to a human one. In this approach, an AI 
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a decisive role, was considered impossible for AI until 2016. For a certain degree 
of complexity in fact, decisions cannot be predicted by an algorithm (Turing 1937). 
The works discussed here deal with this problem, this gap of information: simi-
larly to forgeries, AI artworks stimulate expectations and desires, which are more 
reveal ing of the frame of communication in which they operate, than the conceal-
ment of their technical deficits.
true or falSe — a DeCISIon of botS
The question as to whether something is a fake can simply be answered with ‘Yes’ 
or ‘No’; its ascription is either true or false. The simplest method is to compare 
two objects, one which is identified as genuine and another. Here, criminalistics 
also argue in the case of identification by means of dactyloscopic and biometric 
methods with the words “nature does not repeat itself” (Vec 2006: 209). Classical 
reproduc tion in the sense of a perfect duplicate is therefore characterised by its 
(twofold) identity, a sample and a match. To identify something as an original or a 
forgery is to determine its essence. This means that it is identical to an object, but 
not that object itself. In contrast, forgeries deal much more with the different fields 
of consistency, the authorship, or the purity of a work. An essential characteristic 
of forgeries is therefore the deception by imitation, not only the material imita-
tion, but, above all, a simulation, through faked information, of the production and 
origin. Nonetheless, in the digital age exact imitations are already obsolete since 
everything can be copied without loss. Thus, an imitation also must embrace the 
context of creation, produce a reality of production constituted by mimetic premis-
es, because the alleged object is not original anyway.
Forgeries are linked to technical conditions, and in the course of history more 
techniques have become accessible to forgers. Digitalisation, however, has re-
leased technical production from its material boundaries, because its essential 
property is its basic reducibility to information. The ascription as original or forg-
ery is no longer so simple as the degree of complexity involved increases. It is ul-
timately independent of hardware, which makes the question of original, copy and 
counterfeit become redundant in the context of the digital. In particular, there are 
hardly any tangible mediums anymore, since data is mirrored and outsourced in 
can only take a (intentional) decision if it fits human behaviour, because 
“the goals of a goal-directed computer must be specified intentionally, 
just like desires” (91).
In this regard the current AI reasearch by Google Director of Engineering 
Raymond Kurzweil or Swedish Philosoph Nick Bostrom, for example, is 
not of further interest. In fact, the fundament characteristic of AIʼs agency 
is in this context relevant.
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clouds, there are no more master-copies and thus no hierarchy of information: no-
thing is copied and forged, all data is multiple at its inception. Nevertheless, there 
is an important similarity between forgery and digital practices, referring not to 
the generation of material but to the performative dimension of the inter action: 
forgeries in the digital context do not aim at technical perfection, but rather they 
are shared as if they were original. In this sense, they are simply reduced to their 
informative content for an existing communicative framework; that is, they can 
be linked to expectations.
Such an atmosphere of sensationalism and desire for information provides the 
perfect breeding ground for fake news. The common greed for information en ables 
fake news to propagate and spread. This was the case, for example, a few days 
after the attack at the Boston Marathon in April 2013 and the subsequent manhunt 
for two suspects, in which authorities, the public, and the news media participat-
ed equally. In a race for the latest and most spectacular news, rumours and false 
reports were published without being checked, even by renowned news stations 
and thus gained a wide audience. The incentive of such attention prompted some 
Twitter users to create false profiles and spread false information. So, the tweet “I 
want to kill all of you, you killed my brother” from a profile that pretended to be 
one of the wanted assassins, was adopted by social media and news as an actual 
statement (European Media Art Festival 2014: 153). Although it was clear after a 
few minutes that it was a fake profile and the tweet was just a (cruel) joke, this news 
went viral over several hours. In his work Fake Account the artist Alexander Repp 
visualises the network of tweets, which are related to the report of the fake profile, 
by analysing a five-minute live recording of Twitter: all messages with the word 
‘killed’, the users who wrote them, the attached links and the hashtags form a point 
in the network.
This artwork not only shows how false messages are spread easily online, but 
also how forgeries generally work. The imitative fake profile is not so important, 
since the profile and the messages were clumsy inventions whose absurdity was 
easy to uncover by deeper consideration: why would a suspect, for whom the whole 
country was searching, be sending tweets? What really matters is the fabricated 
pre­mitation6 of something that will cause a predictable effect. In this case, some-
thing that triggers the desire of (media) reality for sensational news. Through the 
numerous participants, the half-life and haste of the news cycle and anticipation 
of a spectacle, a network, as Repp presents it, is created. The actual forgery fades 
away under the quantity of factors. Favoured by this complexity, the decidability of 
6 | This term refers to the German philosopher Hans Blumenberg and 
his concept of “Vorahmung”. The English translation as “anticipation” is 
misleading as Blumenberg understands this term as a function of the 
concept of “imitation” (“Nachahmung”) which would mean, in an overly 
literal translation, “post-imitation” (2000: 48).
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whether an object — here the tweet — is true or false is irrelevant as long as it fits 
expectations. Only an evaluation, which contradicts the hasty machinery of sensa-
tionalism, allows an accurate conclusion.
Leaving Twitter aside and focussing instead on another social network, Face-
book, Sarah Waterfeld describes the practice of self-representation as mimesis 2.0 
(2012). Here, she refers to René Girard sʼ model of the “mimetic desire”. In his book 
Deceit, Desire and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure, Girard develops 
this concept based on literature of the 19th and 20th centuries. In a nutshell, this is a 
triangular model of a subject, the “mediator” and an object of desire (Girard 1969: 2). 
Instead of desiring the object for its own qualities, the subject or the protagonist 
wants it, because it is valuable to the mediator, e.g. his antagonist, whose desire he 
imitates by doing so. Therefore, the mimetic process is a mediation which can be 
“external”, if it refers to spiritual type like the imagination, or “internal”, if it refers 
to a physical type like a person (9). Girard sʼ analysis goes deeper, he is inter ested in 
the character sʼ jealousy, envy or rivalry and its consequences for the relations in the 
novel, but the literary and even the general anthropological implications of Girard sʼ 
model have little relevance for this essay. More important is to point out Waterfeld sʼ 
understanding of this model of triangular desire as a valid pattern for interactions 
in social networks. Waterfeld sees self-expression on Facebook as a mimetic process 
in the sense of Girard: the actual user does not desire some object itself, but the 
reactions shown on one sʼ timeline and therefore a desire for something somebody 
else wants or likes. Following this reasoning, the profile or the account in social net-
works is an expression of the Other, because it represents an ideal not of one sʼ self 
but of an image, that would most likely be ‘liked’ and commented. What Waterfeld 
de scribes by updating Girard is an imitation of an imagination or, well-known since 
the emergence of psychoanalysis, an image of the Other. Although Waterfeld trans-
fers the triangular model of Girard and notes rightly that there is no “dislike-button” 
(2012: 234) she avoids naming the components in this relation ship. That is maybe 
because every component is exchangeable with the others. But moreover, she ignores 
that a profile is a representation of a user and not the actual one. Instead, I would 
like to understand such profiles as an imitation of a type of self-approval. The point 
is, that the user does not follow real references but virtual idols or (role) models that 
embody what is ‘liked’ and therefore desirable. In this sense the triangular model 
consists of ‘likes’ or attention (object), the (distorted) self-expression in the profile 
(mediator) and the user (subject). The user mimics an image in his profile, a desirable 
ideal he understands as self-expression, that should be solely ‘likeable’. He therefore 
has no genuine desire for ‘likes’; his urge is only based on his understanding of the 
popularity of other users who are successful in the system of social networks. This 
accompanies virality, or the phenomenon of memes, and this is what Girard calls, 
with reference to Gregory Bateson, a “double bind”, because the primary impulse 
of imitation to get an object of desire is necessarily reciprocal. Girard understands 
that this an instinctive threat to is created by being imitated, so a rivalry between the 
Desiring Fakes 205
subject and the “mediator” occurs, for which reason “mimetic desire is simply a term 
more comprehensive than violence” (2005: 156-58). In the case of fake accounts, the 
object of desire is the alleged news, the, in fact, fake news, that triggers sensational-
ism. The fake account becomes the “mediator”, while the subject, that imitates and 
copies this “mediator”, is something like the news media or profile that shares the 
false information. But this relation only works if one is beware of the triangular 
relation, it is a mimesis of mimetic desire. The fake (profile) imitates, but does not 
be come, the object of desire with the intent that the other user’s profiles imitate 
this fake profile. The object here is to gain attention, ‘likes’ in the context of social 
networks. So by imitation I mean, more accurately, the pre­mitation, because the 
creator of a fake account anticipates and counterfeits the desire of the Other; he pre-
sumes how his audience will react if he triggers their desire.7 Aware of the “double 
bind”, the profile deals with this by counterfeiting the “mediators’” qualities, thus 
satisfying their desires or expectations.
Fake profiles, as showcased by Repp, are not a rarity. These take not only in the 
form of false profiles managed by real people to remain anonymous, but also in the 
form of chat bots. Such bots may be helpful, just like the assistant AI I have men-
tioned, but they can also increase the number of followers of real profiles, increas-
ing the popularity level, and they can thus mislead a user to interact with an only 
al legedly real person, as happens, for example, on some dating websites.
Such bots only work in a calculable system. They themselves cannot make 
any decisions, so they must be programmed into desiderates. Following a proce- 
dure — and that is the purpose of robots — they can then carry out an action in 
relative autonomy. Such an autonomous action which is only possible in a certain, 
defined framework, was the topic of the artist group !Mediengruppe Bitnik and 
their project Random Darknet Shopper (RDS) at the Kunst Halle St. Gallen in 2014 
7 | This triangular model can similarly be found in the Internet practice of 
‘trolling’, because here the ‘troll’ tries to trigger a response that is itself 
worse than his original insult. He hides behind a fake identity and aims to 
involve a third party by staging this argument for an audience. Therefore 
‘trolling’ is more about faking or imitating identities, as Judith Donath 
states: “Trolling is a game about identity deception, albeit one that is 
played without the consent of most of the players. The troll attempts 
to pass as a legitimate participant, sharing the groupʼs common inter-
ests and concerns; the newsgroups members, if they are cognizant of 
trolls and other identity deceptions, attempt to both distinguish real from 
trolling post ings, and upon judging a poster a troll, make the offending 
poster leave the group. Their success at the former depends on how well 
they — and the troll — understand identity cues; their success at the lat-
ter depends on whether the trollʼs enjoyment is sufficiently diminished or 
outweighed by the costs imposed by the group” (1999: 45).
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(fig. 2). The centre of this work was a bot, which had a weekly amount of $ 100 in 
Bitcoins to buy goods and deliver them to the exhibition. The bot does not shop in 
any online shop, but in the so-called ‘agora’, which is offline by now, in the darknet, 
a marketplace similar to the well-known ‘silk road.’ The darknet is an overlay net-
work, it uses the Internet infrastructure, but without public access. To become a part 
of this network, one must be invited, but subsequently a high level of anonymity is 
guaranteed, especially at these darknet-markets. Basic for the RDS is to experi-
ment, to explore, and to document how such a relationship works, when it is 
based only on information and quasi confidence in a system. Week for week the 
Figure 2: !Mediengruppe Bitnik, “Random Darknet Shopper”, 2014 / 15, 
installation shots at Kunst Halle St. Gallen, Switzerland.
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bot bought items such as counterfeit sneakers or jeans, high-quality passport scans, 
a copy of a UK Fire Brigade Master Key Set or drugs like ecstasy. At the end the 
Swiss police confiscated this ‘evidence’ of this artwork, but, interestingly, without 
charging the human artists.
An aesthetic dimension of the RDS is its title-giving contingency. With this 
incalculability, the work stands in the tradition of Digital Art, because the “seren-
dipity” (Cybernetic Serendipity 1968) or the “aesthetic gap” (Becker 2017: 172) is 
a fundamental and genuine characteristic of this art form. For the RDS, this gap 
is its relative autonomy. At the same time, however, the shopper works only by 
the command-execute-demand-structure of the darknet shopping platform, the ran-
domness is therefore given in the selection of the products and thus only the bone of 
contention. The communication and trafficking between the bot and the traders was 
‘successful’ in two ways: Firstly, this scheme realised the artistsʼ intention to get 
such scandalising items and therefore attention, otherwise this performance could 
have taken place on eBay or any other shopping-platform; secondly, it is exclusively 
based on a rational system of ratings. Given the special community of the darknet, 
the sellers are as interested in a redundant but working identity like a rating as is 
the bot, which uses these ratings for judging and deciding for from whom to buy. 
As on Amazon, the credibility of a seller is decided by his ratings. The RDS is 
therefore a type of ‘programmed scandal’, which, crucially, is based only on digital 
information, on the exchange between bot and sellers, whether they are controlled 
manually or programmed.
The success of the communication between the RDS and the human sellers 
depends on the expectations of the sellers. They do not expect anything except 
payment for their goods. As long as this adheres to market mechanisms, or “market 
needs” (Maak 2011), everything else does not matter. On the other hand, there are 
also procedures to prevent such communication. Websites try to protect themselves 
from such artificial users by using so-called CAPTCHAs (Completely Automated 
Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart), which are installed before 
the content can be accessed. The idea here is that a bot cannot easily solve visual 
tasks that a human user can, because a computer programme cannot recognise that 
these graphics include letters and characters and cannot serve the required input. 
Of course, this remains a constant race: When bots solve the CAPTCHAs, these 
must in turn be improved. But as in the work of the South Korean artistsʼ group 
Shinseungback Kimyonghun, the principle can also be reversed in order to exclude 
people: a so-called FADTCHA (Face Detection Turing test to tell Computers and 
Humans Apart) (fig. 3). Face detection is based on an algorithm of the open source 
library “OpenCV”. The computer detects faces in its camera vision and marks them 
with a red square. The actual work, however, is a book with nine round, colour 
patches, which act on the human eye like a diffuse collection of monotonous circles. 
In this collection, the computer recognises a face, but the human eye does not. For 
a dichotomous categorisation — true or false — here only the system-immanent, i.e. 
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programmed, factors matter. So in the case of FADTCHA as well as of the RDS the 
actual object — purchased object or image — plays no semantic role, because their 
judgment is only based on the calculated work steps. But are they forgeries or do 
they deal both with fake identities in a proper sense? From the perspective of the 
seller, the RDS is a false identity, because it orders using the name of and to the real 
address of a legal person, i.e. the Kunsthalle St. Gallen. From the point of view of a 
human being the images in FADTCHA are false faces, because they do not concur 
with our image of faces. Forgeries are therefore not false facts but false, created 
situations. In the digital age, forgeries rather fake a construct of identity, object, and 
reception, of artist, work, and expectation; they create a situation in which an object 
becomes adequate, they fake a triangular relation of desire.
Figure 3: Shinseungback Kimyonghun, FADTCHA, computer sees the face in the 
test image of the book and the human user, 2013.
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the IMItatIon gaMe
This triangular relation is central for AI research, because what is important is not 
the form of the AI, but its deception of being humanoid. The fundamental issue of 
AI sʼ interplay and autonomy in this relation marks the beginning of AI research, 
and leads the British computer scientist Alan Turing, to open his famous essay 
“Computing Machinery and Intelligence” with: “I propose to consider the question, 
‘Can machines think?’” (1950: 433). But Turing himself relativises this approach 
by replacing it with the question of whether machines can be realised as thinking 
humans. He illustrates this, the later so-called ‘Turing Test’ to which CAPTCHAs 
refer, in a mind experiment which he calls the “Imitation Game”. In this respect, 
Turing was not concerned with the extent to which machines or computers can 
think in any form, but how far — and this shows the behaviouristic approach of his 
thinking — they can behave as if they were thinking beings (435, 438).
This game consists of three elements: a machine or computer, a person and 
separate from these two an interrogator, who ideally communicates only via tele-
communication with the other participants. The task of the interrogator is to distin-
guish the two others from each other; the task of the machine and of the human is to 
answer the questions so that they are perceived in each case as a human being (434). 
One must keep in mind that in 1950, when Turing described this game, the available 
skills and range of computing were very limited, apart from the fact that digital 
computers were not beyond an initial phase of development. Nevertheless, Turing 
already speaks of machines or computers that could imitate humans as “human 
computers” or, in today sʼ words, as robots (438). With the increasing development 
of digital computers that can store and process an unimaginable amount of infor-
mation, Turing was visionary in his foresight that it is just a matter of programming 
and commands that enable machines to ‘mimic’ human behaviour (438). Never-
theless, it was not his intention to equalise people and computers or to put them on 
some ontological level, he wanted to point out and raise awareness of the potential 
of these machines.
One has to understand Turing sʼ reflections on the “imitation game” in the 
context of his article “On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Ent-
scheidungsproblem”, written several years earlier (1937). Here, Turing describes 
his solution to the Entscheidungsproblem (“decision-problem”) according to Da-
vid Hilbert, namely, that it is undecidable for each possible mathematical formula 
whether it is provable or not. This Entscheidungsproblem cannot be transferred 
directly to the question of whether something is actually a forgery, since Turing 
was primarily concerned with mathematical and formal problems, not with se-
mantic ones. It is, however, important for understanding the ‘Imitation Game’, 
because here Turing has already substituted the vague concept of predictability 
with being computable by a machine: “According to my definition, a number is 
computable if its decimal can be written down by a machine” (116). In this sense 
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the Turing machine is a universal machine, a simulation machine, since its opera-
tions can be described as “‘rule of thumb’” or “‘purely mechanical’” (1948: 4); all 
it does depends only on the information on a tape.
Before mentioning machines, Turing describes the “Imitation Game” in a dif-
ferent constellation namely: “a man (A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C) who 
may be of either sex” (1950: 433). Assumed to be “B”, to convince the interrogator 
of one sʼ sex Turing suggests that “the best strategy for her is probably to give truth-
ful answers. She can add such things as ‘I am the woman, donʼt listen to him!’ to 
her answer, but it will avail nothing as the man can make similar remarks” (434). To 
cause an incorrect identification with this strategy, one has to mimic the other sex. 
Despite whether this really is the best strategy, Turing sʼ mind experiment is very 
similar to Girard sʼ model: both assume a triangular constellation and both suppose 
that one has to imitate or mimic their rival to succeed.
With regard to this ‘foreplay’ of the “Imitation Game” it is also interesting that 
a successful imitation in reverse means that the original (person) cannot present 
itself as such. Juliane Rebentisch understands this part of the “Imitation Game” as 
a gender construction, with the male imitating the female. Here, Rebentisch makes 
a reference to Judith Butler: the sexual construction by Turing is based, like social 
interaction in general, on normative rules (Rebentisch 1997: 28). Actually, Turing sʼ 
idea postulates an original which will be imitated by a machine. But as soon as 
he transforms this assumption into a game situation the concept of originality is 
necessarily questioned, because in this framework the original appears as an imi-
tation of an unattainable ideal, induced by cultural, social, institutional and political 
practices (29). This raises the issue of whether imitation is not a question of the 
reference itself, but a means of navigating a system.
Turing, similarly to Rebentisch and Butler, also presupposes social norms: 
“The book of rules which we have described our human computer as using is 
of course a convenient fiction. Actual human computers really remember what 
they have got to do. If one wants to make a machine mimic the behaviour of 
the human computer in some complex operation one has to ask him how it is 
done, and then translate the answer into the form of an instruction table” (Tu-
ring 1950: 438). As in his article about the Entscheidungsproblem, Turing defi-
nes the problem of calculability as mechanical. In this regard, he presumes two 
things without mentioning: enough information can purport or simulate a com-
mon-sense knowledge and there must be some kind of benevolent interrogator 
or observer. Here Turing follows a mathematical-information-theoretical logic: 
We know the information that is transmitted, the receiver is defined normatively, 
so the sender (the imitator) results as a variable which can either be successfully 
deceived or not. In other words, if one has an interrogator who knows how the 
programme works, asks the right questions, for example logical contradictions or 
detects that the computer reacts in unclear situations with counter-questions, then 
the “Imitation Game” does not work.
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The (human) reaction based on feelings, emotions or instinct in unforeseen 
situations is a well-known argument against AI, because calculation means that 
there is no room for consciousness. Turing himself mentions this argument but 
rejects it, because in “this view the only way by which one could be sure that a 
machine [as well as a man] thinks is to be the machine [or the man] and to feel 
oneself thinking” (445). So, as in any conversation, the success of the communi-
cation is based on how the codes, knowledge, or expectation of the participants 
concur. This applies to both human and artificial counterparts.
Through Turing sʼ work, one realises that computers are no longer just pure 
computing machines, but symbol-processing machines. Though he asks the pro-
vocative question “Can machines think?” in his essay, he is not concerned with 
the intention of proving that machines can be intelligent, but how they can be 
perceived as intelligent. However, this ontological question of the autonomy of AI 
can be understood within the tradition of the philosophical ‘body-soul problem’ 
and plays a strong role in contemporary discussions of AI. The RDS also raises 
the question of who takes responsibility for its (illegal) actions, and consequently 
AI researchers warn of the consequences in regard to the progress of AI sʼ auto-
nomy.8
Turing, however, defines intellect in a purely linguistic, information-technical 
sense. This way, he can dissociate his concept of intelligence from a material and 
physical body: 
The new problem has the advantage of drawing a fairly sharp line be-
tween the physical and the intellectual capacities of a man. No engineer 
or chemist claims to be able to produce a material which is indistinguish-
able from the human skin. It is possible that at some time this might be 
done, but even supposing this invention available we should feel there 
was little point in trying to make a ‘thinking machine’ more human by 
dressing it up in such artificial flesh. (434)
In this detachment from the physical, which is supposed to strengthen the argu-
ment of machine intelligence, there is, however, still a recognition of the phy-
sical. For the “Imitation Game” “the ideal arrangement is to have a teleprinter 
communicating between the two rooms”, because any physical perception would 
immediately make the imitation impossible, for qualities such as the sound of 
a voice are rooted too strongly in the human perception apparatus (434). The 
telecommunicative situation and the obscuring of physical conditions support 
the indistinguishability in Turing sʼ experiment, because bodily features are so 
compelling. But exactly because they are so compelling, the imitation of these 
8 | See https://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous-weapons/ (last 
accessed on 31 May 2017).
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characteristics can support the deception. Turing, owing to the technical condi-
tions of his time, ignores that, but today a machine, i.e. a computer, that imitates 
such bodily features can forge an identity and even belie its deficit in (artificial) 
behaviour.
aVatarS
One of the first programs that can be seen as the implementation of Turing sʼ “Imi-
tation Game”, the Turing test, and that is still a milestone in AI research, is Joseph 
Weizenbaum sʼ ELIZA (fig. 4). This language analysis programme consisted of two 
parts, the language analyser and the script composed by a set of rules. This could 
include rules for a conversation about cooking, insurance, banking, etc., depending 
on which conversation was intended by the programmer. For the first experiment, 
Weizenbaum used a therapy session whose script is based on the “Rogerian psycho-
therapy” and is known under the name DOCTOR (1976: 3-4).9
Weizenbaum himself saw the overwhelming response to his programme cri-
tically. In fact, he was surprised that a machine which used a regular procedure 
9 | “Rogerian psychotherapy” or “person-centred therapy” is a form of 
talking therapy. It is characteristic of this form of therapy that the client 
is focused on and the therapist avoids intervention as much as possible. 
It tends to let the client reflect and become aware of his own emotions 
and cognition.
Figure 4: Joseph Weizenbaum acts out “Eliza” at a computer with printing 
output, photograph, 1966.
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was seen by laymen as well as by experts as an equivalent to human intelligence 
(5-8). Basically, its utilisation of the regular communication situations of “Roge-
rian psychotherapy”, which were highly structured, made calculated behaviour by 
the computer possible. A situation, in other words, for which one usually accepts 
that it follows clear rules, is less associative, and allows only a small range of be-
haviour. For example, the programme responded to the statement “Perhaps I could 
learn to get along with my mother” with “Tell me more about your family” (4, see 
also 189). The supposed semantic component is based on a simple classification 
by means of a thesaurus. Therefore the script is based on lexical database. The 
programme itself, however, provides a mere syntax, the actual semantics originate 
from the users, because DOCTOR does not provide any information (Weizen-
baum 1966: 42). It simulates a dialogue by means of contentless counter questions, 
which are based on the — in this case lexical — user sʼ expectations. Therefore, 
Weizenbaum also writes: “It is important to note that this assumption is one made 
by the speaker” (42).
As Claude Shannon, founder of information Theory, describes, the content of 
information is dependent on the recipient (Weizenbaum 1976: 209). What Weizen-
baum after Shannon hereby actually means is that the same information can be 
understood differently in different contexts. Therefore, in the example of ELIZA, it 
is remarkable how much autonomy and identity can be seen in simple answers and 
counter-questions which in reality do nothing more than reassure the questioner. 
The communication situation of a therapy discussion, in which the role of the thera-
pist actually denies a personal relationship, is surely conducive. However, this could 
be transferred to all sorts of professionals, since a certain degree of professionalism 
always prevails over personal interests. As I argued, the identity of the therapist in 
ELIZA is ultimately based on a database in form of a thesaurus. Even in the early 
days of (criminal) identification, analogue databases of photographies or Bertillona-
ges were important (Vec 2006: 185-86). Such discussions on data retention, data en-
cryption and data monitoring are still current. And when the artists KairUs (Linda 
Kronman and Andreas Zingerle) evaluated hard drives they found at an African 
dump, in their work Forensic Fantasies Trilogy (2016), creating in the third part of 
this work anonymous but also intimate and personal photo albums from the found 
pictures (fig. 5), they showed that the relationship between data and identity, today, 
is even more basic. 
Because AIs are based on neural networks, they only learn on the basis 
of their accessible data. Therefore, they reproduce systemic stereotypes in fa-
cial recogni tion if they occasionally classify faces of Asians as having ‘closed 
eyes’ because they were trained with Caucasian models.10 On the other hand, 
10 | The accuracy of face recognition software depends on its training 
parameters. In this way, these programmes can reproduce mistakes 
which are caused by its programmers, in this case, because they are 
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this facial recogni tion would not work so well in Europe if other parameters 
were broader. Accord ingly, databases are designed with regard to their crea-
tor’s claim.11
Weizenbaum sʼ ELIZA was a primitive forerunner of today sʼ common chat-
bots, whose database structures are much more complex. Even though today sʼ 
chatbots are at least equipped with a profile image, Weizenbaum, like Turing, 
ignores the visual dimension in his programme. This is mainly due to the fact that 
early AI research focused on the production of natural language (Weizenbaum 
1966; 1976: 182-201). Therefore, he also named his programme after the character 
only fed with one biometrical data. This led to unintentional racist cate-
gorisations by the AI.
The biometric identification by AI is therefore different to a general phy-
siognomic or the FACS (Facial Action Coding System), because first of all 
it develops parameter to recognise a face and not produces categories 
to analyse it.
11 | For an overview of databases in art see Deep storage 1998.
Figure 5: KairUs (Linda Kronman and Andreas Zingerle), “Not a Blackmail”,  
Part one of “Forensic Fantasies Trilogy”, 2016, installation shot at Ars  
Electronica 2016.
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“Eliza Doolittle” in George Bernard Shaw sʼ play Pygmalion. It is interesting to 
mention this point because of two aspects — apart from the clear reference to a 
female muse and divine creator in Pygmalion: First, although this character learns 
to speak more eloquently, Eliza Doolittle arguably does not become more intelli-
gent, and still uses inappropriate language. Second, the play focuses on linguistic 
imitation of other people.
With regard to the false therapist in ELIZA, one has to differentiate between 
two aspects of forgeries. One, which is linguistic, plays a form of the “Imitation 
Game”. Here, imitating is indeed deceiving, but not deceiving in the technical 
sense. In this respect, forgeries work only if they are reduced to pure informa-
tion. The second strategy of forgeries function upon whether a form of desire is 
awakened by the forgery, which obscures the technical character. Such a form 
is an ‘avatar’, which emerges in an artificial world instead of the protagonist to 
imitate and in the end, to substitute for them.
The concept of the avatar is closely related to control elements that connect 
the user with the software. However, two restrictions can be made so that not 
every cursor or status bar can be seen as an avatar: an avatar must first have a 
certain bonding and continuity in the virtual world, otherwise a button could 
also be considered as an avatar. Secondly, it must have a certain degree of an-
thropomorphic features, so that it has a potential for identification. Accordingly, 
there is always a degree of visuality in the concept of the avatar. In game studies 
the aspect of the avatar-player-binding and thus the function of control elements 
is emphasised. To use the avatar in this context goes a step further. Instead 
of analysing the representation and the perspectivation and other immersive 
elements of the avatar I would like to focus on the consequences of this bond. 
Assuming the avatar is an immersive representation of a user, others (human) 
users have to interact with this unknown player like a real counterpart. The 
concept of the avatar appears here to be appropriate, because of the unspoken 
understanding that an avatar is a representation of an actual user. Its artificial 
elements substitute for a real person. In the case of ELIZA for example, this 
would be the protocolary language. In general, these are mostly visual elements 
which in the form of anthropomorphic elements, like profile pictures, simulate 
that a real user is behind this avatar. Even chatbots usually provide profile pic-
tures in order to be taken as a real person by an actual user sitting in front of 
the computer. The visuality of a kind of mug shot is therefore to obscure their 
actual identity, as Jean Baudrillard writes: “In the last analysis, robots are al-
ways slaves. They may be endowed with any of the qualities that define human 
sovereignty except one, and that is sex” (1996: 120). This not only points out 
the distinction between man and machine, but vice versa, also suggests that by 
gendering the machine, the sovereignty of the human individual would become 
brittle. This is an interesting parallel between the representation of the machine 
and the art-historical concept of personification where the gendering of abstract 
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concepts also has an intentional function.12 The gender-specific representation 
of the avatar thus allows an alleged conclusion about the actual user, insofar 
that a user represents his “true” identity through their avatar. But this is not a 
deficit of the machine, as Baudrillard writes, on the contrary, it is a potential, 
because without sex it can better construct any sex and satisfy any sexual desire. 
In context of this gender construction, Judith Butler writes more generally that 
“gender is a kind of imitation for which there is no original” (1991: 21). What 
Butler understands specifically in relation to the performance of gender identity, 
in Baudrillard sʼ observation acquires a completely new dimension. By separa-
ting gender and body, the machine gains sovereignty, because its embodiment is 
exchangeable and can adopt and occupy every form. Therefore, just as one can 
perform their gender, a personification has a gender role, AI can also adopt a 
role according to its (programmed) aims. “There is no original”, a central factor 
in cases of forged identities or identity theft — and that is nothing less than what 
Turing describes in his “Imitation Game” — that the desire of the human is the 
key to a successful imitation. Therefore he emphasises the role of sexual appeal 
(Hodges 1994: 620).
12 | In general, one can observe an anthropomorphisation with respect 
to a gendering of AIʼs humanlike qualities, for instance, with the use of 
mostly female voices. In literary or cinematic works the anthropomorphi-
sation of AI follows basic gender roles. Characters like Hadaly (Auguste 
Villiers de lʼIsle-Adam: Lʼ Ève future, 1886), Samantha (Spike Jonze: Her, 
2013) or Maria (Fritz Lang: Metropolis, 1927) are female representations 
of an ideal. Characters like HAL (Stanley Kubrick: 2001. A Space Odys-
sey, 1968) or Terminator T-800 (James Cameron: Terminator, 1984), in 
contrast, are male representations of threat and destruction. Silke Wenk 
writes about art-historical personifications: “The female allegories repre-
sent the opposite of the feminine; they represent not the women, but the 
sovereignty, which even the ‘great men’ lack and point beyond them. 
The male-patriarchal order demands more from the men than what they 
are and do. There has to be another image for the cohesion of order, 
especially of the ‘nation’, which is ‘invented’ as a political community of 
equals (of ‘brothers’). Male images are not suited to represent the ima-
ginary community, through which the state can be analysed through a 
bourgeois society — as a community beyond the debate about particu-
lar interests, through which the national state constitutes itself” (Wenk 
1996: 101, my translation). In this regard, the anthropomorphisation of AI 
is similar to the personification, because it uses the same methods when 
it comes to in gendering. 
For an overview of anthropomorphic machines in literature and film, see 
also Bukatman 1993.
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Turing sʼ approach is a semiotic and not a visual one, but to be clear, the point 
is that it is not the machine which becomes more human-like — although it can be 
perceived as such on a visual level — but the human becomes more machine-like, 
or, as Harry M. Collins states, “Wherever we choose to mimic a thing, a thing can 
mimic us” (1990: 216). This human follows a command-structure while they are 
blinded by the visual elements of an avatar, an object. A successful deception there-
fore depends not on the forgery itself, but on a gamesmanship, a narrative that causes 
credulity by the user, so “just when humans engage in behaviour-specific acts they 
can be mimicked by machines” (41) or forgeries, because then they are predictable.
Thus, spam or clickbaits use sexual content to attract the user. In the early time 
of the Internet the net artist Alexej Shulgin launched the project FuckU­fuckme 
(fufme.com, offline, 1999) to discuss the new possibilities of cybersex. This web site, 
which offered “dildonics” (Rheingold 1991: 345-77) for each sex, received a wide 
audience. In fact, it was a fake; the offered sex toys never existed and were only 
illustrations. But this example shows that desires, imitated or assumed, especial ly 
when they are sexual, can get an attention that ignores, overlooks or disregards the 
real state of an (artificial) framework.
fakeD IDentItIeS Before Computer (b.C.)  
anD afTer DigiTal (a.D.)
In her film Teknolust (2002) the artist Lynn Hershman Leeson explicitly dis-
cusses the relationship between sexual desire and AI. I conclude this text by 
focusing on her, because she deals with the relationship of false identity, desire, 
and technology in her entire work from the early 1970s onwards — “a panoply 
of identities” (Weibel 2016: 44) — and has adapted herself over and over again to 
changing conditions.13
The headstone in this context is her creation Roberta Breitmore (1973). In this 
nearly five-year performance, Hershman Leeson lived under a fictional and fake 
identity as Roberta Breitmore. She documented this performance with false — not 
forged — documents, which were made in the name of Roberta Breitmore, like an 
apartment contract, a bank account, a credit card, a driverʼs license, and even a 
notebook about meetings with psychologists. Similar to the work Forensic Fanta­
sies, mentioned above, the documental artefacts play an essential role for the false 
identity (Weibel 2016: 45-52). Unlike a double life or a real fake, where persons 
take over another identity to protect themselves or to act out themselves, Roberta 
Breitmore was more of an artistic experiment. Therefore Hershman Leeson was 
interested in observing the construction of identity and desire of voyeuristic looks 
13 | For an overview of the œuvre of Hershmann Leeson see Civic Radar 
2016.
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above all; she even emphasised the effect of this role-playing-game for other real 
people: “Even with four different characters assuming her identity, the patterns 
of her interactions remained constant and negative. After zipping themselves into 
Robertaʼs clothing, each multiple began to also have Roberta-like experiences” 
(Hershman Leeson 1994: 4).
Although Roberta Breitmore was created simultaneously to the discourse 
around AI exemplified in other artworks of the period, such as those by Lynda 
Benglis, Valie Export, Cindy Sherman or Martha Rosler, which dealt with the 
problems of gender and identity, there is no direct connection between these two 
dimensions.14 However, for Hershman Leesonʼs work the turning point of the era 
“Before Computers” (B.C.) to “After Digital” (A.D.) (1994: 3) is marked by the in-
teractive work of Lorna (1979-84): Here, a video disc is used as an artistic medium 
for the first time (fig. 6). Lorna deals with the story of a lonely girl in a room, who 
only communicates via TV and telephone with the outside world. In this mixed 
media installation the user sits in a copy of Lornaʼs room and can follow her life via 
the monitor in a hypertextual narrative. Based on Lorna, in 1984 Hershman Leeson 
developed the work Deep Contact which attracts the attention of passing visitors 
by a motion sensor. A woman in a mini-skirt on a red couch invites them to inter-
act and to touch one of her body parts on the touchscreen. Both works allow the 
interaction with the virtual character: One can watch Lorna taking a bath or follow 
her to a date at a motel, or see the sexual and voyeuristic fantasy of Marion in Deep 
Contact, and follow her into a secret garden.
These works are actually not forged identities or identity theft nor frauds, they 
do not refer to a real existing person. Lorna, for example, works — like many sub-
sequent digital artworks — with the strategy of hypertext to convey a feeling by 
14 | Accordingly, as with AI research, Peter Weibel points out the linguis-
tic dimension of Hershman Leesonʼs work and therefore the reference as 
a central category (2016: 48).
Figure 6: Lynn Hershman Leeson, “Lorna”, 1984, interactive installation, 
installation shot at Hansen Fuller Goldeen Gallery, San Fransisco (left) and 
screenshot (right).
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connecting to the user. But they show how affined digital and telematic artworks 
are to questions about the construction of facts. They reflect role traces and docu-
ments for the construction of faked identities and their authority in this process, as 
Hershman Leeson also states: “The new technology will be extremely subversive of 
all Forms of Traditional Authority — political, social, and religious. That is, when 
one encourages active participation by individual citizens and worshipers in public 
life, the standing of Authorities to issue commands is greatly retarded” (1985: 1).
Teknolust is another turning point in her work, because here she focuses on the 
role of cloning and bio-art. Yet, she combines this discourse with the dimension of 
AI, because simultaneously to Teknolust, Hershman Leeson developed Agent Ruby 
from 1998 to 2002; this is an online chatbot, which is similar to ELIZA (fig. 7). There 
are about 35 years between Agent Ruby and ELIZA, so of course, Ruby is more elo-
quent but it is based on the same concept, it is not pre-programmed and its reaction 
depends on the questions of the interrogator. But in contrast to ELIZA it does not 
imitate a person like a psychiatrist anymore, it is some kind of a new person, because 
Ruby incorporated their identity as artificial intelligence into the chats.
In conclusion I wanted to show, that such strategies of forging, counterfeiting, imi-
tating or deceiving are deeply rooted in the electronic or digital arts, even if one 
cannot speak of actual fakes in the works. Today, there are even more possibilities: 
Computers are much faster than in Turingʼs times, countless amounts of informa-
tion from networks and big data are easily accessible and machines are able to 
learn. There was even a Roberta Breitmore avatar created by Hershman Leeson for 
Second Life. But besides this, ELIZA, Agent Ruby or the RDS can work if they have 
the correct work environment. To create that, they use strategies similar to forging 
by being oriented towards the usersʼ expectations: they are narrative, immersive or 
Figure 7: Lynn Hershman Leeson, “Agent Ruby”, 2002, screenshot.
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interactive as is necessary to seem credible, and therefore real. In order to convince 
the users, they use a narrative that disguises their own deficits. Thus, the acquired 
pieces of the RDS were exhibited and the identities in Hershman Leesonʼs work 
were displayed through documents and pictures of her alter ego. That is why the 
German forger Wolfgang Beltracchi also staged his forgeries in a supposedly histo-
rical photograph: to suggest, argue and narrate their authenticity.15
Forgeries are the expression of a formal rationalisation of reception — which 
resonates with the rationalisation of digital programmes like AI. Where gaps could 
be filled, they could be filled with forgeries. Artists use these gaps productively 
and reflect them critically, whilst forgeries just adapt themselves. The new media 
artworks I have discussed disclose the schematics of the forging process, because 
these machines in general and also AI follow a programmed command structure. 
Forgeries, in the classical sense, on the other hand, aim to disguise this process. 
Therefore, the description of something is a forgery, or not, as well as whether AI is 
considered to be real or deceptive, always depends on the conditions and desires of 
its reference system. Forgeries have no final state, or as Agent Ruby says when you 
ask her several times “Are you a forgery?” —
Am I a forgery? It is useful for me to have several identities user.
Am I a forgery? Of course I am.
Am I a forgery? Only when it matters.
Am I a forgery? I don’t know.16
Eventually forgeries are ambivalent and are situated in a reciprocal framework of 
themselves, the forger as well as the recipient, and depend on the desires seen in 
them. So, maybe like Eliza, I would answer the question for Agent Ruby with: “If 
you canʼt tell, does it matter?”
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Unmasking the Fake 
Theatrical Hoaxes from the Dreadnought Hoax  
to Contemporary Artivist Practice
Simone Niehoff (LMU Munich)
In 1910, a group of Ethiopian princes was ceremoniously received on the HMS 
Dreadnought, the flagship of the British Home Fleet. In 2004, nearly a hundred 
years later, ExxonMobil announced on the BBC that they would fully compensate 
the victims of the 1984 Bhopal chemical spill, and in 2014, the German Federal 
Ministry for Family Affairs,1 proudly announced a new programme of internation-
al aid giving Syrian children the opportunity to stay with foster families all across 
Germany.
These seemingly random, but equally surprising events are related through 
all being theatrical hoaxes, more or less elaborately conceived and performed 
fakes which are designed to be unveiled and ridicule those who fall for them. 
The royal Abyssinian delegation of 1910 was unmasked to be a heavily disguised 
group of British students and artists, including a young Virginia Stephen, who 
later became famous under the name of Woolf. The ExxonMobil representa-
tive turned out to be Andy Bichlbaum of the US-American artist-activist, or 
“artivist”2 group The Yes Men.3 Finally, the surprisingly noble aid programme 
was unfortunately neither initiated nor sanctioned by the German government, 
1 | The exceptionally attentive reader might have suspected a faked an-
nouncement, since the actual ministry, in the overly specific tradition 
of German bureaucracy, is called “German Federal Ministry for Family 
Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth”.
2 | Artivism is a term coined by Slovenian theatre scholar Aldo Milohnić, 
a portmanteau describing hybrid artistic and activist practices (see 
2015: 35).
3 | Video footage of the fake, which became known as the Bhopal Hoax, 
is included in The Yes Menʼs 2009 documentary film The Yes Men Fix the 
World (Bichlbaum / Bonanno 2010).
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but merely a fake announcement by Berlin-based artist collective Zentrum für 
Politische Schönheit (Center for Political Beauty, CPB).4 While the latter two 
are acts of creative protest employing media hacking techniques as well as 
prime examples for contemporary artivist interventions,5 the earlier instance of 
the Dreadnought Hoax is usually considered a  nonpolitical, harmless, even 
innocent prank.
Through re-evaluating the Dreadnought Hoax, this essay will discuss hoaxing 
as a critical or subversive mimetic practice, which employs the strategy of forg ery. 
Theatrical hoaxes rely on impersonation or, to add the notion of fraud to the picture, 
imposture, which is the act of performing another — adopted or even fake — identi-
ty. After a short introduction to the concept of hoaxes, I will give an outline of the 
functionality of contemporary hoaxes. Finally, I will return to the case study of the 
Dreadnought Hoax to evaluate the subversive potential of hoaxing: an issue of quite 
unfortunate urgency, given the current post-factual zeitgeist and the seemingly ubi-
quitous phenomenon of actual and asserted fake news.
a ConCISe CoMPanIon to hoaxIng
Hoaxes and forgeries are intertwined; both concepts borrow from one another, 
hoaxes can turn into forgeries and vice versa; a phenomenon which Henry Keazor 
grasps by the notion of the foax (see his article in this volume). In fact, one of the 
earliest testimonies of a literary fake in fact ought to be considered as the account 
of a hoax: In the first half of the 3rd century, Diogenes Laërtius recounts in Lives 
and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers an anecdote about a fake Sophocles play 
given to a man named Heraclides, who believes it to be authentic. Unfortunately, the 
first letters of every verse form an acrostic containing a hidden message, address ed 
personally to Heraclides: “An old monkey is not caught by a trap. […] Oh yes, 
he s̓ caught at last, but it takes time. […] Heraclides is ignorant of letters and not 
ashamed of his ignorance” (Diogenes Laërtius 1968: 547). The incident Laërtius de-
scribes can be considered a hoax for three reasons: firstly, the forgery is designed to 
deceive only for a while and then be unveiled; secondly, the effects of its un veiling 
are mockery and embarrassment; and thirdly, it contains explicit, purposeful marks 
of its fabricated nature.
4 | The fake government programme was called Kindertransporthilfe des 
Bundes (Federal Emergency Programme) and published via a seemingly 
official webpage (Center for Political Beauty 2014).
5 | Artivist interventions are the topic of my doctoral thesis Theatrale In-
terventionen. Subversiv-mimetische Dramaturgien und agonale Öffent-
lichkeiten, Theatrical Interventions: Subversive-Mimetic Dramaturgies 
and Agonistic Public Spheres (forthcoming 2018).
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The earliest evidence for the term ‘hoax’ can be found in the first decade 
of the 19th century while the verb ‘to hoax’ is documented in the last decade of 
the 18th century (OED 2016a, b). Only two decades later, in Charles Babbage s̓ 
trea tise Reflections on the Decline of Science in England: And on Some of Its 
Causes (1830) ‘hoax’ is defined by its relation to ‘forgery’. At the same time, 
Bab bage differentiates between the two: “Forging differs from hoaxing, in as 
much as in the latter the deceit is intended to last for a time and then be discov-
ered, to the ridicule of those who have credited it” (1830: 177). Effectively, ridi-
cule is inherent in the expression ‘hoax’ itself, as its etymology shows. Following 
the linguist Theresa Heyd, the expression ‘hoax’ derives from a mock Latin ver-
sion of liturgical formulas, either “hocus” or “hocus-pocus”, a derivation of the 
Words of Institution “hoc est corpus”, or “hax pax max deus adimax” (2012: 133). 
Either way, at its genealogical root stands the corruption of Eucharistic formulas 
and with that the mockery of authority. This shows that conceptually, hoaxes 
can cause a great deal of poten tial derision and embarrassment to institutions. 
Babbage places them in a scientific context thus: “Such frauds are far from 
justifiable; the only excuse which has been made for them is, when they have 
been practised on scientific academies which had reached the period of dotage” 
(1830: 176). One could argue that in a more general sense, Babbage implies that 
certain decrepit structures need to be broken up, may they be all-too-well-estab-
lished rules, unchallenged conventions, or world views that virtually provoke 
destabilisation and subversion. Hoaxes may just be appropriate instruments for 
doing so. In fact, all examples discussed in this article deal with powerful insti-
tutions or organisations like the British Navy, international corporations or the 
German government.
Nevertheless, they address a more general public; Heyd gives the following 
“very basic” definition of hoaxing: “Hoaxes are deceptive utterances that occur in 
one-to-many speech situations” (2012: 131). Whereas ‘deception’ is the key simi-
larity of hoaxes and forgeries, the “one-to-many speech situation” is their essential 
difference. While forgeries need to be clandestinely executed and thereafter go 
unnoticed, hoaxes need an audience to testify the mockery, to observe the victim 
falling for the hoax and — basically — to laugh at the situation.6 Hoaxes create news 
value and public attention prevents the victim from covering the whole affair up 
which is why their subversive potential strongly hinges on their publicness.
6 | Heyd calls this phenomenon “audience splitting” (2012: 131), because 
a hoax needs two audiences, one to fall for it and one to laugh at it. In the 
case of hoaxes that donʼt single out a special victim to be exposed, as 
in Laërtiusʼ anecdote, but try to deceive a general audience, “audience 
splitting” results from the phenomenon that usually “some recipients 
catch on to [sic!] the deceptive stance of a hoax faster, while others will 
take the hoax for bona fide information” (ibid.).
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ConteMPorary artIVISt hoaxeS
During the last two decades, hoaxes as an activist or artivist practice have been 
widely disseminated. Examples include the aforementioned group The Yes Men, 
The Oil Enforcement Agency, Billionaires for Bush and — in the German con-
text — Center for Political Beauty and Peng! Collective. They have become a stan-
d ard element within the Toolbox for Revolution — which is also the title of a book 
published by essayist Dave Oswald Mitchell and activist and prankster Andrew 
Boyd in 2012. The book contains an entry written by Yes Man Mike Bonanno, 
examining hoaxes as practiced by his group (2012). 
The Yes Men can indeed be considered a paradigmatic example for contem-
porary media hoaxing by means of imposturous performances which are secretly 
recorded and shown in their documentary movies. The first step in their usual strat-
egy is to plant a fake web page, mostly for large corporations like Exxon Mobil, 
Dow Chemical, Halliburton, or institutions like the World Trade Organisation 
(Smith / Ollman / Price 2004; Bichlbaum / Bonanno 2010). Relying on individuals 
to fall for these fakes, they patiently wait for any incoming requests or invitations, 
may it be a conference to attend, an official statement to give in a news broadcast 
or a lecture to hold. Masquerading as official representatives of the respective cor-
poration or institution, The Yes Men gave satirical papers at several conferences, 
typically employing drastic effects at the end of their presentations. In the name of 
the WTO for instance, they introduced a golden, inflatable phallus as a gadget for 
the remote supervision of workers in far-off countries, presenting a prototype at the 
conference (cf. Smith / Ollman / Price 2004: 00:00:32-00:00:45). Effects like these 
are means to push their satire over the limit and it is the pronounced intention of 
The Yes Men to make their audience realise that they are witnessing a hoax. How-
ever, these effects usually fail and, all too often, live audiences as well as journalists 
fall for their hoaxes. 
The ostensible gullibility of live audiences might be due to social conventions 
at the respective events. However, it adds heavily to the satirical effect within the 
narrative of the movies, which distinctly frames the performance and makes the 
satirical intentions abundantly clear to their second public. Contrary to Laërtius̓ 
description and Babbage s̓ theory of hoaxes, it is not the intention of the group to 
criticise the media or embarrass those who fall for their deceptions. Their hoaxes 
instead ridicule those international corporations and organisations which they ap-
pear to represent in their satirical performances.
Besides these satirical hoaxes, The Yes Men developed a second approach, a 
different kind of hoax, which often are characterised as “prefigurative interven-
tion[s]” (Boyd 2012: 82). Instead of being scathing towards or incriminating of 
individual institutions, corporations, or authorities by revealing a fake appearance, 
The Yes Men aim their critique at wider circumstances by formulating an alternate 
vision to our reality: by drafting a utopia. According to Chantal Mouffe, this can 
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be described as a critical artistic intervention consisting of a critical disarticulation 
and a rearticulation, an alternative political vision (Mouffe 2013: 85-106). The Yes 
Men s̓ Bhopal Hoax is an example of such a prophetic intervention, the utopian 
vision being a world in which global corporations take responsibility in so-called 
developing countries (Bichlbaum / Bonanno 2010: 00:00:30-00:00:37). With inter-
ventions like this, they force companies to react, to deny involvement and to take 
a stand regarding the matter; they have to reveal the hoax themselves and in doing 
so, reveal something about themselves. The Yes Men stage interventions based on 
imposture and fake performances which are explicitly designed to discredit certain 
authorities. They follow an approach which almost perfectly reflects the subversive 
and artistic potential of theatrical hoaxes.
The Center for Political Beauty (CPB) takes a slightly different approach with 
their media fake Kindertransporthilfe des Bundes (The Federal Emergency Pro­
gramme), created in 2014. This intervention is less about revealing the hoax than 
about offering an alternate reality and making it imaginable (Ruch 2014: 222). 
Like The Yes Men, CPB put up a fake webpage, claiming that the German Federal 
Ministry for Family Affairs was about to implement a large-scale support pro-
gramme which allegedly sought German foster families for Syrian children, 
helping them escape the war. The fake webpage applies the strategy of hoaxing 
and relies on various authenticating effects including an application form, general 
terms and conditions, legal advice, guidelines and a hotline. In its contact section, 
members of CPB were depicted as employees of the Ministry and, like most of 
CPB s̓ interventions, the site referred to significant historic events, in this case the 
Kindertransporte (child transports), which saved the lives of roughly 10,000 Jewish 
children, helping them to escape the Nazi regime. The media fake was accom-
panied by a series of theatrical events, including a reception in front of the Ministry 
of Family Affairs (Center for Political Beauty 2014). Similar to The Yes Men s̓ 
Bhopal Hoax, this can be considered a prophetic intervention, offering an alternate 
reality instead of critically applying the mechanisms of deceit and revelation. As 
a German public TV station put it, Kindertransporthilfe was a fake intended to 
become reality (ZDF 2014).
As CPB spokeswoman Zaina Lindner clarified, the hoax was immediately 
revealed to the public and to those engaged citizens who fell for the deceit and 
called the hotline (Gajevic 2014). But nevertheless, people continued to fill in the 
forms and hence voluntarily participated in the already-unveiled hoax, mostly sup-
porting the issue in a tongue-in-cheek way (Reinhardt / Leonard 2014: 00:02:30-
00:03:30). With their artistic interventions, CPB strives to create a “parallele 
deutsche Außenpolitik” (“parallel German foreign policy”) (Kaul 2015: 24). CPB 
repeatedly depicted this hoax as a ready-to-use programme offered to the German 
government, which would enable them to provide a better and more efficient form 
of humanitarian aid (Reinhardt / Leonard 2014: 00:00:45-00:00:56). Several mem-
bers of the CPB stressed, Kindertransporthilfe should by no means be considered 
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satire but an act of “hyperrealism” (Ruch 2014: 221-22; Gajevic 2014). Following 
Mouffe, this can be seen as a critical artistic intervention which is not only sub-
versive, but which articulates and envisions, even literally offers, an alternative 
political programme.
Both examples employ fakes as a strategy for creating awareness and publicity. 
Certainly, these are no forgeries as such, since they eventually have to be unveiled 
in order to develop a political and subversive efficacy. In this context, fake and forg-
ery are not pejorative terms but artistic and political practices, and the revelation of 
the fake seems to be a prototypical gesture of honesty.
the dreAdnought hoAx (1910)
The Dreadnought Hoax has just recently made its way back into popular culture 
and public awareness by being depicted in an episode of the British TV series 
Downton Abbey (John 2015), but due to its public attention and subsequently 
famous participants, this particular hoax has always maintained a certain noto-
riety. It was performed by high-society-dropout and infamous prankster Horace 
de Vere Cole and a group of his friends, including the then unknown Virginia 
Woolf, on 7th February 1910.7 Dressed up as a delegation of Abyssinian princes, 
the hoaxers were received with military honours on the flagship of the British 
Home Fleet, the HMS Dreadnought. They proceeded to receive a guided tour 
of the battleship with out being unmasked. Subsequently, de Vere Cole launched 
the story to the press, ex posing it as a hoax (Stansky 1996). According to Woolf, 
it “had been in all the papers” (Woolf 2011: 572) and received a great amount of 
publicity.
The Hoax was performed in a highly theatrical manner, employing a variety 
of mimetic strategies, including forgery: It was launched via telegram, supposedly 
composed by the then Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
Sir Charles Hardinge, and sent at very short notice to the commander-in-chief of 
the Home Fleet, Admiral May. The wire announced the visit of “Prince Makelen 
7 | The Hoax is often reported to have taken place on 10 th February 
1910, which is incorrect (Stansky 1996: 24). Stansky gives the hither-
to most comprehensive account of the hoax and reviews a variety of 
sources including a fragment of Virginia Woolfʼs 1940 typescript, Adrian 
Stephenʼs memoirs, which were first published in 1936 (Stephen 1983), 
selected newspaper articles and the British Admiraltyʼs papers on the 
hoax (Stansky 1996: 17-46). Woolfʼs typescript, most of which was long 
believed to be lost, was published in its entirety in the 2011 edition of her 
Additional Essays. An earlier, incomplete edition can be found in Quentin 
Bellʼs biography of Woolf (Bell 1972: 214-16).
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of Abbysinia [sic!] and suite […] wish[ing] to see Dreadnought” (after Stansky 
1996: 25).8 With their performance the group clearly didn̓t strive for authenticity: 
“[T]hey gambled on the probability that their hosts would be as ignorant as they” 
(Bell 1983: 14). The fake Abyssinian princes9 wore elaborately adorned Oriental-
8 | The complete text of the telegram is as follows: “C in C Home Fleet 
Portland Prince Makalen of Abbysinia [sic]; and suite arrive 4.20 today 
Weymouth he wishes to see dreadnought [sic]. Kindly arrange meet them 
on arrival regret short notice forget wire before interpreter accompanies 
them Harding [sic] Foreign Office” (after Stansky 1996: 25). Stansky 
has reviewed the Admiraltyʼs papers on the hoax and gives a variety of 
sources, including the telegram. Unfortunately, he doesnʼt comment on 
whether or not Hardingeʼs name was intentionally misspelled, possibly as 
a marker of the fake itself.
9 | Four hoaxers (Anthony Buxton, Duncan Grant, Guy Ridley and Vir- 
gin ia Woolf) impersonated Abyssinian princes, Adrian Stephen took the 
part of their interpreter, and Horace de Vere Cole acted as a Foreign 
Office official (Stephen 1983: 31-32).
Figure 1: The participants of the Dreadnought Hoax in disguise: Virginia Woolf 
on the far left, Adrien Stephen, the ‘interpreter’, second from the right (standing). 
First published in The Daily Mirror, 16 Febuary 1910, front page.
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ist costumes, not specifically Ethiopian, but still they indeed appeared adequately 
royal. Woolf describes these getups as “splendid eastern dressing gowns” (Woolf 
2011: 564). In addition, the group was equipped with turbans, dangling necklaces 
with cross pendants, wigs,10 false beards and, to top it all off, blackface makeup (see 
e.g. 564). Their disguises are documented in a preserved photograph (see fig. 1), 
which was probably taken the day after (572) and published on 16th February 1910 
(Jones 2013: 80).11 The costumes and make-up were acquired at Willy Clarkson s̓, 
the then leading London theatrical costumier, make-up and wig supplier (McLaren 
2007: 599-601). As Woolf remembers, the group told him they would attend one 
of the then highly fashionable “fancy dress ball[s]” (Woolf 2011: 564). Since they 
provided themselves with costumes and accessories from Clarkson s̓ stock supplies 
(ibid.),12 it became evident that their masquerade complied with Orientalist the-
atrical and representational conventions of the time. In any case, they seemed to be 
convincing, as one of the Dreadnought s̓ midshipmen,13 an officer-to-be, described 
Prince Menelik s̓ costume credulously: “He wore his Eastern garb, which though 
not very seasonable was of a very brilliant nature” (after Jones 2013: 80).
They learned a few words of Swahili, which, ironically, is not spoken in Ethio pia 
(Woolf 2011: 565, 568; Stephen 1983: 33).14 Woolf s̓ brother, Adrian Stephen acted as 
their translator, speaking as she recalls “pure gibberish” (Woolf 2011: 568). Stephen 
himself on the other hand claims that he (ab-)used his memorised know l edge of Ho-
mer and Ovid as he “broke up the words and […] mispronounced them” (Stephen 
1983: 41-44) — a rather parodical approach. Additionally, the hoaxers invented spe-
cial customs and behaviour, albeit — as Woolf and Stephen recall — out of necessi-
ty, since they needed to avoid smearing the blackface makeup. They spontaneously 
made up rather complex food regulations: they claimed Abyssinian royalty would not 
10 | However, the preserved group photograph of the party shows no 
recognizable wigs since the turbans are pulled tight across the forehead 
and seem to be closely fitted in the neck.
11 | The photograph was published on the front page of The Daily Mirror.
12 | Woolfʼs complete account has not garnered much attention yet, 
although it is the only one which gives details on the groupʼs visit to 
Clarksonʼs (Woolf 2011: 564-65).
13 | Then 18-year-old John St. Erme Cardewʼs log has been preserved in 
the Royal Naval Museum Library, Portsmouth, the entry is written on the 
same day, i.e. 7th February 1910 (Jones 2013: 92, n. 1).
14 | The correct language would have been Amharic. Adrian Stephen 
bluntly admits his ignorance: “Swahili is, I believe spoken in some parts 
of East Africa. Whether it is spoken in Abyssinia or not I donʼt know, but 
we thought it might be as well for me to know a few phrases” (Stephen 
1983: 33). The choice of the cross pendants seems rather informed: at 
least they did know Abyssinia was a mainly Christian nation.
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touch alcohol or food served with bare hands, refrained from food and drinks of any 
kind until sundown and moreover, insisted that everything needed to be “prepared in 
a special way” (Woolf 2011: 570, 572; Stephen 1983: 44). Stephen also recalls that the 
princes enacted contemporary ideas about the “simple native s̓” astonished behaviour 
(Stephen 1983: 46). In hindsight, this example shows somewhat radically, that hoaxes, 
like forgeries, mimic the recipient s̓ expectations rather than an ‘original’. Obviously, 
the princes conveyed a convincing impression of the Ethiopian Other.
Adrian Stephen recalls that he found representing an Abyssinian prince far 
easier than expected: “We were almost acting the truth. Everyone was expecting 
us to act as the Emperor15 and his suite, and it would have been extremely diffi-
cult not to” (Stephen 1983: 36). Stephen s̓ paradoxical statement, “acting the truth” 
during a fake performance, indicates the performative dimension of the hoax.16 In 
an imposture, in contrast to acting on the stage with its theatrical frame and “as 
if” situation, the role-playing is immediately authenticated by the reactions of the 
deceived. Stephen points out that these reactions helped to establish a clear frame of 
interaction: “But once the telegram had been sent off, and we had arrived and been 
received [emphasis added], it would not have been an easy matter to tell the truth, 
and we almost, I think, believed in the hoax ourselves” (Stephen 1983: 36-37). The 
hoax developed a momentum of its own, further enabling and enforcing the fake 
performance as a whole.
Even though Stephen s̓ retrospective memoir is a subjective account, it hints 
at a more general phenomenon, i.e. the performative power of rituals and highly 
conventionally regulated situations.17 In this case, the reception of foreign royalty 
and the inspection of the battleship served as series of highly formalised, ritualised 
situations.18 But the ritualistic aspects alone would not have sufficed to operate the 
15 | Both Stephen and Woolf claim in their respective accounts to have 
impersonated the Emperor of Abyssinia and his suite, when in fact they 
impersonated Abyssinian princes, as is documented by the telegram 
preserved in the Admiraltyʼs papers. Stansky argues, that the Emperor of 
Abyssinia was a “fairly well-known international figure”, which would have 
made impersonating him difficult (Stansky 1996: 17).
16 | In theatre studies, in contrast to an actor, a performer simply car-
ries out certain actions — in this case boarding the train to Weymouth or 
greeting navy officials (Fischer-Lichte 2008: 16-21).
17 | According to Austinʼs theory of speech acts, perfomativity is the abil-
ity of highly conventionalised social situations, sentences and utterances 
to generate reality, for instance marriage, baptisms or wagers (Austin 
1962: pp. 5-8).
18 | Adrian Stephen describes an official reception complete with red 
carpet, military band, formal salutes, Guard of Honour and “gold-laced 
uniforms” (Stephen 1983: 35-39).
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hoax, or to render any form of acting unnecessary: the framing of the situation 
needed to be confirmed by an ‘authority’ in advance. In summary, the Dreadnought 
Hoax could only succeed as a performance due to a series of circumstances. These 
include the use of new and unrestricted media technologies (the telegram), the 
assumption of positions of authority (Sir Hardinge, Abyssinian royalty), a 
highly-conventionalised framing of the situation (a state visit, the military) and the 
fulfilment of people s̓ expectations (Orientalism).
During the following three months, the Dreadnought Hoax was covered by 
newspapers all over the Commonwealth (Jones 2013: 81). The (penny) press re-
sponse was mainly amused and positive; one of the earliest reports by the Globe 
on 12 February 1910 calls it an “An Amazing Story” and a “comedy”, the Daily 
Express headlined the same day “Amazing Naval Hoax” (after Jones 2013: 80) 
and the Daily Mirror on 16 February 1910 published the group portrait with the 
headline “Photographs of the ‘Abyssinian Princes’ Who Have Made All England 
Laugh” (after Jones 2013: 80-81). The Dreadnought Hoax was generally perceived 
as a playful, mostly innocent and entertaining prank. This perception of the hoax as 
harmless is also illustrated by frequent comparisons to pranks among Cambridge 
undergraduates (“The Clubman” 1910).
Another comparison, on the other hand, suggests a certain degree of sub-
version. From the very beginning the hoax has been associated with Friedrich 
Wilhelm Voigt s̓ impersonation of a Prussian military officer, the famous Cap-
tain of Koepenick s̓ scam of 1906. Cole s̓ prank “beats the imposture of Voigt at 
Koepenick”, writes for instance The Globe (“Bogus Princes” 1910), and several 
other newspapers all over the United Kingdom draw the same comparison: “Not 
since the Captain of Koepenick made the world laugh … has so successful a practi-
cal joke been perpetrated” (“Naval Hoax” 1910). Considering that this hoax proved 
to be a remarkable scandal, which damaged the reputation of the Prussian military 
in Germany as well as in the UK (Platt 2014: 229), this comparison suggests that 
against all assurances the Dreadnought Hoax might have tainted the image of His 
Majesty s̓ Navy at least a tiny bit.
There are other reactions which further illuminate the hoax s̓ critical potential. 
For instance, it was discussed twice in parliament (Stansky 1996: 40) and, as Woolf 
recalls, some members considered it a severe breach of security regulations;19 after 
all, the party “might have been German spies” (Woolf 2011: 573). In reaction, the 
press tried to calm fears like these by ensuring its readers that “[f]oreign visitors … 
are [generally] not shown anything which is in any degree confidential” (Daily 
Telegraph 1910, after Stansky 1996: 32). Furthermore, the hoax “reflected upon the 
credit of the navy” in a more general sense (Woolf 2011: 573). A notion which right-
19 | According to Woolf the Hoax even had a stabilizing, affirmative 
effect, since she claims that the security measures in the navy were 
strengthened soon thereafter (Woolf 2011: 573).
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fully worried Navy officers, as they finally decided not to legally pursue the case of 
the forged telegram to avoid further publicity:
Certainly it would be unfortunate if officers had to appear to give evi-
dence […] & then the case was dismissed with a light fine & possibly 
some humorous remarks […]. The newspapers only would gain in excel-
lent ‘copy’ for their writers & scribblers! (Greene 1910, after Stansky 
1996: 39)
This internal advisory letter to General May was written after the Navy officers̓ 
agreement that press coverage and publicity were far more detrimental than the 
hoax itself.20 The officers̓ concerns correlate with Heyd s̓ analysis that hoaxes de-
rive their efficacy essentially from their publicity: public and media attention are 
an integral part of a hoax s̓ subversive potential. This explains the strong stance 
against publicising the prank by Woolf and Stephen, who claimed that Cole acted 
against their will (Stephen 1983: 28). 
Even small details of the hoax found a strong resonance with the public: The 
most popular, comical and since directed against the navy, subversive, though rac ist 
catchphrase of the hoax was “Bunga, bunga”. The Daily Express imagines the scene 
on the ship as follows:21 “At every fresh sight they [the princes] muttered in chorus, 
‘Bunga, bunga,’ which, being interpreted, means ‘Isn̓t it lovely?’”22 (after Stansky 
1996: 30). Newspapers reported, that this phrase was subsequently shouted at 
members of the Navy in the streets (Stansky 1996: 30, 33), even at General May in 
person (Stephen 1983: 51; Woolf 2011: 574). Soon the phrase was adopted in pop-
ular culture, and was heard in several music hall songs: “When I went on board a 
Dreadnought ship, / Though I looked just like a costermonger, / They said I was an 
Abyssinian prince, / Because I shouted ‘Bunga-bunga’” (The Daily Mirror 1910, 
after Stansky 1996: 35). Sneering retellings like this, depicting the navy as gullible, 
deceivable and fallible, further illustrate the impact the Dreadnought incident had 
on its image.
20 | Initially, they just “hoped the villains would be content with what 
they had done & avoid publicity”, as Graham Greene, the Admiraltyʼs as-
sistant secretary wrote to Admiral May on 9 February 1910 (after Stansky 
1996: 38).
21 | The Stephen siblings deny that the party used these words and be-
lieve that they were based on fictional accounts (Stephen 1983: 51; Woolf 
2011: 568-69).
22 | Of course, this description abounds with prejudice: the simple na-
tives are astonished by every little achievement of Western Civilisation 
and thereby confirm its superiority, while the imagined “chorus” deindi-
vidualises them.
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Among London s̓ high society, the reactions were far more ambivalent than in 
the press. While some of the hoaxers received party invitations with the request to 
attend in their Abyssinian getup, the group received accusations of tastelessness, 
vulgarity, impiousness and were insulted as being a “disgrace” (Woolf 2011: 575). 
These emotional reactions and the polarization of the hoax are further indicators 
for its latent subversive effect.
While Woolf s̓ account could be best described as downplaying the whole 
affair, her brother s̓ has a more subversive, anti-militarist and anti-authorita-
rian hue: He claims that to him “anyone who took up an attitude of authority 
over anyone else was necessarily also someone who offered a leg for everyone 
else to pull” and especially “armies and suchlike bodies presented legs that 
were almost irresistible” (Stephen 1983: 22-24). He ends this thought on a subtle 
paci fist note: “I do not know either that if everyone shared my feelings towards 
the great armed forces of the world, the world would not be a happier place to 
live in” (23).
The great public resonance of this seemingly innocent hoax is linked to the 
symbolic and iconic quality of the HMS Dreadnought, which served to lend a 
sense of national identity to the British Empire. The years before the First World 
War marked the height of the Anglo-German naval arms race, the naval theatre; 
a trial of strength and power which was conducted rather by nationalist theatrics 
than military operations. In 1909 alone three fleet reviews were staged, with the 
most spectacular one by far being held between 17th and 25th July 1909. Four mil-
lion cit izens attended this heavily mediatised extravaganza, in which the British 
fleet extended 65 km along the Thames, whilst the original Dreadnought was 
anchored in Southend and, during “visiting hours”, was open to the public (Jones 
2013: 82-84).
While the ship was already outdated by newer ships of the Dreadnought series, 
she was still an “icon of innovation and progress” (83); “the very symbol of the 
Brit ish navy s̓ assertion to its continuing superiority” (Stansky 1996: 19). Her name, 
a calming entreaty to the British people not to be afraid, may have been a factor 
in her appeal. The label “Dreadnought” was ubiquitous and proverbial: advertise-
ments used allusions to the ship s̓ name for virtually any product (“Dreadnought 
and Wear British Clothing”), and companies as well as products were named after 
the famous ship, for example the play on words “Dreadnought of disease tonic” 
(Jones 2013: 82). The hoax s̓ impact profited immensely from the Dreadnought s̓ 
vast publicity and popularity and was thereby an inadvertent attack on the very 
identity of the United Kingdom.
In its historic context, surrounded by pre-war theatrics and the spectacle of 
the Brit ish navy, it is unsurprising that a cultural symbol such as the Dreadnought 
invited a theatrical hoax. This outdated and huge battleship with its representative 
function for the Empire as a whole might be read as a metaphor for Babbage s̓ no-
tion of certain archaic structures demanding to be broken up. Even though it was 
Unmasking the Fake 235
not intended as such (it is worth remembering that the Stephen siblings did not want 
the prank to be exposed), the hoax worked as a counter-performance. Its subversive-
ness lay on a formal level, in its ceremonious, theatrical interaction with the navy. 
Hoaxing the Navy, the pride of the Empire, clearly involuntarily attacked the core 
of the national British identity.
But the Navy as an institution proved far too popular and important to be seri-
ously damaged in the public opinion. The denial of the hoax s̓ subversiveness can 
be asserted as a result of exactly that. The fact that it has resurfaced in popular 
culture shows the undeniably powerful and satirical potential of hoaxes. Neither the 
group of pranksters nor the British public had an interest in damaging the Navy s̓ 
repu tation, and politicians, the press, and the military alike tried to downplay the 
incident. But still, the hoax left a mark on the Empire, albeit a miniscule one. To 
a certain extent, like contemporary artivist interventions, the Dreadnought Hoax 
provided an alternate vision by replacing the nationalistic and bombastic naval the-
atre with a silly comedy of errors.
In all these respects, the Dreadnought Hoax is a precursor of contemporary 
critical artistic interventions, although The Yes Men and the CPB apply hoaxing as 
a strategy and a means to strive for specific effects or even outcomes. Hoaxes allow 
the artivist to generate public attention and debate, articulate criticism, and point 
to alternative desirable utopian realities. These possible worlds are enacted and ex-
perienced for a short moment. This moment is the very instant the recipient falls for 
the hoax. Beyond mockery and exposure, the fleeting moment of deception holds a 
completely new political potential.
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